Albright v. State

Decision Date12 January 2022
Docket Number21-0116
CourtIowa Court of Appeals
PartiesCHARLES RAYMOND ALBRIGHT, Applicant-Appellant, v. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Franklin County, James M Drew, Judge.

The applicant appeals the denial of postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

S.P DeVolder of The DeVolder Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Norwalk, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.

TABOR PRESIDING JUDGE.

Charles Albright appeals the denial of postconviction relief (PCR) from his convictions for first-degree kidnapping and willful injury causing bodily injury. On direct appeal, the supreme court affirmed his convictions and preserved his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for later proceedings. The PCR court then rejected his eight ineffective-assistance claims. After reviewing anew Albright's challenges to his trial representation, we affirm that denial of relief.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

The supreme court set out the facts of the criminal case in considerable detail. See State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 148-49 (Iowa 2019). For our purposes, the following is enough. In October 2016, Albright lived with his girlfriend, K.H. One night, Albright used methamphetamine and marijuana before going into what he called a "blind rage"-paranoid about K.H.'s alleged infidelity. Throughout that night and into the morning, Albright repeatedly attacked K.H., using his hands, a cordless drill, a knife, and a stun gun. Albright's German Shepherd also bit K.H. on the leg and hip. K.H. tried to escape several times, but Albright blocked her or dragged her back.

The next afternoon, Albright forced K.H. into his truck when he took another dog to the veterinarian's office. On the trip, Albright continued to punch K.H. And he threatened, among other things, to "bury [her] up to [her] neck in a cornfield and let a combine take [her] head off and nobody would ever find [her]." After the vet visit, Albright stopped at a Casey's convenience store. While Albright was inside, K.H. fled to a Dollar General across the street. She borrowed a phone from the store clerk, locked herself in the restroom, and called 911. At the emergency room, a nurse noted K.H.'s extensive injuries including two nose fractures. Her eyes were swollen almost shut and her dentures were broken.

The State originally charged Albright with kidnapping in the first degree under the "serious injury" alternative, a class "A" felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 710.1 and .2 (2016). The State also charged willful injury resulting in serious injury, a class "C" felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1). But just before trial, it amended the willful injury count to causing bodily injury, a class "D" felony. Iowa Code § 708.4(2). And it amended the kidnapping enhancement to "torture" rather than "serious injury." Id. § 710.2(1). That charge remained a class "A" felony. Defense counsel, James Metcalf, did not object to those amendments.

The State built its case with testimony from K.H., as well as an emergency medical technician (EMT) who happened to be shopping at the Dollar General when K.H. entered, the hospital emergency room (ER) nurse, and several law enforcement officers. But K.H. was the only witness, other than Albright, to the events preceding her escape from the truck. The EMT testified that K.H.'s face was swollen and she had dried blood on her lips and ear. The nurse chronicled K.H.'s broken bones, cuts, and bruises. As part of the treatment, K.H. revealed that "her boyfriend had been beating her up since morning." The State also offered a slew of photographs of K.H.'s injuries.

For the defense, the strategy was to acknowledge that Albright committed willful injury causing bodily injury but to deny that he intentionally tortured K.H. for purpose of the kidnapping enhancement. Attorney Metcalf called Albright to the stand, as well as Albright's mother and a friend. But that strategy did not work.

The jury found Albright guilty of both charges. The court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the first-degree kidnapping offense, to be served concurrently with a five-year term for the willful injury conviction. The court also imposed various fines, surcharges, and other conditions, including restitution.

On direct appeal, the supreme court affirmed his convictions but remanded for the district court to fix a problem with the restitution order. See Albright, 925 N.W.2d at 158-62. The court preserved Albright's ineffective-assistance claims for PCR proceedings so that Metcalf could "defend" against allegations that he failed to perform as reasonably competent counsel. Id. at 158.

Albright filed this PCR application in October 2019. After a videoconference trial in the fall of 2020, the court denied relief. Albright appeals.

II. Scope and Standards of Review

"We generally review a district court's denial of an application for postconviction relief for errors at law." Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa 2021). For constitutional claims-such as ineffective assistance of counsel-our review is de novo. See id. To establish ineffectiveness, Albright must show his attorney failed to perform an essential duty, which created prejudice. Id.; accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984).

On the first prong, we ask whether counsel acted within the normal range of competency, starting from the presumption that he did. See State v. Cromer, 765 N.W.2d 1, 7-8 (Iowa 2009). Albright "must rebut the presumption of competence by showing a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." State v. Lorenzo Baltazar, 935 N.W.2d 862, 868 (Iowa 2019) (cleaned up). On that performance prong, we apply "prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The applicant must show more than mere "improvident trial strategy, miscalculated tactics, mistake, carelessness or inexperience as viewed with the clarity of hindsight." Cromer, 765 N.W.2d at 8 (cleaned up). Counsel has no duty to raise a claim or make an objection that has no merit. Id.

On the second prong, an attorney's deficient performance causes prejudice when the "errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. It is not enough to show the error could have conceivably influenced the verdict. State v. Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Iowa 2015). Albright must show there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "The ultimate question is 'whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). We may resolve the claim on either prong of the Strickland test. State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003).

III. Analysis

Albright raises seven grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim of cumulative prejudice.

A. Defense strategy

Despite giving notice of an intoxication defense, trial counsel did not pursue an intoxication or diminished capacity defense at trial. Albright contends counsel should have advanced those defenses to negate the specific intent elements of the charges. For kidnapping, the State had to prove Albright confined or removed K.H. "with the specific intent to inflict serious injury" on her and "intentionally subjected [her] to torture."[1] And for willful injury, the State had to show Albright "specifically intended to cause a serious injury" to K.H.[2] To support his contention, Albright presented the testimony of psychiatrist Donner Dewdney who opined at the PCR trial that the drugs Albright consumed, combined with his mental-health issues, made him unable to form specific intent.

These affirmative defenses were a route that attorney Metcalf considered. Several months before trial, Metcalf filed a notice of an intoxication defense. But when trial started, he withdrew that affirmative defense. At the PCR trial, Metcalf explained that his initial plan was to negate the specific intent elements by asserting Albright's intoxication. Metcalf did not intend to present expert testimony, only to have Albright on the stand. Metcalf testified he discussed the strategy with Albright, who "wanted to tell the story." Metcalf also testified he considered a diminished capacity defense. He discussed Albright's mental-health and substance-abuse history with Albright's mother and with a psychiatrist in Minneapolis. But the doctor could not provide an opinion in support of those defenses, so Metcalf abandoned them.

After deciding not to pursue those defenses, and considering the State's strong case, Metcalf entertained a compromise position. After discussion with Albright, Metcalf decided the best strategy was to acknowledge that Albright committed willful injury causing bodily injury but to fight the kidnapping count.

What he did do was willful injury, that he went into this blind rage when he found out she had been cheating on him, and we thought the jury would understand that. We thought the jury may come back with a willful injury finding and not a kidnapping . . . . [W]e knew that there was a risk in doing that, but that's the way he wanted to proceed, the way I wanted to proceed, and we did.

Albright also faults Metcalf for this decision.[3] Albright now argues the admission that he specifically intended to cause serious injury for the willful injury count let the...

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