Albino v. Municipality of Guayanilla

• Decision Date: 15 February 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 12–1060 (FAB).
• Citation: 925 F.Supp.2d 186
• Parties: Rosana M. Ruiz ALBINO, Plaintiff, v. MUNICIPALITY OF GUAYANILLA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

925 F.Supp.2d 186

Rosana M. Ruiz ALBINO, Plaintiff,

v.MUNICIPALITY OF GUAYANILLA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 12–1060 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Feb. 15, 2013.

Dennis J. Cruz–Perez, Dennis J. Cruz Perez Law Offices, Katiria M. Perez–Lopez, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiff.

Johanna M. Emmanuelli–Huertas, Pedro E. Ortiz Alvarez, Law Office, Ponce, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant Municipality of Guayanilla's (“defendant Municipality”) motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) (Docket No. 10.) Having considered the arguments in the motion to dismiss, (Docket No. 10), and Rosana M. Ruiz–Albino's (“plaintiff Ruiz”) opposition, (Docket No. 15), the Court GRANTS defendant Municipality's motion to dismiss for the reasons discussed below.

I. BACKGROUNDA. Procedural History

On January 30, 2012, plaintiff Ruiz filed a complaint seeking damages from defendant Municipality and defendant Edgardo Arlequin–Velez (“defendant Mayor Arlequin”) in his official and individual capacities, as well as unidentified defendants “not presently [sic] known to the plaintiff,” in their official and individual capacities. (Docket No. 1.) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”), she asserted claims of political discrimination, political harassment, and equal protection and due process violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. Additionally, plaintiff Ruiz sues the same defendants for violations of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Id. Defendant Municipality filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on June 19, 2012. (Docket No. 10.) Plaintiff Ruiz filed an opposition on July 20, 2012. (Docket No. 15.)

B. Factual Background

In her complaint, plaintiff Ruiz alleges the following non-conclusory facts. She began her employment with the defendant Municipality as an Office Clerk at the Municipal Finance Department in 2002. (Docket No. 1 at p. 3.) Sometime thereafter, the position became permanent. Id. From 2004 to 2007, plaintiff Ruiz participated in political activities that supported defendant Mayor Arlequin's reelection campaigns as part of the Popular Democratic Party (“P.P.D.”). Id. Around 2007, plaintiff Ruiz became the Director of the Citizen's Services Office, where she supervised employees and took complaints from citizens, which she referred to the defendant Mayor. Id. She kept her designation as Clerk while she carried out the additional duties. Id.

Around October 2009, plaintiff Ruiz's husband began to work for a political team supporting another P.P.D certified candidate who rivaled defendant Mayor Arlequin in the P.P.D. Guayanilla mayoral primary race. Id. Plaintiff Ruiz's husband performed computer work for defendant Municipality, but his association with defendant Mayor Arlequin's rival was well-known throughout the area. Id. Plaintiff Ruiz occasionally appeared along-side her husband at community events that supported the rival P.P.D. candidate. Id. at pp. 3–4. Plaintiff Ruiz was treated as the rival's supporter because of her marital relationship and appearances alongside her husband. Id. at p. 4.

Plaintiff Ruiz was removed as Director of the Citizen's Services Office and was assigned to the Municipal Waste and Recycle Plant. Id. She alleges that she was “belittled” and asked to perform tasks outside of her official duties as a Municipal Clerk.¹Id. Thereafter, plaintiff Ruiz's supervisor accused her of misusing a USB drive to steal information, to which she had access at her previous position, about Municipal employees and local citizens. Id. Her supervisor accused her of using this information for personal gain, and also accused her of undue use of the municipal computers for personal benefit. Id.

An administrative hearing was held to address the allegations against plaintiff Ruiz.²Id. Prior to the hearing, defendant Mayor Arlequin made a series of statements to the local press indicating that one of his employees had been accused of information theft. Id. at pp. 4–5. Defendant Mayor Arlequin did not name plaintiff Ruiz as the suspect in these statements, but he provided “[t]he name[s of,] and statements of facts by[,] fellow municipality workers.” Id. Plaintiff Ruiz alleges that the information provided by the mayor made the “plaintiff's identity rather obvious among municipal employees and to the local public.” Id. at p. 5. When she heard about the press releases, plaintiff Ruiz suffered an emotional breakdown, requiring medical treatment. Id. After an administrative hearing, plaintiff Ruiz was dismissed from her position on January 31, 2011.³Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) permits the Court to dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When assessing whether a plaintiff's complaint provides “fair notice to the defendants” and states “a facially plausible legal claim,” the Court must utilize a two-pronged approach. See Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir.2011). First, the Court can disregard statements that “offer legal conclusions couched as fact,” because the plaintiff must do more than “parrot the elements of the cause of action.” Id. at 12. Second, the Court is bound to treat all “properly pled factual allegations” as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. The Court must base its determination solely on the material submitted as part of the complaint and expressly incorporated within it. See Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001).

The factual material pled must be sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and to permit the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ocasio–Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's pleading must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A district court should not attempt to forecast the likelihood of success even if proving the alleged facts is “improbable.” Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint that contains a plausible basis for relief, therefore, “may proceed even if it appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citation omitted). The Court draws “on its judicial experience and common sense” in evaluating the complaint's plausibility. Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir.2012) (internal citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant Municipality argues that plaintiff Ruiz fails to state a claim for political discrimination, political harassment, an equal protection violation, or a due process violation pursuant to the First or Fourteenth Amendments necessary for section 1983 liability. (Docket No. 10 at pp. 2–8.) It also contends that any claim related to political harassment is barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations and that plaintiff Ruiz fails to establish municipal liability. (Docket No. 10 at pp. 6–7, 10.) The Court addresses those arguments in turn.

A. Plaintiff Ruiz's Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 allows “a private right of action for violations of federally protected rights.” Marrero–Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2007). The Supreme Court has held that section 1983 does not confer substantive rights, “but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Marrero–Saez v. Municipality of Aibonito, 668 F.Supp.2d 327, 332 (D.P.R.2009) (citing Graham v. M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). In order to state a claim pursuant to section 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly plead (1) that he or she was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) that a “causal connection exists between [defendants' conduct] and the [constitutional deprivation]; and (3) that the challenged conduct was attributable to a person acting under color of state law.” Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

1. Municipal Liability

Municipalities are “persons” for the purpose of a section 1983 claim, and, therefore, are subject to claims pursuant to the statute. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable for actions of its employees, however, pursuant to a theory of respondeat superior. Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir.2011) (internal citations omitted). In order for a plaintiff to allege a claim of municipal liability, he or she must show “a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff's injury.” Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (internal citation omitted). Liability can be established in two ways: (1) when a municipal custom or policy causes a constitution violation, or (2) when a person with final decision making authority took the action that violated the constitutional right. See Kelly v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002).

The Court finds that plaintiff Ruiz fails to allege facts showing that the municipality enforced a policy or custom that led to her dismissal. First, plaintiff Ruiz fails to plead that a policy or custom even existed. ( See Docket No. 1.) The Court surmises it would be a custom or policy to dismiss people who supported one of defendant Mayor Arlequin's rivals. Other than conclusory statements that plaintiff Ruiz was “belittled” and dismissed because of her support for the rival, she does not provide any support demonstrating a municipal policy or custom. See id. Evidence of a plaintiff's own employment history...