Albright v. State
| Decision Date | 26 January 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-183A3,4-183A3 |
| Citation | 459 N.E.2d 76 |
| Parties | Stanley C. ALBRIGHT, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Stanley C. Albright brought this appeal from the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In our original memorandum decision, we reversed, holding the trial court's finding that Albright knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally pled guilty was contrary to law. We also held that the State could not raise for the first time on appeal a contention that Albright had waived this issue. The State has challenged both of these holdings in a timely-filed petition for rehearing. Although we do not agree with the State that the trial court's ruling should be affirmed, we find that several matters raised in the State's petition should be addressed. We accordingly grant rehearing and substitute the following for the discussion in our original opinion.
The central issue in this appeal is whether the trial court hearing Albright's petition for post-conviction relief erred in finding Albright pled guilty knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. We may affirm only if the record of Albright's guilty plea shows the trial court directly informed him of all the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, in strict compliance with Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-3 (now codified at Ind.Code 35-35-1-2 (1982)). Garringer v. State, (1983) Ind., 455 N.E.2d 335; Davis v. State, (1983) Ind., 446 N.E.2d 1317; German v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234. This does not mean that the court was required to use any particular language in carrying out the mandate of the statute. Garringer v. State, supra. Rather, the issue here is whether the trial court's statements to Albright fairly conveyed the substance of the rights enumerated in Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-3.
We find that they did not. Although the trial judge carefully advised Albright of most of his rights, he inadvertently failed to inform Albright of his right to a public trial, as required by Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-3(c). The right to a public trial is meant to ensure that one accused receives a fair trial and generally requires that at least some portion of the general public be allowed to attend and observe the trial. State ex rel. Post-Tribune Publishing Co. v. Porter Superior Court, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 748; Hackett v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 103, 360 N.E.2d 1000; 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law Sec. 878; see also James v. State, (1983) Ind.App., 454 N.E.2d 1225 (). Searching the transcript of the hearing on Albright's guilty plea, we find no statements by the trial judge even hinting at the existence of this fundamental constitutional right.
In so finding, we note that the facts in this case differ from those in Garringer, supra, cited by the State. In Garringer, the court found the right to a public trial was adequately conveyed by the explanation that "twelve people of the Elkhart County area" would hear the defendant's case and that "other people would be present during the trial including witnesses who could be called to testify against or for the defendant." 455 N.E.2d at 339. In this case, because Albright had previously waived his right to a jury trial, 1 the trial judge told him he had no right to a jury. The judge did, however, tell Albright he had a right to call witnesses and to confront the State's witnesses. We do not believe this is enough under Garringer to inform Albright of his right to a public trial. In light of the common practice of excluding witnesses from the courtroom when they are not on the stand, telling a defendant that he may subpoena witnesses does not at all indicate that they will be allowed to observe the trial. Unlike Garringer, Albright was never told his trial would be observed by twelve of his peers on a jury or by any "other people." On these facts, to hold that Albright was meaningfully advised of his right to a public trial would render meaningless our supreme court's holding that one pleading guilty must be directly informed of all the constitutional rights listed in Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-3. See German v. State, supra. Because Albright was not adequately informed of his right to a public trial before pleading guilty, we cannot find his plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. German v. State, supra; Brown v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 435 N.E.2d 582. Thus, the trial court's finding that Albright's plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently was contrary to law.
The State argues, however, that the post-conviction court's decision should be affirmed because Albright has waived the issue of whether his guilty plea was validly entered. Specifically, the State claims this issue is waived because it was the subject of an earlier pro se petition by Albright to withdraw his guilty plea. The record shows the court denied this petition and Albright failed to appeal. In our original opinion, we held the State had itself waived this waiver theory by failing to raise it in the trial court. On rehearing, however, the State points out that the trial court denied Albright's P.C.R. 1 petition before the State was required to file its answer. Because the State was thus precluded from raising the issue of waiver in the trial court, we now...
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Albright v. State
...holding appellant's guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently given. The Court of Appeals opinion reported at 459 N.E.2d 76 is hereby Appellant appeared by counsel before the court on January 15, 1981, and waived his right to a jury trial. At that time counsel stated, "Mr......
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