Albemarle Mental Health Center, In re
Decision Date | 17 July 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 781SC996,781SC996 |
Citation | 42 N.C.App. 292,256 S.E.2d 818 |
Parties | In re ALBEMARLE MENTAL HEALTH CENTER. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Lennie L. Hughes, Elizabeth City, for respondent appellee.
The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that it was "without jurisdiction to proceed and to determined the merits, rights and duties of the parties."
The State argues, and we agree, that this cause is in the nature of a special proceeding. G.S. 1-2 provides that "An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment or prevention of a public offense." G.S. 1-3 provides that "Every other remedy is a special proceeding." Moreover, G.S. 1-394 provides in part that "Special proceedings against adverse parties shall be commenced as is prescribed for civil actions." Respondent argues that the trial court here was without jurisdiction because the proceeding was not commenced pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 3 which provides that a civil action may be commenced only by the filing of a complaint or by the issuance of a summons with permission of the court to file complaint within twenty days. Clearly, this proceeding was not commenced pursuant to our statutory requirements for initiating a civil action. We do not agree, however, with the respondent's view that our law is so inflexible as to preclude the superior court's jurisdiction in a matter of such moment as presented by the facts before us.
The superior court is the proper trial division for an extraordinary proceeding of this nature. See G.S. 7A-246. The judicial power of the superior court is that which is granted by the Constitution and laws of the State. Baker v. Varser, 239 N.C. 180, 79 S.E.2d 757 (1954). Within the guidelines of our Constitution, the legislature is charged with the responsibility of providing the necessary procedures for the proper commencement of a matter before the courts. Occasionally, however, the proscribed procedures of a statutory scheme fail to embrace the unanticipated and extraordinary proceeding such as that disclosed by the record before us. In similar situations, it has been long held that courts have the inherent power to assume jurisdiction and issue necessary process in order to fulfill their assigned mission of administering justice efficiently and promptly. We believe that this is one of those extraordinary proceedings and that our rules of procedure should not be construed so literally as to frustrate the administration of justice.
Our legislature plainly intended that the implementation of the provisos in G.S. 8-53 and G.S. 8-53.3 be a function of the judiciary. By virtue of the failure of our legislature to provide precise statutory directions for fulfilling this responsibility, it becomes incumbent upon the courts to proceed in a manner consistent with law. The general rule is that:
All powers, even though not judicial in their nature, which are incident to the discharge by the courts of their judicial functions, are inherent in the courts, and . . . (they have) such power as is necessary to the exercise of the judicial department as a coordinate branch of the government.
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 144, p. 694 (1956). It has, for example, been held that it is an inherent power of courts to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 4, p. 351 (1957). Our own Supreme Court has indicated that the absence of discovery as a matter of right does not necessarily preclude the trial judge from ordering discovery in his discretion. State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 235 S.E.2d 828 (1977). Federal courts have also recognized the judiciary's inherent power to compel pretrial discovery Where not specifically prohibited by statute. See United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Richter, 488 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1973). In Richter, it was said that:
"A federal court has the responsibility to supervise the administration of criminal justice in order to ensure (sic) fundamental fairness." (Citations omitted) It would be ill-advised to limit improvidently this inherent power for fear of misuse. The firing point of the legal system is with the trial judge who is best situated to administer the law and protect the rights of all. Id. at 173-74.
The pertinent portion of G.S. 8-53 reads as follows: "(P)rovided, that the court, either at the trial or prior thereto, or the Industrial Commission pursuant to law may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice." We think that the legislature intended to employ the phrase "may compel such disclosure" in such manner as to authorize the court to require disclosure in all situations governed by G.S. 8-53 without exception, when disclosure "is necessary to a proper administration of justice."
While the proviso contained in G.S. 8-53.3 does not contain the precise language of the proviso to G.S. 8-53 specifically providing that the required disclosure may be prior to trial, we believe that such was the legislative intent. The pertinent portion of G.S. 8-53.3 reads as follows: "Provided, that the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice." It would be wholly inconsistent to allow disclosure in the case of a physician-patient relationship while, in a statute extending the rule to the psychologist-client relationship, precluing the required disclosure until the time of trial. We do not assume any such inconsistency on the part of our legislature. Further, we find nothing inherent in the wording of either statute that would Prohibit the court in the proper administration of justice from requiring disclosure prior to the initiation of criminal charges or the commencement of a civil action.
The heart of a statute is the intention of the law-making body. In performing our judicial tasks, "we must avoid a construction which will operate to defeat or impair the object of the statute, if we can reasonably do so without violence to the legislative language." Ballard v. City of Charlotte, 235 N.C. 484, 487, 70 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1952). In construing a statute, we must view it as giving effect to the obvious intention of the legislature as manifested in the entire act and other acts in Pari materia. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 381 b(1), p. 885 (1953). When so construed, we find the language of both G.S. 8-53 and G.S. 8-53.3 sufficient to allow the trial court to compel disclosure prior to trial and prior to the filing of criminal charges when such action is necessary to the exercise of its implied or inherent powers to provide for the proper administration of justice.
In the case at bar, the District Attorney, acting pursuant to G.S. 8-53.3, filed a motion in the superior court requesting that the court conduct an In camera hearing to determine whether the information in the possession of the director of the Mental Health Center and other employees was "necessary to a proper administration of justice." The court promptly issued an order requiring the director and other employees to appear in court and this notice was personally served by the Sheriff of Pasquotank County. We can think of no more effective or practical way to effectuate the intent of the proviso in question than through the employed procedure. To interpret our rules of procedure with the rigidity argued for by the respondent would...
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