Alabama Educ. Ass'n v. State Superintendent of Educ.
| Citation | 161 Lab.Cas. P 61218,23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 661,665 F.3d 1234,192 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2353 |
| Decision Date | 23 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | 11–11267 and 11–12609.,Nos. 11–11266,s. 11–11266 |
| Parties | ALABAMA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, an Alabama non-profit corporation, A–VOTE, an Alabama political committee, Pam Hill, Jeff Breece, Chassity Smith, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, State of Alabama, Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, State of Alabama, Attorney for Lee County, State of Alabama, Defendants–Appellants.Alabama Education Association, an Alabama non-profit corporation, A–VOTE, an Alabama political committee, Pam Hill, Jeff Breece, Chassity Smith, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Governor of Alabama and President of the State School Board, Director of Finance, State of Alabama, Comptroller, State of Alabama, Defendants–Appellants.International Association of Firefighters, an unincorporated labor organization, FIREPAC, a political action committee, American Federation of Teachers Local 2115, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Superintendent of Education, in his capacity as the Superintendent of Education of the State of Alabama, State of Alabama, Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, in her capacity as Chancellor of Postsecondary Education of the State of Alabama, et al., Defendants–Appellants. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Samuel Heldman, J. Cecil Gardner, The Gardner Firm, PC, Mobile, AL, Annary Cheatham, Cheatham & Associates, PLLC, Herman Watson, Jr., Watson, McKinney & Artrip, LLP, Huntsville, AL, Philip A. Hostak, Alice O'Brien, Nat. Educ. Ass'n, Washington, DC, Robert D. Segall, Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, PA, Montgomery, AL, Edward Still, Edward Still Law Firm, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs–Appellees Alabama Educ. Ass'n, A–VOTE, Pam Hill, Jeff Breece, Chassity Smith, et al.
Douglas L. Steele, Thomas A. Woodley, Megan K. Mechak, Woodley & McGillivary, Washington, DC, Leslie Jeanne Horton, Robert Moore Weaver, Quinn, Connor, Weaver, Davies & Rouco, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs–Appellees Intern. Ass'n of Firefighters, FIREPAC, American Fed. of Teachers Local 2115, et al.
James W. Davis, Margaret L. Fleming, William Glenn Parker, Jr., John Cowles Neiman, Jr., Montgomery, AL, for Defendants–Appellants.Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (Nos. 5:11-cv-00761-CLS and 5:11-cv-01054-CLS); C. Lynwood Smith, Jr., Judge.Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, COX, Circuit Judge, and HUNT,* District Judge.
Prior report: N.D.Ala., 788 F.Supp.2d 1283.
This appeal comes to us following the district court's entry of a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of Alabama Act No. 2010–761 (the “Act”). This Act would prohibit a state or local government employee from arranging “by payroll deduction or otherwise” the payment of any contribution to an organization that uses any portion of those contributions for “political activity.” The district court found that the statute impinges on important free speech rights protected by the First Amendment and that the Appellees—the Alabama Education Association (“AEA”) and other organizations—are likely to succeed in showing the Act is both overbroad in its restrictions and unduly vague as to what constitutes political activity. We conclude that the constitutional question before us turns upon a question of state law. Rather than speculating as to the meaning of a state statute, we believe it is more in keeping with the principles of federalism to offer the Alabama Supreme Court an opportunity to explicate the Act.
Alabama Code §§ 36–1–4.3 and 36–1–4.4 authorize public employees to request that the Alabama State Comptroller arrange for the payment of membership dues for employee organizations by payroll deduction. There is tension between this statute and Alabama Code § 17–17–5 which prohibits public employees from using government resources for any “political activities.” An employee found in violation of § 17–17–5 is subject to prosecution for the crime of trading in public office, a Class A misdemeanor. In 2010, the Comptroller's Office reevaluated its interpretation of § 17–17–5 and changed its policy regarding salary deductions, thereafter declining to honor requests for deductions that benefited organizations involved in political activities, including AEA and its PAC, A–VOTE. Lawsuits followed and are still pending in the state courts.
After this policy change, in December 2010, Governor Riley called a special session of the legislature aimed at enacting ethics reform legislation. That special session amended § 17–17–5 to codify the position of the Comptroller's Office, forbidding state and local government employees from arranging “by salary deduction or otherwise for any payments to a political action committee or ... for any payments for the dues of any person so employed to a membership organization which uses any portion of the dues for political activity.” Ala.Code § 17–17–5(b)(1). The legislation limits political activity to the following seven categories:
a. Making contributions to or contracting with any entity which engages in any form of political communication, including communications which mention the name of a political candidate.
b. Engaging in or paying for public opinion polling.
c. Engaging in or paying for any form of political communication, including communications which mention the name of a political candidate.
d. Engaging in or paying for any type of political advertising in any medium.
e. Phone calling for any political purpose.
f. Distributing political literature of any type.
g. Providing any type of in-kind help or support to or for a political candidate.
Id. The Act further requires that any organization seeking “to arrange by salary deduction or otherwise ... shall certify to the appropriate governmental entity that none of the membership dues will be used for political activity.” Ala.Code § 17–17–5(b)(2).
AEA collects a large percentage of its dues through salary deduction. AEA argues that these deductions are particularly important for its members who do not have checking accounts. In February 2011, AEA filed a complaint claiming that the Act unconstitutionally infringes on the First Amendment rights of AEA and its members. Two weeks after filing its complaint, AEA moved for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Act on the grounds that it was likely to show that the Act was both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The district court agreed. In its opinion, the court reasoned that the “or otherwise” language of the statute reached beyond salary deductions to the personal political contributions of government employees. The district court also found that the term “political activity” was unduly vague.
We review a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir.2008). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, “understanding that application of an improper legal standard ... is never within a district court's discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
There is no question that a properly conceived ban on salary deductions to organizations engaged in political activity would be constitutional. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 355, 129 S.Ct. 1093, 1096, 172 L.Ed.2d 770 (2009) (). In Ysursa, public employee unions challenged an Idaho state law ban on political payroll deductions as a violation of the First Amendment. The Court began by reiterating that the First Amendment Id. at 358, 129 S.Ct. at 1098; Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2003, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (). The Court accepted that the unions challenging Idaho's law faced substantial difficulties in collecting funds for their political speech without the assistance of the state through salary deductions. However, this fact posed no difficulty for the Court, which concluded,
While publicly administered payroll deductions for political purposes can enhance the unions' exercise of First Amendment rights, Idaho is under no obligation to aid the unions in their political activities. And the State's decision not to do so is not an abridgment of the unions' speech; they are free to engage in such speech as they see fit. They simply are barred from enlisting the State in support of that endeavor.
Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 359, 129 S.Ct. at 1098. The Court then held, “Idaho's decision to limit public employer payroll deductions as it has is not subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Instead, “[g]iven that the State has not infringed the unions' First Amendment rights, the State need only demonstrate a rational basis to justify the ban on political payroll deductions.” Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the payroll deduction ban met the rational basis test....
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