Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen, s. 95-35151
| Decision Date | 06 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 95-35151,95-35188,s. 95-35151 |
| Citation | 108 F.3d 1065 |
| Parties | , 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,910, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1675, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3165 ALASKA WILDLIFE ALLIANCE; American Wildlands, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Marvin JENSEN, Superintendent, Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve; Boyd Evison, Regional Director, National Park Service; James Ridenour, Administrator, National Park Service; Manuel Lujan, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior; National Park Service, Defendants-Appellees, and Holland American Line-Westours, Inc.; Allied Fishermen of Southeast Alaska, Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees. ALASKA WILDLIFE ALLIANCE; American Wildlands, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Marvin JENSEN, Superintendent, Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve; Boyd Evison, Regional Director, National Park Service; James Ridenour, Administrator, National Park Service; Manuel Lujan, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior; National Park Service, Defendants, Holland American Line-Westours, Inc., Defendant-Intervenor, and Allied Fishermen of Southeast Alaska, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Geoffrey Y. Parker, Anchorage, Alaska, Thomas E. Meacham, Anchorage, Alaska, for the plaintiffs-appellants-cross-appellees.
Robert L. Klarquist, Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the defendants-appellees.
Bruce B. Weyhrauch, Faulkner, Banfield, Doogan & Holmes, Juneau, Alaska, for the defendant-intervenor-appellee-cross-appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, H. Russel Holland, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-90-00345-HRH.
Before: WRIGHT, SCHROEDER and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
We must decide the extent to which federal statutes restrict commercial fishing in Alaska's Glacier Bay National Park (the Park). We hold that plaintiffs Alaska Wildlife Alliance and American Wildlands have standing to challenge commercial fishing in the Park's waters. We further hold that commercial fishing is statutorily prohibited in the Park's designated wilderness areas, but not in its non-wilderness areas.
Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Interior and officials of the National Park Service, claiming that commercial fishing in the Park violates certain federal statutes. 1 Plaintiffs interpret the Organic Act, 2 which created the national park system, and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 3 ("ANILCA") to prohibit commercial fishing throughout the Park. The Park Service concedes that commercial fishing is prohibited by statute in the Park's wilderness areas. 4 It maintains, however, that the statutes give it discretion to permit commercial fishing in non-wilderness areas. The Allied Fishermen of Southeast Alaska (the Fishermen), an association of commercial fishers, intervened to defend its interests. It argues that plaintiffs lack standing and that commercial fishing is permitted throughout the Park.
The district court concluded that plaintiffs have standing and that commercial fishing is statutorily prohibited only in wilderness areas of the Park. Plaintiffs appeal the determination that commercial fishing is permitted in non-wilderness areas of the Park. The Fishermen cross-appeal the court's findings that appellants have standing and that federal law prohibits commercial fishing in the Park's wilderness areas. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
We review de novo whether a party has standing. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir.1992). An organization may bring an action on behalf of its members if: (1) the individual members would have standing to sue; (2) the organization's purpose relates to the interests being vindicated; and (3) the claims asserted do not require the participation of individual members. Id. The Fishermen challenge only plaintiffs' ability to meet the first requirement of organizational standing. The individual members have standing if they can demonstrate (1) an actual or threatened injury that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged action such that (3) it is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
The individual members of the plaintiff organizations would have standing. First, they have shown injury. The experiences recounted in their affidavits demonstrate aesthetic and recreational harm that will support standing. 5 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1365-66, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972); Fund for Animals, 962 F.2d at 1396. Affiants P.L. Brown and Kin Behrens wrote that the noise, trash and wakes of vessels in the Park have diminished their enjoyment. Brown described seeing "sea lions in the bay with huge trolling lures hanging from their mouths." Karen Jettmar, a former back country ranger in the Park, expressed concern over the vessels' displacement of whales from preferred feeding areas and described how she now plans her visits to the Park to avoid the fishermen's presence. And Wayne Hall wrote that the wake from vessels in the bay endangered kayakers.
Next, plaintiffs offer sufficient proof that their injuries are traceable to commercial fishing. At the summary judgment stage, factual allegations in support of standing are taken as true. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136-37. Plaintiffs need only plead facts that, taken as true, would show that commercial fishing caused their injuries. We find their affidavits about injuries sufficient.
Finally, their injuries are likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. The Fishermen argue that plaintiffs cannot meet this requirement because they challenge agency regulation of a third party. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568-70, 112 S.Ct. at 2140-42 (). This case does not present the problems that the Fishermen identify. A finding in plaintiffs' favor, that commercial fishing is statutorily prohibited in Glacier Bay, would result in the elimination of commercial fishing in the relevant areas. This would redress plaintiffs' claimed injuries.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, but will defer to the agency's interpretation unless it contravenes the express language of the statute or clear congressional intent. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Conlan v. United States Dept. of Labor, 76 F.3d 271, 274 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 431, 136 L.Ed.2d 330 (1996).
ANILCA designates roughly 2.77 million acres of the Park as "wilderness" to be administered under the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq, unless otherwise provided by ANILCA. Greater protections apply to wilderness areas than to ordinary park lands. In pertinent part, the Wilderness Act bans commercial enterprise from wilderness areas: "Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise ... within any wilderness area designated by this chapter...." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). The court held that this provision bans commercial fishing in Glacier Bay's wilderness areas, and the Park Service agrees with this interpretation.
The Fishermen argue that two provisions exempt commercial fishing from the Wilderness Act's ban on commercial activity. The first is a section of the Wilderness Act that allows motorized vessels in wilderness areas "where these uses have already become established." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1). This provision is of no use to the Fishermen. Their use of motorboats is not at issue; it is fishing for profit that the Wilderness Act prohibits. This they may not do, whether from motorized vessels or otherwise.
Next, the Fishermen cite a section of ANILCA that provides:
On all public lands where the taking of fish and wildlife is permitted in accordance with the provisions of this Act or other applicable State and Federal law, the Secretary shall permit ... the continuance of existing uses, and the future establishment, and use, of temporary campsites, tent platforms, shelters, and other temporary facilities and equipment directly and necessarily related to such activities.
16 U.S.C. § 3204(a). The Fishermen interpret this provision to require that all "existing uses" of park resources be allowed to continue. The plain language of ANILCA does not support this interpretation, and the Park Service's contrary interpretation requires deference.
The court correctly held that ANILCA and the Wilderness Act prohibit commercial fishing in the Park's wilderness areas. 6
Plaintiffs argue that the Organic Act and ANILCA prohibit commercial fishing throughout the Park. The Park Service and the Fishermen interpret the statutes to give the Park Service discretion to permit or to prohibit commercial fishing in non-wilderness areas of the Park. In the absence of an explicit statutory directive, we must defer to the Park Service's interpretation if it is "permissible" in light of the available evidence of congressional intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82. The question before us is not which interpretation we prefer, but whether the Park Service's interpretation is reasonable. Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir.1990). Because the Park Service is charged with administering the statutes at issue, we must find its interpretation reasonable "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative...
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