Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. J.W. (In re I.A.)

• Decision Date: 21 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. A131432.,A131432.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re I.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. Alameda County Social Services Agency, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.W., Defendant and Appellant.

201 Cal.App.4th 1484

134 Cal.Rptr.3d 441

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 15,159

2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 18,059

In re I.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.Alameda County Social Services Agency, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.J.W., Defendant and Appellant.

No. A131432.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 19, 2011.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing and Denial of Motion for Judicial Notice Jan. 17, 2012.

Review Denied March 21, 2012.

Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Richard Roy Karlsson, Acting County Counsel, Grace Fongmei Tam, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MARGULIES, Acting P.J.

I.A. (minor) was detained at birth by Alameda County Social Services Agency (agency) after she tested positive for cocaine. As a basis for jurisdiction, the agency alleged I.A.'s mother (Mother) abused drugs, preventing her from caring properly for the minor, and Mother and the minor's alleged father, appellant J.W. (Father), had engaged in domestic violence and had criminal histories. The juvenile court sustained all of the jurisdictional allegations and detained the minor. Father contends the jurisdictional findings involving his conduct should be vacated because they were not supported by substantial evidence, but he does not challenge the validity of the jurisdictional finding based on Mother's drug abuse. Because Father's contentions, even if accepted, would not justify a reversal of the court's jurisdictional ruling or the grant of any other effective relief, we decline to address them and dismiss the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

The minor was the subject of a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code ¹ section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), filed November 15, 2010.² Under subdivision (b), the petition alleged the minor tested positive for cocaine at birth and Mother had a history of drug abuse that limited her ability to care for the minor. In addition, it alleged she had reported episodes of domestic violence between herself and Father, and both had criminal histories. The minor was detained and placed in foster care, and a paternity test was ordered for Father.

The agency's jurisdictional report noted Mother had admitted using crack cocaine prior to giving birth to the minor. She gave birth at home, apparently without proper prenatal care, and had made no provision for the minor's care. Mother had been in and out of drug treatment for the last 10 years, and her two earlier children both resided with their fathers. Father had custody of one of those children, an older sister of the minor. During a meeting with the agency, Father acknowledged he and Mother had “fights,” and Mother told the agency Father was verbally abusive and had committed domestic violence. Based on the tone of Father's remarks to Mother during this meeting, the agency's social worker concluded “they were in a domestic violent relationship.” Father's arrest record revealed 14 aliases and 7 Social Security numbers. He had been arrested for battery against a cohabitant in 2006, resisting an officer in 2005, theft in 2002, and several drug and theft charges in 1990 and 1996.

At the contested jurisdictional hearing, the social worker confirmed Father told her he was arrested for battery in 2006 after he and Mother got into a fight. During the meeting at which this disclosure was made, the social worker observed Father make demeaning remarks to Mother and raise his voice, leading her to characterize his conduct as “emotionally and psychologically abusive.” She found “[h]is tone and the manner in which he spoke to [Mother] ... shocking.”

Father testified he had known Mother for about 10 or 11 years and believed he was the minor's biological father.³ He deniedever being abusive to Mother. He said the 2006 arrest for battery was based on her false statement to police he had hit her and pointed out no charges were filed in connection with the arrest. He also denied demeaning or otherwise mistreating Mother at the meeting with the agency. Although Father acknowledged having been criminally convicted “a few times when I was younger,” he claimed his most recent arrest, before the 2006 arrest, was in 1996.

Mother acknowledged using crack cocaine, testifying she had relapsed seven months into her pregnancy with the minor. With respect to Father, she testified that over the course of their 10–year acquaintance, she “periodically” had occasion to fear him. He would call her names and intimidate her with “forceful and demanding ... words. They just put me in a certain feeling, you know, a feeling of fear.” On three occasions, she had called police when he refused to leave her home. Mother was also reluctant to cross Father, since she depended upon him for access to the daughter of whom he had custody.

Without explanation, the juvenile court found true all of the petition's allegations under section 300, subdivision (b). By the time of the dispositional hearing, Mother was participating in a residential drug treatment program. The court placed the minor in Mother's custody, ordered reunification services for Mother, and granted visitation to Father.

II. DISCUSSION

Father contends the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings involving his conduct were unsupported because there was no evidence his conduct presented a substantial risk to the minor. The agency urges us to dismiss the appeal, arguing it fails to raise a justiciable issue because Father has not challenged all of the jurisdictional findings. Because we agree with the agency this appeal does not raise a justiciable issue, we do not reach the merits of Father's contention.

A. Justiciability Doctrine

It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable issue. (E.g., Costa Serena Owners Coalition v. Costa Serena Architectural Com. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1205–1206, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 170( Costa Serena ).) The justification for this doctrine, which in general terms requires an appeal to concern a present, concrete, and genuine dispute as to which the court can grant effective relief, is well explained by Wright and Miller's hornbook of federal practice: “The central perception is that courts should not render decisions absent a genuine need to resolve a real dispute. Unnecessary decisions dissipate judicial energies better conserved for litigants who have a real need for official assistance. As to the parties themselves, courts should not undertake the role of helpful counselors.... Defendants, moreover, should not be forced to bear the burdens of litigation without substantial justification.... Perhaps more importantly, decisions involve lawmaking. Courts worry that unnecessary lawmaking should be avoided, both as a matter of defining the proper role of the judiciary in society and as a matter of reducing the risk that premature litigation will lead to ill-advised adjudication.” (13B Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed.2008) § 3532.1, at pp. 372–374, fns. omitted.)

The many aspects of the justiciability doctrine in California were summarized in Wilson v. L.A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 246 P.2d 688: “ ‘A judicial tribunal ordinarily may consider and determine only an existing controversy, and not a moot question or abstract proposition.... [As] a general rule it is not within the function of the court to act upon or decide a moot question or speculative, theoretical or abstract question or proposition, or a purely academic question, or to give an advisory opinion on such a question or proposition....’ ” ( Id. at pp. 452–453, 246 P.2d 688.) An important requirement for justiciability is the availability of “effective” relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties' conduct or legal status. “ ‘ “ ‘It is this court's duty “ ‘to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” ' ” ' ” ( Costa Serena, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1205–1206, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 170; see also In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 889 [a case is moot when it is “ ‘impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief’ ”]; Simi Corp. v. Garamendi (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 [“A case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical impact or cannot provide the parties with effective relief”].) When the court cannot grant effective relief to the parties to an appeal, the appeal must be dismissed. ( Costa Serena, at p. 1206, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 170.)

B. Dependency Jurisdiction

Although Father's appeal was taken from the court's dispositional order, he does not question that order. Rather, he characterizes his appeal as challenging the juvenile court's jurisdictional order.⁴ As explained below, however, an examination of the juvenile court's dependency jurisdiction demonstrates the issues raised in his appeal present no genuine challenge to the court's assumption of dependency jurisdiction. As a result, any order we enter will have no practical impact on the pending dependency proceeding, thereby precluding a grant of effective relief. For that reason, we find Father's appeal to be nonjusticiable.

It is commonly said that the juvenile court takes jurisdiction over children, not parents. (E.g., Kern County Dept. of Human Services v. Superior Court (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 302, 310, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 735;In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 202, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 213.) While this is not strictly correct, since the court exercises personal jurisdiction over the parents once proper notice has been given ( Kern County Dept. of Human Services v. Superior Court, at p. 310, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 735), it...