Gaulin v. Commissioner of Public Welfare

• Decision Date: 29 May 1987
• Citation: 505 N.E.2d 898,23 Mass.App.Ct. 744
• Parties: Jason GAULIN v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WELFARE (and two companion cases). 1
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 898

505 N.E.2d 898

23 Mass.App.Ct. 744

Jason GAULIN v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WELFARE (and two companion cases).

¹

Appeals Court of Massachusetts,

Hampden.

Argued Nov. 14, 1986.

Decided March 31, 1987.

Further Appellate Review Granted May 29, 1987.

Despena Fillios Billings, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

J. Patterson Rae, Springfield, for plaintiffs.

Allan G. Rodgers, Boston, for Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Before ARMSTRONG, KAPLAN and SMITH, JJ.

KAPLAN, Justice.

In these consolidated actions, brought to enforce asserted civil rights, the plaintiffs based their claims on State law and on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (civil action for deprivation of rights). As prevailing parties in these actions, the plaintiffs secured an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (vindication of civil rights; attorney's fees). The defendant State official paid the amount of the award, but after a period of delay. Accordingly the plaintiffs applied for post-award interest accrued during that period. From the order allowing such interest, the defendant appeals. We affirm the order for the reasons set out below. We go on to suggest how the State may proceed when it has a meritorious reason for asking a court to postpone the obligation to pay assessed fees.

1. We take, as typical of the consolidated cases, that of Jason Gaulin, a child three years old. He is the son of Patricia LaRochelle. The other members of Ms. LaRochelle's household are her children, Marsha and Dennis Delgado, aged six and seven years, who receive Social Security survivors' benefits because their father is dead; David LaRochelle, her present husband; and David LaRochelle, Jr., their son, six months old. Jason's father, Keith Gaulin, has not contributed to Jason's support. When the mother sought "general relief" pursuant to G.L. c. 117, § 1 et seq., on Jason's behalf, and for him alone, the Department of Public Welfare declined to consider the application; rather it required the mother to apply for herself and all four children. In refusing the combined application thus made, the Department attributed David LaRochelle's income to the mother and decided that his earnings were available to support her and all the children. This brought the group over the income baseline for general relief. ² It was asserted on Jason's behalf that so to count the stepfather David LaRochelle's income in deciding Jason's eligibility not only violated the statute (G.L. c. 117, § 9) and regulations (106 Code Mass.Regs. § 313.520 [1979] ), but also violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution (and provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution to the same effect) by discriminating invidiously against stepchildren claiming general relief in situations like Jason's, for the basic rule of law was that a stepfather was not obligated to furnish support for his stepchildren.

The plaintiff exhausted administrative review and then applied to the Superior Court under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, by complaint filed in July, 1982. Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the court held for the plaintiff on State grounds (interpretation of the statute and regulations) without having to pass on the constitutional issues. ³ Judgment entered in November, 1982. The defendant Commissioner took an appeal from the decision, ⁴ and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review. However, in September, 1983, there was a stipulation of voluntary dismissal, the defendant Commissioner having acceded to the plaintiff's view which allowed individual consideration of Jason's application without counting the stepfather's income.

In October, 1983, the plaintiff moved on affidavits for allowance of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. ⁵ After discovery in connection with this motion, the judge made an award of $8,199.75 (in the three consolidated cases) on June 13, 1984. The Commonwealth paid this amount on September 28, 1984, after a delay of three and one half months. Thereupon the plaintiffs moved for an order for interest on the award accrued during the period of delay. An order, in the amount of $286.99, was allowed; ⁶ a defendant's motion for reconsideration was denied; and it is the allowance of this item of interest that is the subject of the present appeal. (We have omitted from our narrative the substance of an affidavit offered by the defendant to explain the delay of payment. This will be discussed at point 3 below.)

2. The courts of the Commonwealth are well acquainted with the § 1988 provision for reasonable attorney's fees payable to the prevailing parties in civil rights actions against State officials grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or certain other Federal enactments which, at plaintiff's election, may be instituted in State courts. See Draper v. Town Clerk of Greenfield, 384 Mass. 444, 425 N.E.2d 333 (1981); Stratos v. Department of Public Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 439 N.E.2d 778 (1982); Mulhern v. Roach, 398 Mass. 18, 27 & n. 13, 494 N.E.2d 1327 (1986). Section 1988 is "appropriate legislation" of the Congress "to enforce the provisions" of the Fourteenth Amendment within the meaning of § 5 thereof. See Senate Report (Judiciary Committee) No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 5908, to accompany S. 2278, which passed as P.L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The effect of the statute is to overcome any inconsistent claim that a State official, as defendant, may advance under the banner of the sovereign immunity of the State. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-700, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2574-2578, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2576, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). For this purpose it does not matter whether the civil rights enforcement action against a State defendant is brought in State or Federal court. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 & n. 12, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2507-08 & n. 12, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980); Ferdinand v. Fairbanks, 599 P.2d 122, 125 (Alaska 1979). Cf. Thompson v. Hales Corners, 115 Wis.2d 289, 304, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983). So also § 1988 imports a Federal standard for a court, whether State or Federal, in deciding what is the reasonable fee. See Stratos v. Department of Public Welfare, 387 Mass. at 320-325, 439 N.E.2d 778. ⁷ Such were the bases for the award of the attorney's fee in the present case.

Although § 1988 does not speak in so many words about interest accruing on an award of attorney's fees when there is a delay of payment by the State, the general practice of the Federal courts is to allow such interest. Thus in Preston v. Thompson, 565 F.Supp. 294, 297 (N.D.Ill.1983), the court said, citing considerable authority, "Every reported case to address the issue has held that interest is available on an award of attorney's fees under § 1988." See also Preston v. Thompson, 565 F.Supp. 310, 320-321 (N.D.Ill.1983). Characteristic decisions are Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1275-1276 (5th Cir.1980), modified, 636 F.2d 942 (1981), rehearing en banc denied, 641 F.2d 403 (1981); Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 747-748 (9th Cir.1982); R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1234-1235 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009, 104 S.Ct. 527, 78 L.Ed.2d 710 (1983). Cf. Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 129 (1st Cir.1984). The practice with respect to post-award accrual of interest parallels that regarding interest due upon ordinary money judgments, and the courts, indeed, in awarding post-award interest, often refer to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, ⁸ the statute applied in Federal courts that deals in general terms with interest owing on unpaid judgments for money.

See, e.g., R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d at 1235; Preston v. Thompson, 565 F.Supp. at 300. ⁹

Section 1961 cannot be directly invoked when it is a State court that has made an award of fees under § 1988, but the liability of the State for post-award interest is alike regardless of the forum. It stems from those considerations of policy which led to fee-shifting in civil rights litigation by statutory statement and nonstatutory development, and which manifested themselves strikingly in the 1976 amendment of § 1988. ¹⁰ Broadly speaking, the Congressional intention has been to create a strong system of private enforcement of Federal civil rights. The prospect of recovering reasonable (not extravagant) attorney's fees encourages the initiation and conduct of worthwhile litigation in this field that might otherwise never be brought (note that plaintiffs are often without resources and that this kind of litigation commonly results in injunctive or declaratory relief rather than money judgments). The threat of superadded liability for the opponent's legal expenses tends to deter abuses of governmental power. Where excesses are found to have occurred, the substantial financial burdens of corrective litigation are put where they justly belong. These and complementary motives were expressed during the passage of the 1976 legislation, and likewise appear in the decided cases. See the forceful statement in Senate Report No. 1011, and Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d at 1274-1275; Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 918 & n. 5 (1st Cir.1980).

In such a regime, it is entirely appropriate to charge interest for delayed payment of assessed fees. Besides the ordinary justifications for interest, a rule which would free a State of that interest obligation would work against the basic policies mentioned: it would dilute the encouragement of putative plaintiffs and their counsel to commence proper actions and would give State defendants, as losers, an extraneous motive to delay payment. If, in the end, fees awarded as reasonable were paid after delays, net of interest, the effect as a practical matter would be to reduce those fees by indeterminate amounts without an explicable logic. See Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d at 1275-1276; R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712...