Albert v. Dietz
Decision Date | 04 April 1968 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 2660. |
Citation | 283 F. Supp. 854 |
Parties | Peter T. ALBERT, Plaintiff, v. Michael DIETZ, dba Michael Dietz's Golf Shop, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. McWAYNE MARINE SUPPLY, LTD., Cushman Motors, a division of Outboard Marine Corporation and County of Kauai, Third-Party Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Frank D. Padgett, James Krueger, Padgett & Greeley, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Peter T. Albert, plaintiff.
Ronald D. Libkuman, Herbert K. Shimabukuro, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Michael Dietz, dba Michael Dietz's Golf Shop, defendant and third-party plaintiff.
Barry Chung, William H. Dodd, Fong, Miho, Choy & Robinson, Honolulu, Hawaii, for McWayne Marine Supply, Ltd., third-party defendant.
Toshio Kabutan, County Atty., County of Kauai, Lihue, Kauai, for County of Kauai, third-party defendant.
On April 14, 1967 plaintiff Albert filed a diversity action in this court against Dietz, seeking damages allegedly arising out of an accident on August 3, 1966 involving a golf cart rented from Dietz, as the golf professional, at the Wailua Golf Course on the island of Kauai, Hawaii. Dietz thereafter moved this court to implead, among others, the County of Kauai as a third-party defendant to the action, alleging the County to be the owner and operator of the Wailua Golf Course, where the accident occurred, and that if Dietz were found negligent the County, at least, would be a joint tortfeasor. Dietz' motion was granted on November 20, 1967, and a third-party complaint was filed nine days later against the County of Kauai, and others.
On December 19, 1967 the County moved to dismiss the third-party complaint against it for lack of jurisdiction, asserting, inter alia, that inasmuch as plaintiff Albert had failed to give timely and proper notice to the County as required by Section 138-21, R.L.H.1955,1 there could be no liability attaching to the County under the third-party complaint.
After briefing and oral argument it appears that the only question now to be resolved is whether or not presentation of a claim against the County under Section 138-21 within six months from date of plaintiff's injuries is a condition precedent to maintaining a third-party action against that County for contribution under Hawaii's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act: Section 246-16, R.L.H.1955 (enacted in 1941).2
Section 138-21, the county "non-liability" act, was enacted in 1943 but it is a practically verbatim copy of Section 149-6, R.L.H.1955, first enacted in 1907, referring to notice of injuries to the City and County of Honolulu. The House and Senate journals of the 1943 session indicate that Section 138-21 was but intended to give to all counties the same benefits of the non-liability statute long enjoyed only by the City and County of Honolulu. It is manifest from the 1943 House and Senate reports that the 1943 legislature gave not even passing thought to any possible effect which such legislation might have upon Hawaii's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors statute, enacted at the preceding legislative session.
As stated in Rogers v. City and County of Honolulu,3 32 Haw. 722 (1933), Section 149-64 is clear and unambiguous in its application to a prospective plaintiff bringing a tort action against a county. However, there is no provision therein for the situation existing here, i. e., where after the tort action is brought the county is impleaded as a third-party defendant from whom contribution is sought. Therefore, if Hawaiian statutory law is to be implemented, the notice statute and impleader statute must be construed conjointly to determine their effect, one upon and against the other.
It is solidly established under the Hawaii law that statutes having reference to the same subject matter are in pari materia and are to be construed with reference to each other.5 The statutes in question are both concerned with the subject of tort liability and must therefore be construed as indicated above.
From the fact that Section 138-21 was but a copy of Section 149-6, passed in 1907, and Section 246-16, an act of much broader scope and application, was passed in 1941,6 it would not be unreasonable therefore for this court to apply the rule that statutes later in time which may conflict with the application of earlier statutes dealing with the same subject must be given precedence over the earlier statute,7 but there appear other and sounder bases upon which this court may resolve the problem.
The preliminary purpose of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was to create a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, a right which did not exist at common law, and to establish a procedure whereby that right of contribution might be made effective in practice.8 The general common law rule barred contribution by the joint tortfeasors.9 The Uniform Act was necessarily adopted by the Hawaiian legislators in order to do away with the manifest injustice of putting one joint participator in an accident producing an injury in the position of "holding the bag" at the caprice of a plaintiff, as well as giving recognition to the obvious fact that where several parties are involved in an accident, it is only fair in an action to recover from one that, if possible, all should be brought into the court to answer to the plaintiff and to each other for their share of the damages. As well, this procedure prevents a multiplicity of suits. It was intended by the Act that equity should prevail over the manifest injustice of the common law rule.
As indicated above, the right of contribution arises from the application of equitable rules in that where one joint tortfeasor pays more than his just share he has an equitable right to proceed against the other joint tortfeasor for contribution. The law with respect to the time when liability of joint tortfeasors is established is well stated in Western Casualty & S. Co. v. Milwaukee G. C. Co. (1933) 213 Wis. 302, 305, 251 N.W. 491, 492:
Thus, while the right of contribution by the joint tortfeasors does arise at the time of the concurring independent acts, nevertheless until one of those joint tortfeasors pays more than his proportionate share of the underlying claim, the right remains contingent and inchoate. It is not until a tortfeasor pays more than his proportionate share that the right ripens into a cause of action.10
It is manifest, therefore, that as a matter of law the tortfeasor cannot enforce that right of contribution against an alleged joint tortfeasor county until he has paid more than his proportionate share. The joint tortfeasor, not being the person...
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