Albertson v. Superior Court, S085899.

• Decision Date: 04 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. S085899.,S085899.
• Citation: 25 Cal.4th 796,107 Cal.Rptr.2d 381,23 P.3d 611
• Parties: Clarence ALBERTSON, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Ventura County, Respondent, The People of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

107 Cal.Rptr.2d 381

25 Cal.4th 796

23 P.3d 611

Clarence ALBERTSON, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Ventura County, Respondent, The People of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

No. S085899.

Supreme Court of California.

June 4, 2001.

Kenneth Claman, Public Defender, Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy Public Defender, and Todd W. Howeth, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael D. Bradbury, District Attorney, Gregory D. Totten, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Michelle J. Contois and David M. Lehr, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

GEORGE, C.J.

Petitioner Clarence Albertson faces trial under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 6600-6609.3 (SVPA or Act)).¹ In preparation for that trial, the Ventura County District Attorney sought an order directing petitioner to undergo an updated mental health interview and evaluation, and granting the district attorney access to petitioner's mental health treatment files. The trial court granted the district attorney's requests, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that there was no statutory authorization for updated interviews and evaluations, and that the district attorney had no right of access to petitioner's treatment records.

After we granted review to determine whether the district attorney was entitled to updated interviews and evaluations and access to treatment information, the Legislature enacted, and the Governor signed, urgency legislation amending a key provision of the SVPA, section 6603, subdivision (c) (section 6603(c)). As explained below, we conclude that this legislation applies to this case and authorizes updated interviews and evaluations, as well as access to treatment records. In light of the new enactment, we shall vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

In 1986, petitioner entered a guilty plea to rape and admitted an allegation that he had suffered two prior similar convictions. He was sentenced to prison, served 11 years, and was scheduled for release on parole in September 1998. Prior to his release, and pursuant to the provisions of the SVPA, the Department of Corrections reviewed petitioner's background and criminal record and determined that petitioner was likely to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). (§ 6601, subd. (b).) Accordingly the Department of Corrections referred petitioner's case to the Department of Mental Health for a "full evaluation" concerning whether petitioner met the criteria for civil commitment and treatment under the SVPA. (Ibid.; see generally Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1143-1149, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584 [describing Act] (Hubbart).)

As we explained in Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at page 1146, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584, "[t]he evaluation performed by the Department of Mental Health must be conducted by at least two practicing psychiatrists or psychologists in accordance with a standardized assessment protocol. (§ 6601, subds.(c) & (d).) ... [¶] Two evaluators must agree that the inmate is mentally disordered and dangerous within the meaning of section 6600 in order for proceedings to go forward under the Act. (§ 6601, subd. (d).)"

In April and May of 1998, the two independent experts selected by the Department of Mental Health, Drs. Korpi and Hupka, conducted interviews and evaluations of petitioner while he was housed in prison. Petitioner asserts that he was informed that the interviews by these doctors did not constitute treatment, and that therefore the interviews were presumptively not confidential. The experts' evaluations concluded that petitioner met the statutory requirements for commitment as a SVP that is, he was likely to reoffend in a sexually violent manner if released without proper treatment. (§ 6601, subd. (d).) Accordingly, the Department of Mental Health transmitted a request for a petition for commitment, accompanied by the two independent mental health experts' evaluations and other supporting documents, to the county in which petitioner last was convicted. (Id., subds. (d), (h), & (i).) That county's "designated counsel" (id., subd. CO)—in this case, the Ventura County District Attorney (hereafter the district attorney)—reviewed the evaluations and other supporting documents, concurred in the evaluators' recommendation, and hence, pursuant to statutory directive (ibid.), in August 1998 filed a petition in the superior court for commitment under the SVPA. Petitioner was retained in custody, and thereafter, at petitioner's request, the matter was continued twice, in September and October, 1998.

In mid-November 1998 the superior court held a hearing under the SVPA to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that petitioner was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory behavior upon release from the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. (§ 6602, subd. (a).) The mental health expert evaluators, Drs. Korpi and Hupka, testified, each diagnosing petitioner with "Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified, with Non-Consenting Persons" and as suffering from "Antisocial Personality." The superior court found probable cause to believe that petitioner is a SVP, and ordered that a trial be set to determine whether petitioner is in fact a SVP as defined in section 6600.

Because under the Act an alleged predator must be housed in a "secure facility" between the time probable cause is found and the time trial is completed (§ 6602, subd. (a)), petitioner was moved to Atascadero State Hospital (Atascadero). (See § 6600.05, subd. (a).) Thereafter, the case was continued at petitioner's request four more times while this court resolved constitutional challenges to the Act in Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584. Petitioner has been confined in Atascadero since December 1998 and has voluntarily received treatment at that facility pending his trial, but during this more than two-year pretrial period, no new mental evaluations (as described in section 6601, subdivisions (c) and (d)) have been performed.

In mid-September 1999—nearly a year and a half after completion of the original interviews and evaluations by the two independent mental health experts—the trial court held hearings on the district attorney's motion, filed earlier that month, seeking an order requiring petitioner to submit to updated interviews for the purpose of updated evaluations. The district attorney stressed the SVPA's requirement of "evidence of a currently diagnosed mental disorder" (§ 6600, subd. (a)(3)), explaining: "[I]n order to get the best diagnosis of someone's mental condition, [the mental health evaluator needs] to speak to that person. We want the best information going to the jury because to ask the jury to commit somebody as a sexually violent predator based on an evaluation that's two plus years old or a year or more old is not the best information we can give to the jury. Unlike criminal cases or most civil cases where the facts are the facts and they don't change over time, mental condition can." The district attorney asked the court to order updated interviews of petitioner and updated mental evaluations for use at trial, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032, subdivision (a).² In addition, the district attorney served a subpoena duces tecum on the Atascadero facility to obtain access to records of petitioner's mental health treatment undertaken after he was moved there pending trial. Petitioner opposed the request for additional interviews and asserted that the court lacked authority to compel him to participate in such examinations. With respect to the request for his mental health treatment records, petitioner asserted that such records are confidential under section 5328,³ and that the SVPA did not authorize release of those treatment records.

At the conclusion of the hearings, the trial court, citing and relying upon the SVPA's requirement that the fact finder must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that a current disorder exists (see § 6600, subd. (a)(3)),⁴ granted the district attorney's request to compel petitioner to submit to updated interviews by the independent evaluators, found that the district attorney was entitled to access to the records of the treatment undertaken by petitioner during the intervening months at Atascadero, and held that the confidentiality provision of section 5328 was inapplicable.⁵ On application of petitioner, the Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ of mandate directing the superior court to set aside its orders or show cause why a peremptory writ of mandate should not issue. Thereafter, by opinion, the appellate court issued a writ of mandate ordering the superior court to deny the district attorney's requests.

The Court of Appeal, relying upon its own decision in Sporich v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 422, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 (Sporich),

decided the same day as the appellate court's decision in the present case, held that the SVPA did not authorize the county to compel petitioner to submit to additional interviews designed to update the earlier evaluations, and also held that the Act did not grant the district attorney access to petitioner's treatment records. The appellate court further agreed with petitioner that the superior court's order affording the county access to the Atascadero treatment records violated the confidentiality provisions of section 5328. We granted review to consider the validity of the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal.

II.

The SVPA reflects the Legislature's determination of the importance of identifying and controlling persons whose criminal history and mental state render them sexually violent predators. Only persons who (i) have committed sexually violent crimes against multiple victims, and (ii) suffer from a "currently...