Albin v. Board of Directors of Independent Dist. of West Branch

• Decision Date: 19 April 1882
• Citation: 12 N.W. 134,58 Iowa 77
• Parties: ALBIN ET AL. v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF WEST BRANCH
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

12 N.W. 134

58 Iowa 77

ALBIN ET AL. v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF WEST BRANCH

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 19, 1882

Appeal from Cedar District Court.

THE petition states the plaintiffs reside on the east half of sections one and twelve, in township seventy-nine, north of range five, in Johnson county, Iowa and constitute two-thirds of the electors residing thereon. That the school-house is not situate on said territory and that the same was formerly a part of the district township of Scott, in Johnson county but that the same for twelve years last past was set over in the adjoining township of Springdale, in Cedar county, for school purposes only, and attached to the independent district of West Branch.

That plaintiffs, being desirous to be restored to and become a part of the district township of Scott, presented a petition to the board of directors of said district township, and to the defendants, asking that proper action to that end be taken. That the district township granted the relief asked but the defendants omitted to act in said matter, and neglected and refused to enter of record or among their proceedings they had refused or granted the prayer of the petition. The plaintiffs ask that a mandamus be issued commanding the defendants to restore said territory as prayed in the petition aforesaid.

Certain material allegations in the petition were admitted by the answer, but it was denied that it was the legal duty of the defendants to grant the relief asked. It was stated in the answer the defendant was organized in 1869, and it was composed of territory in Springdale and Gower townships, in Cedar county, and that part of Scott township, Johnson county, which plaintiffs ask to be restored. That afterward and before the commencement of this action, a school-house was erected in defendant's district and an indebtedness incurred therefor, to meet which bonds were issued, which are unpaid, and that other lawful indebtedness has been incurred by said independent district. A demurrer to the answer was sustained and defendants appeal.

AFFIRMED.

Nourse & Kaufman and N.W. Macey, for appellants.

Boal & Jackson, for appellees.

SEEVERS CH. J. ADAMS, J., dissenting.

OPINION

SEEVERS, CH. J.

I. The eighteenth General Assembly repealed section 1798 of the Code, and enacted the following in lieu thereof: "That in all cases where territory has been or may be set into an adjoining county or township, or attached to any independent school district in an adjoining county or township, for school purposes, such territory may be restored by the concurrence of the respective boards of directors; but on the written application of two-thirds of the electors upon the territory within such township or independent district, in which the school-house is not situated, the said board shall restore the territory to the district to which it geographically belongs." Miller's Code, § 1798. The italicized words are additions made by the eighteenth General Assembly. In other respects the section is the same as Code, section 1798. The section as it stood in the Code did not embrace independent districts. Independent District of Fairview v. Durland, 45 Iowa 53. The primary object of the change would seem therefore to be to place independent districts on the same footing as district townships and subdistricts therein. One objection urged against this view is, that independent districts may create indebtedness and issue bonds therefor, and district townships cannot. But this cannot have much bearing on the construction of the statute as between these parties. Besides this we do not think it was the intent of the General Assembly to impair the rights of creditors. The latter are not parties to this action, and their rights cannot be affected by whatever determination may be made. It must be remembered the statute provides where a change is made there shall be an equitable division of assets and liabilities between the old and new district. Code, § 1715. Independent School District of Georgia v. Independent School District of Victory, 41 Iowa 321; Independent School District of Oakville v. Independent School District of Asbury, 43 Iowa 444. But it is suggested the district township of Scott cannot bind itself to pay negotiable bonds. This must be regarded as an open question. What liability has been assumed, or been cast upon the district township in consequence of the restoration of the territory, is not before us. But certain it is there must be an equitable apportionment of all the assets and liabilities. In arriving at such apportionment no part of the assets or liabilities can be excluded.

II. It is insisted the meaning and intent of the statute is not to include territory which became a part of an independent district at the time of its formation but includes only such territory as is attached to such district in other townships or counties, which should be regarded as temporarily attached, because of streams or other natural obstacles, which in time may be changed or obviated. It is further insisted, "attached to" does not embrace a case where the territory originally formed a part of the district, the argument being, the district must have existed before any thing could be attached to it. To attach to, among other things, means to "connect with," and this, we think, is the sense intended, for the statute provides, "that in all cases" the restoration shall be made. This clearly includes territory forming a part of the district when organized, or attached thereto afterward. We are not called upon to vindicate the wisdom of the statute, but it may be said, unless grave reasons exist, territory in one county should not be attached to another county, for school purposes, and all such cases should be regarded as temporary, and liable to be changed at any time. Such, evidently, is the intent of the statute under consideration. It is suggested there is a great difference between a case where territory forms a part of an independent district, when it is organized, and territory afterward attached thereto, for school purposes. But the district was originally formed for school purposes, and nothing else. The purpose is the same in both cases, and the primary object sought to be obtained in the formation, and changes in the boundaries of all school districts, is precisely the same. It is not, and cannot, be said all independent districts may not be abolished. So may the boundaries be changed in such manner as the General Assembly may determine. Why the boundaries of an independent district, as originally formed, cannot be as readily changed as where territory is afterward attached thereto, we are unable to conceive. Nor can we see why they cannot be changed as readily as district townships and subdistricts. The thought that independent districts are constituted for the benefit of the inhabitants of cities or towns is fallacious, because the statute provides township districts may be organized as independent districts. Code, § 1814. Of course one independent district may have as high grades in its schools, and as fine a school-house, as any other district. The school-house in independent districts, and subdistricts, is, no doubt, located with reference to the territory embraced therein, when formed, and the house is built. That the boundaries of the latter may be changed, is not disputed, and yet the same arguments against the change could, with the same propriety, be made in such case as where the boundaries of an independent district are changed. To our minds the statute is plain, and its meaning readily understood, and therefore, it is not deemed essential to refer to...