Aknin v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc.
Decision Date | 03 October 2017 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-22341-Civ-Scola |
Parties | Moshe Aknin, Plaintiff, v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. and Bright Star Credit Union, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Plaintiff Moshe Aknin brings this action against Defendants Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian") and Bright Star Credit Union ("Bright Star") for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006) ("FCRA"). This matter is before the Court on Defendant Bright Star's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12).
Aknin alleges that Defendant Experian issued credit reports that included inaccurate information about Aknin's credit history. (Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1.) On or about April 6, 2017, Aknin notified Experian that a particular account had been paid and should reflect a zero balance. (Id. ¶ 12.) Aknin alleges that upon receiving notice of the disputed account from Experian, Defendant Bright Star failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of the dispute, and continued to report false information about the account. (Id. ¶ 13.) In addition, Aknin alleges that Experian did not consider any of the information submitted by Aknin, and did not attempt to verify that the information concerning the disputed account was accurate. (Id. ¶ 14.) The Complaint asserts willful and negligent violations of the FCRA as to Experian, and willful and negligent violations of the FCRA as to Bright Star.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires "a short and plain statement of the claims" that "will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Supreme Court has held that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Thus, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally may not look beyond the pleadings, which includes any information attached to a complaint. U.S. ex. Rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 811 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
Bright Star has moved to dismiss the Complaint as a "shotgun" pleading because each count of the Complaint incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs of the Complaint. (Mot. to Dismiss at 2-4.) As a threshold matter, the Court notes that this argument is properly raised in a motion to require the plaintiff to file a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), not a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Anderson v. District Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Florida Community College, 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996).
All of the cases cited by Bright Star that dismissed "shotgun" pleadings involved complaints that were dozens of pages long and asserted several counts against several defendants. See, e.g., Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) ( ); Anderson, 77 F.3d at 365-66 ( ); Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, 180 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (Moreno, J.) ( ). None of these courts dismissed a pleading simply because it incorporated by reference each of the preceding paragraphs; rather, the pleadings were dismissed because it was impossible to determine which allegations pertained to each defendant and each counts. See, e.g., Magluta, 256 F.3d at 1284 ( ); Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997) ( ). The Eleventh Circuit has specifically noted that "[t]he unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests." Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).
By contrast, here the Complaint includes five paragraphs containing factual allegations, two Defendants, and two counts against each Defendant. Contrary to Anderson, it is clear which of the five general factual allegations pertain to each Defendant. Indeed, Bright Star was able to identify in its reply the sole factual allegation that pertains to it. (Reply at 2, ECF No. 15.) Although Aknin has incorporated by reference all paragraphs of the Complaint into each count, including paragraphs that obviously do not apply to each count, the potential for confusion that existed in the cases cited by Bright Star does not exist here.
In Bright Star's Reply, it argued for the first time that the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted and is so vague that Bright Star is unable to investigate the allegations, based on deficiencies other than the fact...
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