Albritton v. Kansas City
| Decision Date | 07 February 1916 |
| Parties | ALBRITTON v. KANSAS CITY. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Frank G. Johnson, Judge.
Action by Annie Albritton against Kansas City. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and cause remanded.
A. F. Smith, A. F. Evans, and Hunt C. Moore, all of Kansas City, for appellant. Chapman & Hanger and J. T. Allbritain, all of Kansas City, for respondent.
Plaintiff sued for damages she alleges she sustained from negligence of defendant in permitting ice, which had become a dangerous obstruction to travel, to remain upon a public sidewalk. The defense is a general denial and contributory negligence. Verdict and judgment were for plaintiff, and defendant appealed.
In the morning of March 2, 1912, plaintiff, while going to work at a laundry where she was employed, slipped and fell upon an icy sidewalk, and was severly injured. The sidewalk was on the east side of Prospect avenue, between Fifteenth and Sixteenth streets, and adjoined the laundry, which was at the southeast corner of Fifteenth street and Prospect avenue. Plaintiff, who lived on the west side of Prospect avenue south of Sixteenth street, had crossed to the east side, and was walking north in a narrow path worn by pedestrians through the snow which covered the sidewalk, when she slipped and fell. The records of the weather bureau at Kansas City show that on February 25th and 26th 10 inches of snow fell, which the next day was reduced by melting and evaporation to 6½ inches. The next day was colder, and the snow on the ground was reduced only three-tenths of an inch, and in the two days following (February 29th and March 1st) the snow further was reduced to 5 4/5 inches. Early in the morning of March 2d, the date of the injury, snow began falling and at the end of the day the total precipitation was 11½ inches. At the time of the injury, not over an inch had fallen, and plaintiff claims the fall of snow that morning was much less than that.
The evidence most favorable to plaintiff, which, of course, we must accept as true in our consideration of the demurrer to the evidence, tends to show that the heavy snow which had fallen almost a week before the injury had not been removed from the sidewalk on Prospect avenue adjoining the laundry property, and that the pedestrian travel, which was heavy, had beaten down a pathway about 18 inches wide, and with the aid of alternate freezing and thawing the path had been converted into ice which, at places, had formed into ridges and mounds, which made the surface extremely ragged, uneven, and dangerous. This condition, which had continued three or four days, is described by plaintiff and her witnesses as one which presented a far more difficult and dangerous obstruction to travel than that which is spoken of in some of the reported cases as a general condition of snow and ice which ordinarily would result from not removing fallen snow from the sidewalks.
A city is not liable to respond in damages for injuries resulting from such general conditions. The law, as declared in the decisions in this state, does not impose the duty upon the city of keeping the public sidewalks clear of snow and ice, deeming that such a rule would be impracticable or, at any rate, too burdensome. Vonkey v. St. Louis, 219 Mo. 37, 117 S. W. 733; Livingston v. St. Joseph, 174 Mo. App. 636, 161 S. W. 304; Reedy v. Brewing Ass'n, 161 Mo. loc. cit. 536, 61 S. W. 859, 53 L. R. A. 805; Hatch v. Elmira, 142 App. Div. 174, 126 N. Y. Supp. 863; Hyer v. Janesville, 101 Wis. 371, 77 N. W. 729. But the city is required to exercise reasonable care to keep its sidewalks clear from all dangerous obstructions which do not belong to a generally dangerous condition produced by natural causes, and the law recognizes that snow and ice which has been suffered to accumulate upon a sidewalk and to assume an especially dangerous form is such an obstruction, the abatement of which should be included within the scope of the general duty of the city to exercise reasonable care to keep its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel. "Snow and ice, allowed to accumulate on a walk in an uneven and ridgy condition, so as to constitute an obstruction to public travel, renders it defective and actionably so." Vonkey v. St. Louis, supra, 219 Mo. loc. cit. 44, 117 S. W. 735; Reno v. City, 169 Mo. 642, 70 S. W. 123; Barker v. City, 150...
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