Alabama Dep't of Corr. v. Merritt (Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Corr.)

• Decision Date: 13 May 2011
• Docket Number: 1100129.
• Citation: 74 So.3d 25
• Parties: Ex parte ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al.(In re Alabama Department of Corrections et al. v. Jerry Mack Merritt et al.).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

74 So.3d 25

Ex parte ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al.(In re Alabama Department of Corrections et al.

v.Jerry Mack Merritt et al.).

1100129.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 13, 2011.

Troy King, atty. gen., and James W. Davis, asst. atty. gen., and Albert S. Butler, asst. gen. counsel, Alabama Department of Corrections, for petitioners.

Henry L. Penick of H.L. Penick & Associates, P.C., Birmingham, for respondents.

BOLIN, Justice.

The Alabama Department of Corrections (“the department”), then Governor Bob Riley,¹ and various officials of the department (all hereinafter referred to collectively as “DOC”), petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's judgment interpreting § 14–8–6, Ala.Code 1975, which allows the department to withhold a percentage of an inmate's work-release earnings for costs incident to the inmate's confinement.² Alabama Dep't of Corr. v. Merritt, 74 So.3d 1 (Ala.Civ.App.2010). We granted certiorari review. We also asked the parties to address whether, in light of our opinion in Hutchinson v. State, 66 So.3d 220 (Ala.2010), the Court of Civil Appeals had subject-matter jurisdiction. However, because we hold that the judgment appealed from was not one that could be made final by the Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., certification, we do not address the issue whether the Court of Civil Appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals is the appropriate appellate court to review this appeal.

The Court of Civil Appeals set out the facts as follows:

“[DOC] appeal[ed] from the trial court's judgment determining that the [department] violated [its] regulations by overcharging work-release inmates for transportation costs and by misinterpreting State law by withholding more money from the gross pay of inmates' work-release earnings than it was authorized to do under State law. Jerry Mack Merritt, Thomas Layton, Johnny Walker, Warren R. Robinson, and Darrell Williams (hereinafter referred to collectively as ‘the plaintiffs'), inmates or former inmates in the custody of the department who participated in a work-release program, cross-appeal from the trial court's judgment determining that [the department] was authorized to charge work-release inmates for certain goods or services and to charge all inmates a fee for self-initiated medical care and a fee for drug testing conducted by entities other than the department.

“... The department is authorized to operate a work-release program for inmates. Pursuant to that program, inmates are permitted ‘to leave the confines [of their places of incarceration] unaccompanied by a custodial agent for a prescribed period of time to work at paid employment.’ § 14–8–2(a), Ala.Code 1975. Work-release inmates are confined in their respective prisons during the hours they are not at work. § 14–8–2(a). Inmates who are qualified to take part in the program have the option of whether to participate.

“Since 1992, § 14–8–6, Ala.Code 1975, has authorized the department to withhold up to 40% of an inmate's work-release earnings for costs ‘incident to the inmate's confinement.’ Before 1992, § 14–8–6 provided that the maximum amount of earnings the department was allowed to withhold from an inmate's work-release earnings was 32.5% of those earnings. The record includes a copy of Admin. Reg. No. 410, promulgated by the department, which, in § VII.B., provides that, ‘[a]s authorized by statute, thirty-two and one-half percent (32 1/2%) of work releasees' gross earnings will be deducted by the Department of Corrections to assist in defraying the cost of his/her incarceration.’ (Emphasis in original.) Richard Allen, the [then] commissioner of the department, testified by deposition that, after § 14–8–6 was amended to allow the department to withhold up to 40% of an inmate's work-release earnings, the department's policy was to withhold up to 40%, rather than up to 32.5%, of an inmate's work-release earnings even though Admin. Reg. No. 410, § VII.B., had not been formally amended. However, that unwritten policy has been ratified by the commissioner. The copy of Admin. Reg. No. 410 submitted into evidence is dated 1997, and it includes a handwritten notation at § VII.B. stating: ‘Changed to 40%, see 14–8–6.’ ⁴ The balance of a work-release inmate's earnings is deposited into his prison account.

“Administrative Regulation No. 410 also authorizes the department to charge inmates participating in the work-release program for the cost of transportation to and from their places of employment.⁵ Pursuant to Admin. Reg. No. 410, § VII.B., inmates using transportation provided by the department to and from their work-release jobs may be assessed $2 for a one-way trip and $4 for a round trip. At the time of trial, however, inmates were being charged transportation costs of $2.50 for a one-way trip and $5 for a round trip.

“The department also charges work-release inmates a laundry fee for cleaning the ‘free-world’ clothes they wear to their work-release jobs. There is no charge for laundry services for prison-issued clothing. One of the plaintiffs, Merritt, complained of having to pay $16 a month for laundry services while he was at the Loxley and Mobile work-release centers. He also complained about having to use a coin-operated laundry while at the Mobile work-release center after September 2005, because, he said, ‘minimum custody laundry was free.’

“Merritt and Walker also testified that they had to purchase their own toiletries while participating in the work-release program. Those purchases must be made in addition to the money the department withholds from work-release inmates' earnings to defray the costs of the inmates' confinement. The plaintiffs testified that, when they were incarcerated in prisons, as opposed to work-release centers, toiletries were provided to them at no charge.

“The department has promulgated a number of other regulations authorizing certain charges at issue in this case. Pursuant to Admin. Reg. No. 601, the department is authorized to charge an inmate a $3 co-pay for ‘self-initiated’ medical visits. If the visit is initiated by medical staff, a physician referral, the warden, or another prison official, the inmate is not charged the co-pay. The regulation also specifies that under no circumstances would an inmate be denied access to health care because of an inability to pay the co-pay. Allen said that the purpose of the co-pay is to discourage malingering among inmates.

“Pursuant to Admin. Reg. No. 440, § V.F.3., the department is authorized to charge an inmate the cost of a urine drug test performed by an independent laboratory to confirm a positive test for illegal drugs. At the time of trial, that cost was $31.50. If the results of the independent test were negative for illegal substances, the inmate was not charged the fee. Admin. Reg. No. 440, § V.E.5.

“After a hearing, the trial court entered a judgment approving the practice of charging work-release inmates the co-pay for ‘self-initiated’ medical care, approving the drug-testing fee charged to inmates when a drug test is administered to confirm the results of a previous drug test indicating that the inmate has tested positive for use of an illegal substance, and approving the laundry fee.

“On the other hand, the trial court found that the department had failed to amend its regulations, as required by the regulations themselves, and that the department's ‘informal’ amendment of the regulations was invalid. Therefore, the trial court held, the department did not have the authority to withhold more than 32.5% of a work-release inmate's earnings to defray the costs of incarceration or to increase the charges an inmate pays for transportation costs from $2 to $2.50 for one-way trips and from $4 to $5 for round trips to the inmate's place of employment. The trial court enjoined the department from withholding 40% of an inmate's work-release earnings or from charging inmates more for transportation than the amount stipulated in Admin. Reg. No. 410, § VII.B. However, the trial court stayed its injunction for 180 days to allow the department to formally amended its regulations to bring them in line with current practices.

“Because the trial court found that, under the terms of the department's current regulations, the department was allowed to withhold only 32.5% of an inmate's work-release earnings, the issue whether [the department], by charging fees for certain goods and services in addition to withholding funds from an inmate's work-release earnings, was exceeding the 40% cap under § 14–8–6 was moot. However, the court went on to ‘hold’ that, in amending § 14–8–6, the Legislature intended ‘to place an absolute cap on the monies [the department] could take from inmates: “ In no event shall the withheld earnings exceed 40% of the earnings of the inmates.” (emphasis added).’ The trial court stated: ‘Once the 40 percent threshold is reached, [the department] is prohibited by statute from taking any more money, whether it is for costs of confinement, costs of work release, or any other fee or expense.’

“The trial court further held that § 14–8–6 authorized the department to withhold a percentage of a work-release inmate's earnings ‘actually deposited in the institution by the employer’ and not a percentage of an inmate's gross income. Therefore, the trial court held, the department had misinterpreted the statute when it promulgated Admin. Reg. No. 410, § VII.B., which allows the department to withhold 32.5% of a work-release inmate's gross earnings.

“The trial court noted that the parties had agreed to resolve liability issues before presenting evidence on damages or class certification. Because the amount of damages relating to the issues of transportation costs and income withholding had yet to be determined, the trial court certified its judgment on the issue of liability as final pursuant to...