Akpeneye v. United States
| Decision Date | 15 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2020-1622 |
| Citation | 990 F.3d 1373 |
| Parties | Tejere J. AKPENEYE, Jonathan Allen, Sahr Alpha-K, Jacques V. Alston, Rodolfo Ancheta, Jr., Wayne A. Antoine, Carl Aslaken, Michael Baker, Rochelle Banks, James Bouyer, Jr., Maia Bradley, Gwendolyn Brown, Kevin L. Brown, Lori O. Brown, Tracy Brown, George Burns, Shawn R. Butterfield, Brad Byrnes, Ryan H. Case, Christy Cassady, Jeffrey Clute, David L. Cousins, Dexter Cumberbatch, William A. Cummings, Veronica Coutee, Charles DeLugo, Lenardo Eccles, Brandyn Fox, Clyde A. Franklin, Mary B. Green, Nicholas Guzan, Paul Guzan, Larry W. Hollmand, Peter L. Howell, Warren A. Hutton, Anthony W. Jackson, Jeffrey Johnson, George A. Jones, Michael D. Jones, Luke Kornacki, Michael J. Long, Omar F. Mann, Chrislina R. Marshall, Joseph A. McCray, Kennest Meador, Javier Montero, Bertrand Moore, William Nieves, Sr., Albert D. Noonan, Gregory Norman, Robert Olejnik, Lindsay M. Ortiz, Alan Pitts, Robert Robinson, Bernard Russell, Javier Santiago, Francis Sarpong, Francis Selph, Roosevelt Singleton, Franklin D. Taylor, Kevin Tindal, Sr., John H. Travis, Alex Trejo, Kenneth Turner, Anthony O. Washington, Twila Williams, Byron M. Wilson, Plaintiffs-Appellants Christopher M. Baldwin, Zanda Bell, et al., Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit |
Jonathan L. Gould, Law Office of Jonathan L. Gould, Roxbury, CT, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by Stephen Girard DeNigris, The DeNigris Law Firm PLLC, Albany, NY.
Rebecca Sarah Kruser, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by Jeffrey B. Clark, Steven John Gillingham, Robert Edward Kirschman, Jr. ; Lundi McCarthy Shafiei, Headquarters Services & Pentagon Force Protection Agency, United States Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
Before Lourie, Schall, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Tejere J. Akpeneye et al. are police officers employed by the Pentagon Force Protection Agency ("PFPA"). They appeal a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("Claims Court") entering summary judgment in favor of the United States and rejecting their claim for overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). We affirm.
The FLSA was enacted in 1938 to protect workers "from substandard wages and excessive hours which endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of goods in interstate commerce." Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil , 324 U.S. 697, 706, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945), superseded on other grounds by statute , Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84. To this end, the FLSA establishes a forty-hour workweek.1 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Employees are entitled to overtime compensation of at least "one and one-half times the regular rate" for any time worked in excess of forty hours. Id. By regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor, a "bona fide meal period," which must ordinarily be at least thirty minutes long, does not qualify as "worktime." 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). Employees are thus not entitled to overtime compensation for time spent on qualifying meal breaks.
Here, in each two-week pay period, PFPA officers were assigned to ten shifts that were 8.5 hours long (five each week), during which they received two 35-minute breaks.2 Under PFPA policy, Plaintiffs were compensated for their entire shift except for one 30-minute meal period.3 Plaintiffs thus received two breaks per shift—one for which they were compensated and one for which they were not. Plaintiffs argue that they did not receive a bona fide meal period during either break period because they were required to work during all break periods, thereby causing Plaintiffs to work in excess of forty hours per week and entitling them to overtime compensation.
Necessary to an understanding of the overtime claim is a description of the officers’ duties. PFPA officers were responsible for security and law enforcement at the Pentagon reservation. On a day-to-day basis, an officer could have been assigned to an interior post, an exterior post, or a patrol unit; officers could also have been assigned to work as "breakers," whose role was to assume the duties of a post while another officer went on break.
PFPA officers could spend their breaks nearly anywhere on the Pentagon reservation, which includes two break rooms closed to the public. The break rooms contain eating areas, microwaves, refrigerators, televisions, and computers.
PFPA officers were subject to various restrictions during their breaks. Officers were not allowed to leave the Pentagon reservation or remove their uniforms during break, or to act in a manner that would leave the public with a negative perception. Because the public would not necessarily know when an officer was on break, officers on break were not allowed to congregate in public—e.g., in a food court—or publicly engage in leisure activities such as having their shoes shined, watching videos online, or playing video games.
PFPA officers also had some duties while on break. They were required to remain vigilant and ready to respond to any emergencies that might arise—which occurred frequently at the Pentagon. If an officer was required to respond to an emergency or contingency during both break periods (and was thus unable to take a bona fide meal break), PFPA policy granted overtime pay for one break period. See, e.g. , J.A. 459 (). Plaintiffs agree that such overtime payments were consistently granted when requested.
Remaining vigilant also required officers to constantly monitor their radios to be informed of any contingencies or emergencies. In addition to responding to emergency radio calls, until recently, officers were also required to respond to hourly radio checks.4
On break, officers were also required to respond to questions from other employees or members of the public at the Pentagon reservation. These interactions varied in length from under a minute to approximately ten minutes and occurred frequently during officers’ breaks but could be avoided by going to a break room.
Besides their security duties and obligations to the public, PFPA officers often performed administrative duties during breaks. These administrative duties fell into three categories.
First, PFPA officers processed paperwork such as emails, personnel forms, time sheets, and incident reports. While not required to do so, officers often performed these duties while on break. Personnel forms took several minutes to read, sign, and discuss with a supervisor on a monthly or quarterly basis. Officers spent ten to fifteen minutes filling out time sheets every two weeks. Incident reports took between thirty and forty-five minutes to complete, and officers spent break time writing incident reports almost every day.
Second, PFPA officers were required to complete between eight and twenty mandatory training courses per year, which varied in length from twenty minutes to three hours. When a training course needed to be completed, officers were notified between seven days and almost a year in advance. Training courses could be completed during break time or while an officer was at a post with a computer, and at least some of the training courses were able to be paused and resumed at a different location. Officers reviewed or studied training materials multiple times a week, and sometimes nearly every day. Again, while not required, officers sometimes worked on training courses while on break.
Third, when stationed with a vehicle, officers were required to refuel their assigned vehicle, which typically took between 10 and 15 minutes once per shift. While not required, this refueling was often done during a break. Officers were prohibited from using their vehicles on break to make special trips to buy food, but they were allowed get food at a nearby location while refueling. Officers were also required to spend around five minutes per shift inspecting their vehicle for damage, a task they were not required to perform while on break, but generally did perform during breaks.
Plaintiffs filed suit under the FLSA, arguing that they did not receive a bona fide meal break and are therefore entitled to thirty minutes of overtime compensation per shift. The parties agreed to initially litigate the claim of twenty sample plaintiffs. After discovery, Plaintiffs and the government filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Claims Court entered summary judgment in favor of the government. Plaintiffs conceded that they had no further evidence to present with respect to the non-sample plaintiffs that could change the disposition of their claims. The Claims Court then entered judgment in favor of the government, and Plaintiffs appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).5
We review a grant of summary judgment by the Claims Court de novo. Athey v. United States , 908 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing FastShip, LLC v. United States , 892 F.3d 1298, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
This appeal requires us to first determine whether the Claims Court applied the correct legal standard to Plaintiffs’ meal break claim under the FLSA.
In cases involving meal break claims, the central issue is whether employees are required to "work" within the meaning of the FLSA. E.g. , Reich v. S. New. Eng. Telecomms. Corp. , 121 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Henson v. Pulaski Cnty. Sheriff Dep't , 6 F.3d 531, 533–34 (8th Cir. 1993) ). While the FLSA does not define "work," the Supreme Court has held that...
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