Albertville City Bd. of Educ. v. Moore
| Decision Date | 28 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 4:19-cv-00025-SGC |
| Parties | ALBERTVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA MOORE, as Parent and Next Friend of S.B., a minor, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
The Albertville City Board of Education (the "Board") commenced this action, seeking review of an administrative decision determining an individualized education program ("IEP") proposing to advance S.B. to kindergarten for the 2017-2018 school year denied the child the free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") guaranteed to him by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (Doc. 1). Pending before the undersigned is a motion requesting access to the sealed administrative record through the court's CM/ECF system, filed by Patricia Moore, as parent and next friend of S.B., a minor. (Doc. 20). The court provided Ms. Moore with a paper copy of the sealedadministrative record shortly after she filed her motion. Therefore, the motion (Doc. 20) is due to be denied as moot. Also pending before the undersigned is the Board's motion for judgment on the administrative record. (Doc. 15). For the reasons discussed below, the Board's motion is due to granted in part and denied in part, and this case is due to be remanded to the administrative law judge ("ALJ") who issued the decision at issue.
S.B. was born on May 24, 2012. (A.R. at 106).2 At eighteen months of age, he was diagnosed with moderate to severe autism. (Id. at 116-17). He also suffers from a milk allergy so severe that even dermal contact with a product containing milk risks a life-threatening anaphylactic reaction. (Id. at 119, 123-30). After S.B. was determined eligible to receive special education services, he began an early intervention program in the Albertville City Schools ("ACS") system during the 2015-2016 school year. (Id. at 133). He was enrolled in the ACS pre-kindergarten program for the 2016-2017 school year. (Id. at 145).
S.B.'s "IEP Team," comprised of school officials, teachers, Ms. Moore, and other persons with knowledge of S.B.'s unique needs, met in the spring of 2017 to develop S.B.'s IEP for the 2017-2018 school year. (Id. at 617-18). Ms. Moore believed her son should stay in pre-kindergarten for another year. (Id. at 153-54,617-18, 634-35). The other members of S.B.'s IEP Team, including S.B.'s general education teacher for pre-kindergarten, special education teacher, and speech language pathologist, believed S.B. should advance to kindergarten. (Id. at 617-19, 636). After her opinion regarding S.B.'s placement for the 2017-2018 school year was rejected, Ms. Moore enrolled her son in a private pre-kindergarten program. (Id. at 634-35).3 She also requested a due process hearing, alleging the ACS violated the IDEA in its treatment of S.B and seeking to recoup the cost of educating S.B. privately for the 2017-2018 school year, which she testified was approximately $28,000. (Id. at 158-59, 215, 408-13).
After a two-day hearing, the ALJ determined S.B.'s proposed IEP for the 2017-2018 school year denied him a FAPE. (Id. at 398-99). The ALJ found advancement of S.B. to kindergarten was not appropriate because (1) assessments indicated that in the spring of 2017, S.B. was functioning at the developmental level of a two-and-a-half-year-old child; (2) S.B.'s intellectual limitations and difficulty communicating with peers and adults prevented him from protecting himself from exposure to milk products; (3) the kindergarten classroom would have a greater student-to-teacher ratio; (4) the ACS could not ensure S.B. would have a dedicated aide in kindergarten; (5) given the greater student-to-teacher ratio in the kindergarten classroom and the possibility S.B. would not have a dedicated aide there, S.B. wouldlack the supervision necessary to ensure he did not come in contact with milk products; and (6) S.B. was physically small for his age. (Id. at 398-99). The ALJ further faulted the proposed IEP because, notwithstanding S.B.'s behavioral issues, the IEP did not provide for the training of a para-educator to ensure behavioral and educational integrity or include a behavior intervention plan developed by a board-certified behavior analyst ("BCBA"). (Id. at 398-99).
After determining S.B.'s proposed IEP for the 2017-2018 school year denied him a FAPE, the ALJ determined the private pre-kindergarten program in which Ms. Moore enrolled S.B. for the 2017-2018 school year provided appropriate services to S.B. and that the equities weighed in favor of requiring the Board to reimburse Ms. Moore in the amount of $14,000. (Id. at 20-23).
The IDEA establishes a substantive right to a FAPE for certain children with disabilities. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017) (citing Bd. of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)). A FAPE includes both "special education" - defined as "specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability" - and "related services" - defined as "supportive services . . . required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26), (29). The special education and related services to beprovided to a particular disabled child are documented in a written statement called an IEP. Id. at §§ 1401(14), 1414(d). To provide a FAPE, an IEP must be " 'reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits.'" Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F., 137 S. Ct. at 995-96 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204). The Supreme Court has also articulated the standard as requiring an IEP to be "reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances." Id. at 998-99. "Any review of an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal." Id. at 999; see also Weiss by Weiss v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cty., 141 F.3d 990, 998 (11th Cir. 1998) ().
If a local educational agency does not provide a FAPE to a disabled child in a timely manner, the agency may be required to reimburse the cost of educating the child in a private school. Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)). A disabled child's parent may seek reimbursement through a due process hearing before a state or local educational agency. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F., 137 S. Ct. at 994 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) and (g)). At the conclusion of the administrative proceedings,the losing party may seek redress in state or federal court. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)). The substantive questions at both the administrative level and for the federal district court are (1) whether the local educational agency failed to provide a FAPE, (2) whether the private school provides appropriate education and services, and (3) whether the equities warrant reimbursement in full or part. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter by and through Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. Of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Dep't of Educ. of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
"[G]reat deference must be paid to the educators who develop the IEP," and at the administrative phase the party challenging an IEP bears the burden of proving the program is inappropriate. Devine v. Indian River Cty. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2001). When review of an administrative decision is sought in federal district court, the burden of proof falls on the party challenging the decision. L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Pickens Cty. Sch. Dist. v. E.W. by and through R.W., 2011 WL 13272826, at *17 (N.D. Ga. June 11, 2011).
The standard of review to be applied by a federal district court when reviewing an administrative decision under the IDEA has been described as "puzzling" and " somewhat confusing." Walker Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Bennett ex rel. Bennett, 203 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg,59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995); Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 853 F.2d 853, 856 (11th Cir. 1988)). The statute instructs a reviewing court to "receive the records of the administrative proceedings," "hear additional evidence at the request of a party," and "basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, [] grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).4 Both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have noted the IDEA's judicial review provision contemplates an "independent" ruling by a reviewing court. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205; Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 853 F.2d at 856. The Eleventh Circuit also has described a district court's task in an IDEA case as to "conduct[] an entirely de novo review of the ALJ's findings." Sch. Bd. of Collier Cty., Florida v. K.C., 285 F.3d 977, 983 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205); CP v. Leon County Sch. Bd. Florida, 483 F.3d 1151, 1156 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing K.C., 285 F.3d at 983).
At the same time, the Supreme Court has instructed, "[T]he provision that a reviewing court base its decision on the 'preponderance of the evidence' is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. According to the Court, the statutory obligation of a reviewing court to...
To continue reading
Request your trial