Alameda Cnty. Mgmt. Emps. Ass'n v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty.

• Decision Date: 24 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. A128697.,A128697.
• Citation: 2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6636,195 Cal.App.4th 325,11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5536,125 Cal.Rptr.3d 556
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: ALAMEDA COUNTY MANAGEMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Alameda County, Defendant and Respondent.

195 Cal.App.4th 325

125 Cal.Rptr.3d 556

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5536

2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6636

ALAMEDA COUNTY MANAGEMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.SUPERIOR COURT of Alameda County, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A128697.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

May 10, 2011.

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

Review Denied Aug. 24, 2011.

Leonard Carder, Oakland, and Arthur A. Krantz for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Pleasanton, Paul M. Loya and Elizabeth P. Lind; Wiley Price & Radulovich and Joseph E. Wiley, Alameda, for Defendant and Respondent.

NEEDHAM, J.

Facing a multi-million dollar budget reduction for the 2009–2010 fiscal year, the Superior Court of Alameda County (the Court) implemented a reduction in force. Among those laid off were a number of members of appellant Alameda County Management Employees Association (ACMEA), a labor organization representing certain Court employees in managerial classifications. After being notified of the impending action, a number of ACMEA members selected for layoff invoked the seniority provisions of the Court's personnel policies and requested demotions or transfers to lower paying classifications in which they had previously held tenure. Although these employees' seniority would have entitled them to demotions under the Court's personnel policies, in all but two instances, the Court denied their requests, citing the definition of seniority contained in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) it had negotiated with another union. The Court determined that the seniority definition contained in the MOU applied to ACMEA's members and that under that definition, they could not exercise the demotion rights they would otherwise have enjoyed under the Court's personnel policies. In addition, the laid-off ACMEA members requested due process hearings in front of a hearing officer, believing that their layoffs were disciplinary in character. The Court denied those requests also.

ACMEA and the employees later filed a petition for writ of mandate, alleging that the Court had violated the provisions of the Trial Court Employment Protection and Governance Act (Act; Gov.Code, § 71600 et seq.) ¹ by failing to meet and confer with ACMEA before changing the seniority and demotion rights of its members. They also claimed the Court had violated its own policies and rules by refusing to grant the requests to demote in lieu of layoff. Finally, they alleged the Court had violated their due process rights under the federal and California Constitutions by failing to accord them due process hearings. The petition was heard under the special provisions of the Act, and after hearing, the trial judge denied the petition. ²

ACMEA now appeals from that adverse judgment. We agree with ACMEA that the Court's actions violated the Act and the Court's own policies and rules. We disagree that the Court denied the laid-off employees due process. Accordingly, we will reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The Statutory Background

ACMEA contends the Court violated the provisions of the Act by changing its members' seniority rights without first meeting and conferring with their union. (See § 71634.2, subd. (a).) To our knowledge, only one other California appellate court has construed the Act. ( OCEA, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 287, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 201.) We will therefore briefly review its origins and the relevant provisions of the Act before turning to the merits of the case before us.

Origins of the Act

The Trial Court Funding and Improvement Act of 1997 established a Task Force on Trial Court Employees (the Task Force) “charged with recommending an appropriate system of employment and governance for trial court employees.” (See Stats.1997, ch. 850, § 48, p. 6009, codified at § 77600 et seq.) The Legislature's stated goal was “to adopt a plan to transition all existing court employees into an appropriate employment status” by January 1, 2001. (Stats.1997, ch. 850, § 3(g)(2), p. 5970.) It also wished to consider “a mechanism for involvement of the local judiciary in the negotiations regarding compensation of court employees.” (Stats.1997, ch. 850, § 3(g)(3), p. 5970.)

The Legislature directed the Task Force to study a number of components of personnel policy, including such issues as employment status, classification, and salary; retirement and other benefits; and bargaining procedures and agreements. (§ 77603, subds. (a)-(e).) In addition, the Task Force was directed to examine and outline issues for establishing a local personnel structure for trial court employees and then to recommend such a structure. (§ 77603, subds.(g), (i).) The Legislature's intent was to enact a personnel system for trial court employees that would have “uniform statewide applicability and promote organizational and operational flexibility....” (§ 77605, subd. (a).)

In its final report, the Task Force made recommendations regarding the components of a personnel system for trial court employees. (See Task Force on Trial Court Employees (Dec. 31, 1999) Final Report, pp. 63–201 (Final Report).) Relevant here is the Task Force's recommendation for a meet and confer model under which representatives of the trial courts and representatives of recognized employee organizations “shall meet and confer and be authorized to reach tentative agreement regarding all subjects within the scope of representation on behalf of their respective principals.” ( Id. at p. 84, ¶ VI.) The Task Force recommended meet-and-confer provisions for the new Act based on the language of the Meyers–Milias–Brown Act (MMBA; §§ 3500–3511). (Final Report, at p. 84, ¶ II.)

The Legislature responded to the Task Force recommendations with Senate Bill No. 2140. (Sen. Bill No. 2140 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) § 14.) Senate Bill No. 2140 embraced the recommendations by adopting “a mechanism for setting the terms and conditions of trial court employment, incorporating various provisions of the [MMBA]; [and by] provid[ing] that recognized employee organizations and court representatives shall utilize the ‘meet and confer’ process....” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2140 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 25, 2000, p. 1; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 2140 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 5, 2000, p. 1.) The Act was signed into law on September 29, 2000. (§§ 71600 et seq., Stats.2000, ch. 1010, § 14, p. 7356.)

Labor Relations Under the Act

The provisions of the Act governing labor relations are found in Title 8, Chapter 7, Article 3 of the Government Code. One purpose of the statute is “to promote full communication between trial courts and their employees by providing a reasonable method for resolving disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment between trial courts and recognized employee organizations.” ³ (§ 71630, subd. (a).) Another stated purpose of this article is “to extend to trial court employees the right, and to require trial courts, to meet and confer in good faith over matters within the scope of representation, consistent with the procedures set forth in this article.” ( Ibid.)

The Act therefore guarantees trial court employees “the right to form, join, and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations.” (§ 71631.) Recognized employee organizations, in turn, are empowered to represent their members in employment relations with trial courts as to the matters covered by the Act. (§ 71633.) Under the Act, the scope of representation includes “all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” (§ 71634, subd. (a).)

Trial courts are therefore required to meet and confer in good faith with representatives of recognized employee organizations regarding matters within the scope of representation. (§ 71634.2, subd. (a).) The Act mandates that trial courts “consider fully the presentations as are made by the recognized employee organization on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a determination of policy or course of action.” ( Ibid.) If the trial court and the employee organization reach agreement, they must prepare a written MOU and present it to the trial court for determination. (§ 71634.3.) If the trial court adopts the MOU, the written agreement becomes “binding upon the parties.” (§ 71639.5, subd. (a).)

Transitional Provisions

Unless expressly provided by the statute, the enactment of the Act did not itself require “modification or elimination of any existing ... terms and conditions of employment of trial court employees.” (§ 71612.) Save for minimum standards prescribed by the Act, however, the statute permits the elimination or modification of pre-existing terms and conditions of employment “through the meet and confer in good faith process.” ( Ibid.) In establishing local personnel structures for their employees, trial courts are required to give consideration to “protecting the rights accruedby trial court employees under their current systems,” but the Act permits reconsideration of prior contractual obligations and rights, again subject to obligation to meet and confer in good faith. (§ 71615, subd. (d).)

Factual and Procedural History

The facts of this case are undisputed. In the court below, the parties filed joint stipulations regarding the facts and the procedures governing the conduct of the litigation. The parties specifically agreed their stipulations “contain [ed] all material facts upon which the parties ... intend to rely in the merits phase of this litigation.” We therefore take our factual statement from these stipulations and their attached exhibits.

The Parties

ACMEA is a labor organization and is...