Fleming v. Dowdell

Citation434 F.Supp.2d 1138
Decision Date29 March 2005
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 2:03cv1246-D.
PartiesHerbert FLEMING, Plaintiff, v. Eddie DOWDELL, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Robert F. Lewis, Robert F. Lewis PC, Birmingham, AL, Jon E. Lewis, G. Griffin Sikes, Jr., Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Greg Griffin, Chief Counsel, Hugh Davis, Principal Litigation Counsel, Steve Simmons, Litigation Counsel, State of Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, Montgomery, AL, for Eddie Dowdell.

Alyce S. Robertson, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

IRA DeMENT, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 57) filed by Defendants Eddie Dowdell, Johnnie Johnson, Donald Parker, Gladys Riddle and Martha White. Accompanying said motion are a memorandum brief and an evidentiary submission. (Doc. Nos.58-59.) Plaintiff Herbert Fleming filed a brief in opposition and an evidentiary submission. (Doc. Nos.68-69.)

Also before the court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 52) filed by Defendant Beth Poe. Poe filed a brief in support of her motion and an evidentiary submission. (Doc. Nos.53-54.) A response, reply and surreply followed. (Doc. Nos.63, 66, 67.)

Fleming commenced this lawsuit, seeking money damages for deprivations of rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law when he was continued on parole and, ultimately, incarcerated on parole violations, despite the fact that Fleming's writ of habeas corpus had been granted, and his underlying judgment of conviction vacated, by a federal court. Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White are employees of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles who played a role in Fleming's parole supervision and parole violation proceedings, and Poe is the assistant state attorney general who opposed Fleming's writ of habeas corpus. There is no dispute that Fleming suffered a substantial deprivation of liberty in this case, as he remained under parole supervision and was incarcerated on parole violations for approximately five years longer than he was legally required. There also is no dispute that neither Fleming, Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle nor White was aware of the federal court's order.

Although what happened to Fleming is grievous, having carefully considered the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds the above Defendants cannot be held liable for the liberty deprivations under either § 1983 or state law. The court, therefore, finds that the motions for summary judgment are due to be granted.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for all claims arising under federal law. The court also has original jurisdiction over claims based upon violations of civil rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court considering a motion for summary judgment must construe the evidence and make factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment is entered only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). At this juncture, the court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but solely "determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). This determination involves applying substantive law to the substantive facts that have been developed. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, based on the applicable law in relation to the evidence developed. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party who "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment will not be entered unless the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

IV. BACKGROUND

In January 1991, Plaintiff Herbert Fleming was convicted upon a plea of guilty and sentenced in the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama, on a reduced charge for receiving stolen property. (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 7 (Doc. No. 23).) Because Fleming was a habitual offender, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and was committed to the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections. (Id.)

While confined in a state penitentiary, Fleming filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (Id. ¶ 8.) He named as respondents "Warden Thomas" and the Attorney General of the State of Alabama and sought relief from the 1991 judgment and sentence of the Circuit Court of Etowah County. Defendant Beth Poe, an assistant attorney general, represented the respondents in the habeas corpus proceedings.1 (Pl. Habeas Corpus Pet. (Doc. No. 65, Ex. 1); Resp'ts Answer to Pl. Habeas Corpus Pet. (Doc. No. 65, Ex. 2).)

On January 26, 1998, during the pendency of his habeas corpus proceedings, Fleming was released to parole supervision, subject to certain conditions and restrictions. (Certificate of Parole (Doc. No. 54, Ex. 4).) Defendant Eddie Dowdell, a parole officer employed by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("BOPP"), supervised Fleming while he was on parole. (2nd Am.Compl. ¶¶ 2, 11.) The restrictions of Fleming's parole included, in part, a requirement that Fleming "periodically meet with or otherwise report to" Dowdell. (Id.)

On May 5, 1998, while Fleming was serving his term of parole, the late Honorable Edwin L. Nelson, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge and entered a final judgment granting Fleming's habeas corpus petition. (Id. ¶ 13; Final Judgment (Doc. No. 59, Ex. 4).)2 As grounds, the district court found that, because the offense to which Fleming pleaded guilty was not a lesser included offense of the original charge in the indictment, Fleming's judgment of conviction was obtained without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. (Doc. No. 54, Ex. 5.) In the final judgment, the district court "ordered that any retrial of petitioner must commence within 120 days" of the date of entry of the final judgment. (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 13; Final Judgment (Doc. No. 59, Ex. 4).)

The district court's final judgment also contained a footnote indicating that a copy of the magistrate judge's recommendation had been served on Fleming, but had been returned to the clerk of the court, marked "return to sender."3 (Final Judgment (Doc. No. 59, Ex. 4).) In the same footnote, the district court stated that it independently had attempted to ascertain Fleming's current mailing address through the Central Records Division of the Alabama Department of Corrections. (Id.) As further noted, the Central Records Division advised that Fleming had been paroled and that the only address in its records for Fleming was 1200 Kentucky Avenue, Gadsden, Alabama. The district court, thus, directed the clerk of the court to mail the final judgment, vacating Fleming's conviction, to the Gadsden address.4 (Id.) The court records also reflect that copies of the May 5, 1998 final judgment were mailed to Poe and the Attorney General of the State of Alabama. (Id.)

Upon receipt of the magistrate judge's recommendation, Poe discussed the case with her supervisor, after which Poe conducted research to determine whether to file an objection to the recommendation and, ultimately, whether to appeal any unfavorable judgment. (Poe Dep. at 31-34 (Doc. No. 65).) Poe also engaged in several communications, by telephone and letter, with the district attorney who prosecuted Fleming on the underlying criminal charges and provided him (the district attorney) a copy of the magistrate judge's recommendation. (Id. at 41-42; Letters (Doc. No. 54, Exs.6, 8).) Poe advised the district attorney that, based on her research, she believed that the magistrate judge's findings were correct and that, therefore, unless the district attorney proffered a reasonable argument, she would not file an objection to the recommendation. (Letter (Doc. No. 54, Ex. 6).) The district attorney advised Poe that the State of Alabama intended to retry Fleming on the original charges. (Poe Dep. at 42.) Poe, at that point, had no further involvement in Fleming's case. (Id. at 51-53.)

Ultimately, for reasons not in the record, the State of Alabama did not retry Fleming. (2nd Am.Compl. ¶ 15.) At the latest then, after the expiration of the 120-day time frame for retrial, Fleming was released from all attendants of his state court judgment of conviction based on the district court's final judgment granting habeas relief to Fleming.

On January 12, 2000, some two years and eight months after the district court in the Northern District of Alabama entered its final judgment in Fleming's habeas corpus lawsuit, Dowdell arrested Fleming for parole...

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