Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Hill
| Decision Date | 14 January 1912 |
| Citation | 76 S.E. 1001,139 Ga. 224 |
| Parties | ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R. CO. v. HILL. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Under the statutes of Alabama, the probate court of the county of a decedent's last residence has jurisdiction to grant letters of administration, without notice or citation, to certain classes of persons in a stated order of priority; the husband or widow being given the first preference. If neither husband nor widow, next of kin, or largest creditor residing in the state applies for letters of administration within 40 days from the death of the decedent, the judge of probate may appoint some other person its administrator. The jurisdiction of the court of probate to grant letters of administration by virtue of these statutes, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Alabama, depends, not on the selection of the person to be clothed with the trust, but on the authority of the particular court to appoint a personal representative on the estate; and the grant of administration within 40 days after the death of the intestate to a person who has not a preferred right is premature, but it will not be revoked on that account at the instance of a person who had a prior right, but who does not make his application until after the expiration of 40 days. It follows, therefore, that the grant of administration by the court of probate of the county of the last residence of an intestate to a person not included within the preferred classes, within 40 days of the death of the intestate, is not void, even though the administration of the estate is granted to such person upon the relinquishment of the right of one who represented herself to be the widow of the decedent, but who in fact was not his widow.
The statutes of Alabama pertaining to the grant of administration upon the estate of deceased persons, without notice or citation to heirs and creditors, contain reasonable provision for the distribution of such estates, and do not offend the due process clause of the federal Constitution.
A judgment of a court of probate of the state of Alabama granting letters of administration, rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and apparently legal on its face, when offered as evidence in a cause pending in this state, cannot be collaterally impeached for fraud.
The plea of res adjudicata was sustained, and the verdict is contrary to law.
Error from Superior Court, Dade County; A. W. Fite, Judge.
Action by Charlie Hill, temporary administratrix of George Hill against the Alabama Great Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Foust & Payne, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for plaintiff in error.
Neel & Neel, of Cartersville, for defendant in error.
This is a suit by Charlie Hill, temporary administratrix of George Hill, against the Alabama Great Southern Railway Company to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of her intestate. She alleged that she had been duly appointed administratrix by the court of ordinary of Whitfield county Ga.; and in aid of her right to recover she set forth the employer's liability act of Alabama and the federal employer's liability act. The injury was alleged to have occurred in the state or Alabama. The railroad company denied liability, and also pleaded that the matter of controversy was res adjudicata. It averred that George Hill was a resident of Jefferson county, Ala., at the time of his death and that J. Wiley Logan was appointed and qualified as administrator of his estate pursuant to the judgment of the probate court of Jefferson county, Ala., which court bad jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and that afterwards Logan, as administrator of George Hill, instituted suit against it in the city court of Birmingham, Jefferson county, Ala., a court of competent jurisdiction to entertain such suit, to recover damages on account of the death of George Hill, which suit eventuated in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $550, which judgment had been satisfied by payment to the administrator. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. A motion for new trial was overruled. The principal defense of the railroad company was that of former recovery. It introduced in evidence the transcripts of the judgments referred to in its answer, and copies of certain sections of the Code of Alabama pertaining to the administration of estates. The plaintiff assailed these judgments as void, on the ground that they were procured by the fraud and collusion of the administrator and the railroad company; and on the further grounds that the appointment of Logan as administrator was void, because made on his ex parte application on the same day of its filing, without the consent of the widow, and without notice to her, or any of the heirs at law of the decedent, by publication or otherwise; and that the plaintiff, being the widow, was entitled, under the law of Alabama, to the administration of her deceased husband's estate.
1. We will first notice the point that the judgment of the court of probate granting administration to Logan was void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. It appeared in evidence that the decedent was a resident of Jefferson county, Ala., at the time of his death, and that he was killed by the railroad company in the state of Alabama on September 30, 1906. Sixteen days thereafter, to wit, October 15, 1906, J. Wylie Logan made application to the probate court of Jefferson county, Ala., for appointment as administrator on his estate, alleging, among other things, that the decedent left a widow, one Fannie Hill, who indorsed upon the application a renunciation and relinquishment of her right to act as administratrix of the estate of George Hill, and a consent that applicant should act as administrator. On the same day an order was passed appointing Logan as administrator, who gave bond, and to whom letters of administration were issued. In point of fact Fannie Hill, who gave the relinquishment to Logan, was not the widow of George Hill, but Charlie Hill, the plaintiff in the present suit, is his widow.
It is the law of Alabama: That courts of probate, within their respective counties, shall have authority to grant letters of administration on the estates of persons dying intestate where the intestate at the time of his death was an inhabitant of the county. That if neither of the three preferred classes just mentioned applies for administration in 40 days after the death of the intestate is known the person entitled to the administration of the estate will be held to have relinquished his right to the administration. That "any person entitled to administration may relinquish his right thereto in the same manner as executors are authorized to renounce their appointment." That "no letters of administration must be granted until the expiration of fifteen days after the death of the intestate is known." That letters of administration are conclusive evidence of the authority of the person to whom the same are granted from the date thereof until the same is revoked, and extend to all the property of the deceased, in the state. Code of Alabama, vol. 2, §§ 2519 to 2530, inclusive. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in construing these statutes, has held that a grant of administration within 40 days after the death of the intestate to a person who has not a...
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