Albuquerque Commons P'ship v. City Council of The City of Albuquerque

• Decision Date: 03 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 31,724.,31,724.
• Citation: 248 P.3d 856,149 N.M. 308,2011 -NMSC- 002
• Parties: ALBUQUERQUE COMMONS PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiff–Petitioner,v.CITY COUNCIL OF the CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

149 N.M. 308

248 P.3d 856

2011 -NMSC- 002

ALBUQUERQUE COMMONS PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiff–Petitioner,

v.CITY COUNCIL OF the CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Defendant–Respondent.

No. 31,724.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Jan. 3, 2011.

Mettler & LeCuyer, P.C., Stephen T. LeCuyer, Timothy V. Flynn–O'Brien, Philip B. Davis, Bryan Law Firm, George R. Bryan, III, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.Robert M. White, Mark Andrew Hirsch, Lorenz Law, Alice Tomlinson Lorenz, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent.Law Offices of Jane B. Yohalem, Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, Law Office of William E. Snead, William E. Snead, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association.

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} The issue presented in this appeal is whether NMSA 1978, Section 56–8–4(D) (2004), bars an award of post-judgment interest against the state and its political subdivisions when a plaintiff successfully establishes the deprivation of a federally protected constitutional right in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (Section 1983). If post-judgment interest is not barred, we must determine whether federal law or state law establishes the proper rate of interest. We conclude that the state and its political subdivisions are not exempt from post-judgment interest because the Legislature plainly intended interest to be awarded “as otherwise provided by statute,” Section 56–8–4(D), and a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006) ( Section 1961), provides for post-judgment interest in Section 1983 actions. We further conclude that the Legislature intended the interest rate set forth in Section 1961 to apply to Section 1983 actions filed in state court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} This is the second time this case has come before us for review. See Albuquerque Commons P'ship v. City Council of Albuquerque (ACP II), 2008–NMSC–025, 144 N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411. Because the facts of this case are fully explained in our prior opinion, id. ¶¶ 3–20, we refer only to those facts that are necessary to resolve the present appeal. In July 1995, Plaintiff Albuquerque Commons Partnership (ACP) commenced this Section 1983 action against Defendant City Council of the City of Albuquerque (the City), claiming, in relevant part, that the City's adoption of a revised site zoning plan on ACP's leasehold property violated ACP's right to substantive and procedural due process of law and constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶ 15. “In February 2003, ACP's federal procedural due process and takings claims were tried to a jury.” Id. ¶ 18. The jury found in favor of ACP on both claims, but “[t]he verdict for damages for the takings claim was dismissed pursuant to the election of remedies doctrine, and on April 11, 2003, the district court entered final judgment against the City on the due process verdict in the amount of $8,349,095.00.” Id.

{3} ACP moved for post-judgment interest, claiming that Section 56–8–4(D), which prohibits the award of post-judgment interest against the state or its political subdivisions except as otherwise provided by statute or common law, is preempted by federal law because it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes” and objectives of Section 1983. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262, 99 S.Ct. 1096, 59 L.Ed.2d 296 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court agreed, finding that “the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires an award of post-judgment interest, and that the post-judgment interest rate shall be 8 3/4% per annum pursuant to [Section 56–8–4(A) ].” Additionally, the district court determined that ACP was entitled to post-judgment interest “at the statutory rate of 8.75% per annum” on its award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).

{4} The City appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the district court. See Albuquerque Commons P'ship v. City Council of Albuquerque (ACP I), 2006–NMCA–143, ¶ 78, 140 N.M. 751, 149 P.3d 67, rev'd by ACP II, 2008–NMSC–025, ¶ 60, 144 N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411. However, this Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that “the City's decision [to adopt the revised site zoning plan] lacked procedural fairness and did not comport with due process of law.” ACP II, 2008–NMSC–025, ¶¶ 52, 60, 144 N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411. Accordingly, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with direction to address the City's remaining claims, including the City's claim that the district court improperly awarded post-judgment interest under Section 56–8–4 at the statutory rate of “8 3/4% per annum.” Id. ¶ 60.

{5} On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's award of damages in the amount of $8,349,095 and the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but “reverse[d] the award of post-judgment interest.” Albuquerque Commons P'ship v. City Council of Albuquerque (ACP III), 2009–NMCA–065, ¶ 4, 146 N.M. 568, 212 P.3d 1122. The Court held that the City was exempt from an award of post-judgment interest under Section 56–8–4(D) because Section 1961, which provides for the award of post-judgment interest on Section 1983 claims filed in federal court, does not apply to “Section 1983 claim[s] filed in state court.” ACP III, 2009–NMCA–065, ¶ 53, 146 N.M. 568, 212 P.3d 1122; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c)(4) (“This section shall not be construed to affect the interest on any judgment of any court not specified in this section.”). In arriving at its conclusion, the Court rejected ACP's claim that Section 56–8–4(D) conflicts with the remedial objectives of Section 1983, opining that “[t]he remedial objectives of Section 1983 are certainly achieved when a plaintiff successfully brings suit for damages against the state to vindicate constitutional rights. The recovery of post-judgment interest operates only as an enforcement mechanism to encourage the timely payment of damages after judgment has been entered.” ACP III, 2009–NMCA–065, ¶ 57, 146 N.M. 568, 212 P.3d 1122. In light of its conclusion that the district court improperly awarded post-judgment interest to ACP, the Court did not reach the question of “whether the interest was properly assessed according to the state, and not the federal, interest rate.” Id.

{6} ACP filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34–5–14(B) (1972) and Rule 12–502 NMRA. Albuquerque Commons P'ship v. City Council of Albuquerque, 2009–NMCERT–007, 147 N.M. 363, 223 P.3d 360.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{7} To determine whether the state and its political subdivisions are exempt from post-judgment interest on money damages awarded in a Section 1983 action and the applicable interest rate, if any, we must examine Section 56–8–4, which governs interest “on judgments and decrees for the payment of money.” Section 56–8–4(A). “Statutory construction is a matter of law we review de novo.” State v. Nick R., 2009–NMSC–050, ¶ 11, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868. “The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature using the plain language of the statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent.” State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 242, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994) (citation omitted). “We may only add words to a statute where it is necessary to make the statute conform to the legislature's clear intent, or to prevent the statute from being absurd.” State v. Maestas, 2007–NMSC–001, ¶ 15, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933.

III. DISCUSSION

{8} “[P]ost-judgment interest is routinely awarded in Section 1983 cases filed in federal court.” ACP III, 2009–NMCA–065, ¶ 53, 146 N.M. 568, 212 P.3d 1122. Indeed, “[o]nce a judgment is obtained, interest thereon is mandatory” pursuant to Section 1961. Transpower Constructors v. Grand River Dam Auth., 905 F.2d 1413, 1424 (10th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (“Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.” (emphasis added)). The City therefore concedes that, if ACP's Section 1983 claim had been litigated in federal court, then ACP would be entitled to an award of post-judgment interest under Section 1961(a).

{9} However, the Court of Appeals held that Section 1961 does not apply to Section 1983 actions filed in state court. ACP III, 2009–NMCA–065, ¶ 53, 146 N.M. 568, 212 P.3d 1122; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c)(4) (“This section shall not be construed to affect the interest on any judgment of any court not specified in this section.”); Gaulin v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 744, 505 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1987) (noting that “Section 1961 cannot be directly invoked” in state court, but nonetheless concluding that “the liability of the state for post-award interest is alike regardless of the forum”). Neither ACP nor Amicus Curiae New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association (NMTLA) challenge this conclusion on appeal.

{10} Instead, ACP and NMTLA claim that Section 56–8–4(D) incorporates Section 1961 by reference because it permits an award of post-judgment interest against the state and its political subdivisions “as otherwise provided by statute.” Section 56–8–4(D). Alternatively, ACP and NMTLA argue that Section 56–8–4(D)'s bar on post-judgment interest frustrates the remedial purpose of Section 1983 and, therefore, violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Additionally, ACP argues that Section 56–8–4(D) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, because it “creates several classes of civil rights victims with state court [Section] 1983 judgments, resulting in irrationally inconsistent entitlements to post-judgment interest.”

{11} The City responds that the statutory phrase, “otherwise...