Alabama Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 14 February 2003
• Citation: 855 So.2d 1016
• Parties: ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al. v. Helen THOMPSON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

855 So.2d 1016

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al. v. Helen THOMPSON.

1001191.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 14, 2003.

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Ellen Leonard and Alyce S. Robertson, asst. attys. gen., for appellants.

Mark Kennedy, Patrick Patronas, and Misha Mullins of Gathings Law, Montgomery, for appellee.

JOHNSTONE, Justice.

The appellants are the defendants Alabama Department of Corrections; Edwin Henry, the warden of the Frank Lee Youth Center; and Deborah Haynes and Christopher Thomas, correctional officers at the Frank Lee Youth Center. Pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., we granted permission for these defendants to appeal the interlocutory order of the trial court denying their motion for summary judgment. Their motion for summary judgment was grounded on their claims of absolute and state-agent immunity and their denial of any duty to the plaintiff to protect her from the criminal acts of a third person.¹ We hold that the trial court erred in denying the defendants' summary judgment motion. We reverse and remand with instructions.

Helen Thompson sued the Alabama Department of Corrections for its negligence in causing or allowing the escape of inmate Jessie Bennett from the J.F. Ingram Technical College (the "College") at the Frank Lee Youth Center. Thompson alleged that, after Bennett escaped, he broke into her home, assaulted her, rendered her unconscious, and stole her automobile. She demanded compensatory and punitive damages.

Thereafter, Thompson amended her complaint to add Warden Henry and correctional officers Haynes and Thomas as defendants. Thompson alleged that Henry, Haynes, and Thomas negligently or wantonly "allowed Jessie Bennett to escape from confinement at [the] College." She alleged also that Henry and Haynes negligently or wantonly selected Bennett "to receive training at [the] College." Thompson further alleged that Henry, Haynes, and Thomas negligently or recklessly failed "to properly train and/or supervise the Department of Corrections employees assigned to guard and detain state prisoners at [the] College."

In answering the amended complaint, the Department of Corrections, Henry, Haynes, and Thomas asserted various affirmative defenses including state-agent immunity and absolute immunity. They asserted also that they "owed no special duty to [Thompson] or maintain[ed] [no] special relationship to her."

These defendants then moved for summary judgment on the grounds of absolute immunity, state-agent immunity, and absence of any duty to Thompson to protect her from the criminal acts of Bennett. They asserted also that Thompson failed to "allege sufficient facts to establish proximate cause between any act of the Defendants and any resulting injury or damage[] to [Thompson]." They submitted affidavits and documents in support of their summary judgment motion. Warden Henry's affidavit stated:

"Correctional Officer I's and Sergeants have no involvement with the classification procedure for inmates. Inmate Bennett was assigned to Draper Correctional Facility and classified by officials at Draper Correctional Facility. Inmate Bennett was assigned by officials at Draper Correctional Facility to take classes at J.F. Ingram. The classification officials at Frank Lee Youth Center had no involvement with Inmate Bennett's classification."

In their respective affidavits, Warden Henry and correctional officers Haynes and Thomas all stated that "I do not know Helen Thompson and had no prior knowledge that Inmate Bennett might harm her." Thompson opposed the summary judgment motion and submitted documents and depositions excerpts in support of her opposition.

The trial court denied the summary judgment motion and certified the case as appropriate for a permissive appeal. The Department of Corrections, Henry, Haynes, and Thomas petitioned this Court for permission to appeal the denial of their summary judgment motion, and we granted that petition.

On June 3, 1983, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections adopted Administrative Regulation no. 305:

"Wardens and Directors where vocational schools are located will

"....

"C. Notify the education facility Director that no vehicle other than the vehicle being repaired or the maintenance vehicle will be allowed inside the area.

D. Instruct each correctional officer assigned to education areas that his duties will be as follows:

"....

"(5) No vehicles will be permitted entry in these areas other than the vehicles being repaired or maintenance vehicles."

Although Warden Henry knew Administrative Regulation no. 305 before he became the warden of the Frank Lee Youth Center, he continued the previous warden's unwritten standard operating procedures. These required:

1. That any patron of the College register at the gate;

2. That a correctional officer search the patron's vehicle before it entered the College grounds;

3. That a correctional officer escort the patron and vehicle to the various shops for items to be loaded onto the vehicle;

4. That a correctional officer search the vehicle again at the gate before the vehicle left the grounds;

5. That all containers on the vehicle be visually searched, inside and outside;

6. And that all items and containers on the vehicle be repositioned or unloaded if necessary to allow access for a thorough search.

Although correctional officers Haynes and Thomas both knew Administrative Regulation no. 305 and the unwritten standard operating procedures, they purported to follow only the unwritten standard operating procedures.

Bennett, an inmate at Draper Correctional Facility, attended the College. In order to escape while at the College, Bennett hid inside one of several cabinets built for a patron. Another inmate assisted Bennett in escaping by loading the cabinets, with Bennett inside one, into the back of the patron's truck in such a manner that the cabinets could not be fully opened and searched without being removed from the truck.

At the gate, correctional officer Thomas climbed into the back of the patron's truck, stepped between the cabinets, and searched the cabinets by opening each cabinet partially, putting his arms inside each cabinet, and feeling inside the cabinet. He did not reposition or unload the cabinets to allow a thorough visual search, and he did not feel Bennett inside the cabinets. Thomas also searched the interior of the patron's truck. Correctional officer Haynes supervised Thomas's search of the truck and cabinets.

Shortly after the truck left the College grounds, the patron telephoned the College to report that a black inmate had jumped from the back of the patron's truck in a certain area of Montgomery. The patron reported that he had notified the Montgomery Police Department, officers of which were in pursuit of the inmate, Bennett. At some point during his escape, Bennett broke into Thompson's house, assaulted Thompson, rendered her unconscious, and stole her automobile. Bennett was captured approximately one hour and twenty minutes after the patron reported that Bennett had jumped from the truck.

"Summary judgment is appropriate only when `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So.2d 402 (Ala.1996). A court considering a motion for summary judgment will view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So.2d 397 (Ala.1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 591 So.2d 486 (Ala.1991); will accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence, Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley Steel Constr., Inc., 603 So.2d 981 (Ala.1992); and will resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex parte Brislin,

719 So.2d 185 (Ala. 1998).

"An appellate court reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment will, de novo, apply these same standards applicable in the trial court. Fuqua, supra, Brislin, supra. Likewise, the appellate court will consider only that factual material available of record to the trial court for its consideration in deciding the motion. Dynasty Corp. v. Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So.2d 1278 (Ala.1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank, 599 So.2d 595 (Ala.1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So.2d 35 (Ala.1992)."

Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912-13 (Ala. 2000).

We first address the issue of immunity of the Department of Corrections. Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, provides that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." "[A] Department, as an agency of the State, is immune from the tort liability...." Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Forensic Sciences, 709 So.2d 455, 457 (Ala.1997). Thus, the trial court erred in denying a summary judgment to the Department of Corrections.

We next address the issue of state-agent immunity for the defendants Henry, Haynes, and Thomas. "Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), recounts the evolution of State-agent immunity...," Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d at 913, and restates the law on that topic:

"We therefore restate the rule governing State-agent immunity:

"A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's

"(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or

"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as:

"(a) making administrative adjudications;

"(b) allocating resources;

"(c) negotiating contracts;

"(d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or

"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in

...