Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Hunnicutt

• Citation: 53 So. 617,98 Miss. 272
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Decision Date: 12 December 1910
• Parties: ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. ZACHARIAH HUNNICUTT

53 So. 617

98 Miss. 272

ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. ZACHARIAH HUNNICUTT

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 12, 1910

October 1910

FROM the circuit court of Lauderdale county, HON. JOHN L. BUCKLEY Judge.

Hunnicutt appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $ 3, 500, the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The opinion of the court states the facts.

Judgment reversed and remanded.

Catchings & Catchings, for appellant.

In Hicks v. Mobile, etc. R. R. Co., 91 Miss. 362, U.S L.Ed., it is said by this court that this section must be interpreted precisely as if it had been written thus: "Proof of injury inflicted by the running of locomotives or cars of such company shall be prima facie evidence of liability on the part of the company." The section referred to is Code 1906, § 1985. We shall not comment upon the broad difference between the statute as written and the interpretation which has thus been placed upon it by this supreme court, inasmuch as, for the purpose of our argument, it is immaterial whether the statute is to be construed as written or is to be interpreted as this court said it should be. In either event proof of injury inflicted by the running of locomotives or cars of a railroad company is made prima facie evidence of liability.

In the case of New Orleans, etc. R. R. Co. v. Brooks, 85 Miss. 275, in construing this statute this court said: "There is yet another principle of law, well settled in this state, which required the submission of the case to the jury. It was shown beyond peradventure that the injury was inflicted by the running of the train. This was prima facie proof of negligence, authorizing a recovery by plaintiff. To overcome this statutory presumption, it devolved upon the appellant to exculpate itself by establishing to the satisfaction of the jury such circumstances of excuse as would relieve it from liability. But this statutory presumption cannot be overthrown by conjecture. The circumstances of accident must be clearly shown, and the facts so proven must exonerate the company from blame. If the facts be not proven and the attendant circumstances of the accident remain doubtful, the company is not relieved from liability, and the presumption controls." Practically the same view was set forth in the case of Railroad Company v. Landrum, 89 Miss. 409.

It will be observed that in the Brooks case, supra, the trial court was requested to give the railroad company a peremptory instruction. While the assignment of errors do not appear from the report of the case, it is evident from the brief of the learned attorney of record for the appellee that the question was argued in this supreme court in the case cited as to what should be the character of the testimony which would authorize a court to take the case from a jury. He argued that before a case could be taken from a jury the proof introduced by a railroad company to overcome the prima facie presumption created by the statute must be conclusive. The opinion of this court in the Brooks case, begins by alluding to the fact that the lower court had refused to grant appellant a peremptory instruction. It then stated that the sole question before it was whether, under any view of the case, accepting as true and giving the most favorable consideration to the testimony of the appellee, judgment could be sustained. In other words, it impliedly stated that the question to be as to whether, under the particular facts of that case, the lower court should have taken the case from the jury by a peremptory instruction. It was not intended to hold, by this statement, that to overcome the statutory presumption the circumstances of the accident must clearly show that these circumstances could never be shown by circumstantial evidence, but could only be shown by the testimony of those who witnessed the accident and could therefore speak from personal knowledge.

In the Landrum case, supra, it was also contended for the appellant that a peremptory instruction should have been given, and the question before this court, therefore, was whether, under the testimony the lower court should have taken the case from the jury. It was only intended to be held by that case that the question as to whether the prima facie presumption of the statute had been overcome could not be taken from the jury unless it was clearly shown how the injury occurred. There was no intention to hold, and there was no intention to hold in the Brooks case, that the prima facie presumption created by statute could not be overcome by circumstantial evidence but that there must be witnesses who saw the injury inflicted and who could speak exactly from personal knowledge.

It will be observed in the Landrum case, supra, that it was not said by the court that there was no evidence from persons who saw the injury inflicted and who could speak from personal knowledge; it was simply said that there was no evidence of a nature which could satisfy a court how the injury was inflicted, thus clearly recognizing that it is competent in all cases to have left it to the jury to say whether there be eye witnesses or not from all the evidence as to whether the prima facie case made by the statute had been met.

The court below acted in the case at bar upon the conception that the prima facie presumption of the statute could not be met by circumstantial evidence. But we contend that the law is that the appellant company is not liable, although it may not have been shown to the satisfaction of the jury the exact manner in which deceased was killed; if it had shown to their satisfaction that there was no negligence on its part, or, using the language of the instruction, that at the time of striking and killing the deceased, the train by which he was killed was in good condition and properly equipped, and was being operated by the servants of appellant's company with reasonable care and skill.

If the statute is to be construed, as the lower court construed it by its instruction, then, we contend, that it was clearly unconstitutional. The construction adopted by the circuit court below deprives appellant of its property without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and particularly the 14th amendment.

If Code 1906, § 1985, means what the circuit court below holds it to mean, we think there can be no question as to its unconstitutionality as stated. The statute never intended to do more than establish a prima facie liability upon proof being made that the injury was inflicted by the running of the locomotive or cars of a railroad company. If it had gone further and declared what the circuit court below holds that it means that this prima facie evidence could not be overthrown unless a railroad company could produce witnesses who saw the accident, and who could tell exactly how it happened so as to leave no room whatever for inference or deduction, the effect would be that it would make the evidence conclusive unless testimony of a certain kind were introduced to overthrow it. No matter how strong the proof might be that there was no want of reasonable skill and care on the part of the servants of the railroad company in reference to such injury, yet, if the statute had been written as we have suggested, this alleged prima facie evidence would be conclusive evidence unless it were met with evidence of a particular kind designated by the statute, namely, the evidence of persons who saw the injury and who could testify as to how it occurred.

If the statute had declared that proof of the injury should be conclusive evidence of the want of reasonable skill and care, according to all the authorities it would have been unconstitutional and void.

In some states statutes have been passed imposing absolute liability on railway companies for animals killed or injured on their tracks, regardless of negligence on the part of such companies. Such statutes are unconstitutional and void inasmuch as they violate the provisions of the Constitution which forbids the taking of property without due process of law. Such statutes would violate our state Constitution and also the Constitution of the United States. Elliott on Railroads, vol. 3, 113. We refer the court to the case of Little Rock, etc. R. R. Co. v. Payne, 33 Ark. 816. A statute of Arkansas provides that "All railroads which are now or may be hereafter built and operated in whole or in part in this state shall be responsible for all damages to persons and property done or caused by the running of trains in this state." The trial court interpreted this statute as imposing upon railroads absolute liability to pay for stock killed by its trains, and it withdrew from the consideration of the jury all questions of negligence on the one hand or of due care on the other. The supreme court of that state held that it was not within the power of a legislature to divest rights by prescribing to the courts what should be conclusive evidence. It was further said by the court that such construction of the statute would be to make all railroads insurers of the safety of all live animals in the state against injury; and would either take away from them the defenses which all other corporations and persons might by law set up; or make the killing of stock conclusive evidence of want of skill and due care, and conclusive evidence of negligence. See Zeigler v. Railroad Co., 58 Ala. 594.

Our contention does not conflict with the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States, in St Louis, etc. Railroad Co. v. Matthews, 165 U.S. 1. In that case the court maintained the constitutionality of a statute making railway companies...