Albers v. Cardinal Glennon Children's Hosp.
| Decision Date | 24 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 51590,51590 |
| Citation | 729 S.W.2d 519 |
| Parties | Anne ALBERS, Bonnie Becker, Maureen Betts, Pat Coughlin, Mary Delong, Lisa Doren, Connie Dwyers, Jan Evers, Jane Fetick, Mary Beth Foerstel, Lynn Hauver, Margaret Hennessy, Deborah Huhman, Joanne Jetensky, Ruth Johnson, Maddona Marshall, Margaret Seidl, Fran Soto, and Jan Wodicker, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CARDINAL GLENNON CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, f/k/a Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children, and Douglas Reis, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
David M. Duree, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Ralph Edwards, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.
Plaintiffs appeal after the dismissal of their first amended petition, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
Plaintiffs-appellants are nineteen nurses who have worked for defendant hospital in excess of ten years. As of January 2, 1986, the date of their first amended petition, plaintiffs were all still employed by defendant hospital.
Plaintiffs have challenged the hospital's discontinuation of a wage and scheduling program. Under the "7 for 10 program," nurses on the night shift worked seven nights during a two-week period but were compensated as if they had worked ten nights.
In their five count petition, plaintiffs attempted to allege causes of action for: 1) breach of contract, 2) breach of contract with additional consideration, 3) equitable or promissory estoppel, 4) fraud, and 5) tortious interference with contractual relations. The trial court dismissed all five counts of plaintiffs' petition with prejudice.
In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we must determine whether the averments invoke principles of substantive law entitling plaintiffs to relief. Lowrey v. Horvath, 689 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Mo. banc 1985). In so doing, the pleading is allowed its broadest intendment, all facts alleged are treated as true, and all allegations are construed favorably to plaintiffs. Id. A motion to dismiss, however, "is well taken where the petition fails to plead the essential facts for a recovery." Reinhold v. Fee Fee Trunk Sewer, Inc., 664 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo.App.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S.Ct. 121, 83 L.Ed.2d 63 (1984).
In Count I, plaintiffs alleged that they "were and are all employed as nurses for ten years or more at Cardinal Glennon Children's Hospital," and that the hospital "is a not-for-profit institution." They further averred that:
3. In the early 1970's the Hospital faced a severe shortage of nurses on its night shift. In order to staff its night shift, the Hospital offered to compensate any nurse who worked seven nights in a two week pay period compensation as if they had worked ten days. In further inducement to the Nurses, the Hospital promised the Nurses who participated in this program that such program would be available to the nurse for so long as she was employed by the Hospital. ("7 for 10 program").
4. The custom and practices, policies, procedures, and employee handbook of the Hospital, taken collectively, define "Termination of Employment" as retirement, resignation, or discharge. Employment at the Hospital is not terminated by leaves of absence, sick leave, vacation, administrative leave, educational leave, medical leave, military leave, personal leave, working part-time, or other changes in employment status which do not constitute retirement, resignation, or discharge.
5. The custom and practices, policies, procedures, and employee handbook, taken collectively, only allow the Hospital to discharge the Nurses for "cause" and after following certain procedural steps. The provisions of the Hospital's Employee Handbook regarding the Code of Conduct and Termination of Employment are attached hereto as Appendix A and incorporated by reference.
6. The Nurses all qualified for the 7 for 10 program, they accepted the 7 for 10 offer by participating in the program, and they otherwise met all conditions precedent to participating in the 7 for 10 program, and they are willing, ready and able to continue participating in such program.
7. On or after March 11, 1985, the Hospital notified the Nurses that the Hospital unilaterally decided to terminate the 7 for 10 program on April 15, 1985 and did in fact terminate the 7 for 10 program on such date.
8. Such termination constituted a breach of the 7 for 10 contract.
9. As a proximate cause of such breach of contract, Plaintiffs have suffered wage loss, decreased insurance benefits, decreased retirement benefits, physical hardship, family hardship, emotional distress and other hardships, in the amount $250,000.00 for each nurse.
In Count II, plaintiffs incorporate by reference the averments of Count I and further aver they gave consideration, additional and independent of providing nursing services, to the hospital. In Count II, plaintiffs contend forbearance from accepting other employment, resigning from other employment, the structuring of their lives around the "7 for 10 program," and the hardships associated with working nights, provide such independent and additional consideration.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in dismissing Count I and II because their petition, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, invokes principles of substantive law indicating the existence and breach of an enforceable contract. Plaintiffs contend reference to custom and practice and an employee handbook has defined the term "for so long as the nurses are employed by the hospital" as discharge, resignation, or retirement and thereby avers a contract of definite duration. Plaintiffs further contend they gave the hospital additional and independent consideration which prevents the contract from being terminable at will.
The portion of the handbook attached as an appendix to the petition has a page entitled "Code of Conduct" which enumerates a list of "serious [code] violations." At the bottom of the page it states: "Disciplinary action may be assessed for these violations--up to and including discharge." Two additional pages are incorporated, entitled "Discipline" and "Termination of Employment". Under the "Termination of Employment" heading appear the subtitles "Retirement," "Resignation," "Discharge," "Exit Interview," and "Re-Employment." In the paragraph labeled "Discharge" the handbook states: "The Hospital management reserves the right to dismiss an employee without notice for any major infraction of the Code of Conduct or a violation of the Code during the probationary period." Nowhere does the appended portion of the handbook mention the "7 for 10 program."
Plaintiffs have failed to plead a valid, definite and enforceable contract. We find the handbook irrelevant to determining the duration of the "7 for 10 program" and conclude the custom and practice of the hospital averred to is consistent with an interpretation that the program would last indefinitely and could be unilaterally discontinued. We further conclude that plaintiffs' contract with the hospital was not based upon anything other than the mutual promises of employment and services to be rendered.
Whether the terms of an agreement are ambiguous is...
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