Stephens v. McBride
Decision Date | 12 April 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 81-1406,81-1406 |
Citation | 105 Ill.App.3d 880,435 N.E.2d 162,61 Ill.Dec. 673 |
Parties | , 61 Ill.Dec. 673 Mack C. STEPHENS, Plaintiff, Counter Defendant, v. Thomas McBRIDE, Defendant, Counter Plaintiff, Third Party Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MAYWOOD, Third Party Defendant. Thomas McBRIDE, Third Party Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CITY OF MAYWOOD, Third Party Defendant, Appellee. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, P. C., Chicago (James T. Ferrini, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Murphy & Cope, P. C., Chicago (John B. Murphey, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
This is a third-party action for contribution. Thomas McBride, the defendant in a personal injury and property damage suit based on negligence brought against him by Mack C. Stephens, filed a third-party complaint for contribution against the City of Maywood. The latter moved successfully for summary judgment on the ground that no notice had been served on it within one year of the accident, as required by sections 8-101, 8-102 and 8-103 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 85, pars. 8-101, 8-102, 8-103.) Thomas McBride appeals. He contends that the notice provision of the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to a claim for contribution, but that if it does timely notice was served.
The underlying factual background of this suit is an intersection collision between Stephens' motorcycle and McBride's automobile at Legion and Fourth Streets in Maywood, Illinois, on May 18, 1978. On October 5, 1978, McBride sent a letter to the City describing the accident and stating that shrubbery on one corner of the intersection constituted an obstruction to vision of motorists and that this hazardous condition was the responsibility of the City and contributed to the cause of the accident. It also stated that if suit was filed against McBride, he would join the City as a party based on the supreme court decision in the Skinner case (Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill.2d 1, 15 Ill.Dec. 829, 374 N.E.2d 437). On December 10, 1979, Stephens filed suit against McBride alone. On April 1, 1980, the latter filed an answer which was a counterclaim against Stephens and a third-party complaint against the City. In the third-party complaint, McBride asked contribution from the City, alleging that the accident occurred upon public streets maintained and controlled by the City, which had negligently violated its own ordinances concerning the height and location of shrubbery near intersections, thus contributing to Stephens' injuries.
The pertinent parts of the Tort Immunity Act provide (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 85, pars. 8-101, 8-102 and 8-103):
McBride contends that the Tort Immunity Act does not apply because it applies only to tort actions and contribution is not such an action. We find it unnecessary to consider whether contribution is or is not a tort action because, even if contribution were considered in this case to be a tort action because of the nature of the action between Stephens and McBride, the public policy underlying the right of contribution outweighs the public policy underlying the notice provision of the Tort Immunity Act.
The opinion of the supreme court in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill.2d 1, 15 Ill.Dec. 829, 374 N.E.2d 437, makes clear that the public policy behind the adoption of contribution was the justice of apportioning damages for tort injuries as equally as possible among those who were liable. The court said (70 Ill.2d at 13, 15 Ill.Dec. 829, 374 N.E.2d 437):
The purpose of the notice requirement of the Tort Immunity Act has been succinctly stated in Helle v. Brush (1973), 53 Ill.2d 405, 407-408, 292 N.E.2d 372:
Nine states which have considered the question have held that a tortfeasor's right to contribution is not barred by reason of the notice requirements of tort immunity acts. Those states are California, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, Tennessee and Wisconsin. People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1980), 26 Cal.3d 744, 163 Cal.Rptr. 585, 608 P.2d 673; Royal Car Wash Co., Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington (Del.1968), 240 A.2d 144; Albert v. Dietz (D.C.Hawaii 1968), 283 F.Supp. 854; Olsen v. Jones (Iowa 1973), 209 N.W.2d 64; Roehrig v. City of Louisville (Ky.1970), 454 S.W.2d 703; Cotham v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County (1971), 260 Md. 556, 273 A.2d 115; Zillman v. Meadowbrook Hospital Co., Inc. (1973), 73 Misc.2d 726, 342 N.Y.S.2d 302, rev'd on other grounds, 45 A.D.2d 267, 358 N.Y.S.2d 466; Security Fire Protection Co., Inc. v. City of Ripley (Tenn.App.1980), 608 S.W.2d 874; Ainsworth v. Berg (1948), 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W.2d 790, mandate vacated on other grounds, 35 N.W.2d 911; Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R. R. Co. v. City of Fond du Lac (7th Cir. 1961), 297 F.2d 583; Geiger v. Calumet County (1962), 18 Wis.2d 151, 118 N.W.2d 197; annot. 93 A.L.R.2d 1385.
Colorado and Minnesota have held to the contrary. Brady v. The City and County of Denver (1973), 181 Colo. 218, 508 P.2d 1254; American Automobile Insurance Co. v. City of Minneapolis (1961), 259 Minn. 294, 107 N.W.2d 320.
The Appellate Court for the Second District has but recently considered the public policy underlying contribution vis-a-vis that underlying interspousal immunity. (Wirth v. The City of Highland Park (1981), 102 Ill.App.3d 1074, 58 Ill.Dec. 294, 430 N.E.2d 236, leave to appeal denied.) It found that the former should prevail. With reference to the status of the law of contribution in Illinois, the court said (102 Ill.App.3d at 1080-1082, 58 Ill.Dec. 294, 430 N.E.2d 236):
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