Alcantara v. Alcantara

• Decision Date: 12 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 19-0113 FC,1 CA-CV 19-0113 FC
• Parties: In re the Matter of: CARLOS ALCANTARA, Petitioner/Appellee, v. MARGARITA ALCANTARA, Respondent/Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

In re the Matter of: CARLOS ALCANTARA, Petitioner/Appellee, v. MARGARITA ALCANTARA, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0113 FC

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

December 12, 2019

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC 2018-003384

The Honorable Michael C. Blair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Katz & Bloom PLC, Phoenix

By Jay R. Bloom

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Woodnick Law PLLC, Phoenix

By Markus W. Risinger

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

CAMPBELL, Judge:

¶1 Margarita Alcantara ("Wife") appeals from the superior court's decree of dissolution of marriage ("decree") as well as its judgment in favor of Carlos Alcantara ("Husband") for attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Shortly before their marriage, Husband and Wife executed a premarital agreement. In connection with that agreement, each party was represented and advised by separate counsel. The agreement provided that all real property owned separately by Husband before the marriage would remain his separate property and the community would not acquire an interest in this separate property if: (1) it appreciated in value during the marriage, regardless of the cause; or (2) Husband used community funds to pay the associated mortgages, taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses.

¶3 After six years of marriage, Husband petitioned for dissolution. Early in the litigation, Husband notified the superior court that the parties had reached a "comprehensive" settlement agreement through a private mediator. As outlined in the settlement agreement, the parties agreed to: (1) a parenting-time schedule for their child; (2) spousal maintenance to Wife for a limited period; (3) a lease agreement, permitting Wife to rent one of Husband's properties for a limited period; (4) equal division of jointly held bank and investment accounts, as well as two retirement accounts containing community property but held in Husband's name; (5) allocation of separately held bank, investment, and pension accounts to the named account holder; (6) equitable division of personal property; (7) allocation of student loans to the named account holder; (8) allocation of the marital residence to Husband as separate property; (9) child support to Wife; and (10) payment of attorney fees.

¶4 Disputing Husband's characterization of the settlement agreement as "comprehensive," Wife filed a controverting notice ofsettlement, asserting the agreement failed to resolve the community's claim for reimbursement against Husband's separate property, the marital residence. To address this claim, Wife requested a resolution management conference.

¶5 In response, Husband reaffirmed that the settlement agreement had indeed resolved all claims. He also argued that the premarital agreement precluded any community lien against his separate property. According to Husband, each of the parties' agreements precluded a community lien on the marital residence, and Wife's request for additional proceedings was without merit, justifying an award of his attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324(B).

¶6 Granting Wife's request, the superior court held a resolution management conference. At the hearing, Wife's attorney argued that the parties' premarital agreement was rescinded by operation of law when they executed the settlement agreement. As support for this contention, counsel noted the settlement agreement did not reference or otherwise incorporate the premarital agreement. Working from the proposition that the premarital agreement had been nullified and noting the settlement agreement allocated the marital residence to Husband without expressly precluding a community interest, counsel argued the community was not foreclosed from asserting a lien on the property.

¶7 After the parties presented their respective arguments, the superior court granted Wife's request to file a memorandum fully briefing the issue but warned that attorney fees would likely be awarded to Husband if Wife's memorandum necessitated a response. In her subsequent memorandum, Wife reasserted her contention that the settlement agreement: (1) rescinded the premarital agreement, and (2) did not foreclose a community interest in the marital residence. In response, Husband maintained that the settlement agreement resolved all issues and foreclosed any claim of a community interest in the marital residence. In the alternative, Husband argued that if the settlement agreement failed to resolve all issues—including any community interest in the marital property—it did not operate to rescind the premarital agreement, and the premarital agreement still in effect foreclosed a community interest in the marital residence. Again, asserting Wife's position was unreasonable and meritless, Husband requested an award of his attorney fees and costs.

¶8 In a detailed order, the superior court denied Wife's claim of a community interest in the marital residence, finding: (1) the parties' premarital agreement unequivocally foreclosed any community interest inthe marital residence; (2) Wife acknowledged during the settlement negotiations that she had no legal interest in the marital residence; (3) the settlement agreement entirely resolved the dissolution action subject only to the preparation and signing of a consent decree; (4) the settlement agreement did not rescind the premarital agreement; (5) both the premarital and settlement agreements are binding and in full effect; and (6) the settlement agreement is fair and equitable. Notwithstanding Husband's substantially greater income, the court further found that under these facts Wife's claim of a community interest in the marital residence was unreasonable, justifying an award of attorney fees. After Husband filed an affidavit of attorney fees, the court awarded him $5,000 pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324.

¶9 At that point, the parties submitted competing parenting plans and forms of decree of dissolution, and the superior court entered a signed decree incorporating its prior rulings regarding the marital residence and adopting Husband's parenting plan. Wife appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

¶10 As a preliminary matter, Husband contends Wife failed to timely appeal from both the superior court's November 5, 2018 signed order, determining that the community had no interest in the marital residence, and its December 5, 2018 signed judgment, awarding attorney fees to Husband. Whether this court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Francisco F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 228 Ariz. 379, 381, ¶ 6 (App. 2011).

¶11 While the December 5, 2018 judgment was certified as a final, appealable order pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family Procedure ("Rule") 78, the November 5, 2018 order did not contain Rule 78(B) certification and therefore was not final and appealable. See Bollermann v. Nowlis, 234 Ariz. 340, 342, ¶ 8 (2014). Although Husband argues the court's November 5, 2018 order became appealable once the court entered the December 5, 2018 attorney fees judgment, all dissolution matters had not been resolved at that time, as reflected by the subsequently lodged competing parenting plans and forms of decree. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review Wife's challenge to the superior court's November 5, 2018 determinations regarding the marital residence, which were incorporated in the final decree of dissolution, but lack jurisdiction over Wife's untimely challenge to the court's award of attorney fees to Husband. See ARCAP 9(a) (requiringan appellant to file a notice of appeal not later than 30 days from entry of judgment from which the appeal is taken).

II. Lack of Community Interest in Marital Property

¶12 Wife challenges the superior court's determination that the community has no legal interest in the marital property. First, she contends the premarital agreement was rescinded by operation of law when the parties entered the settlement agreement. Second, she argues the court's interpretation of the premarital agreement was incorrect, and even if the premarital agreement remains in full effect, the community has a lien on the marital residence to the extent Husband used community funds to voluntarily pay down the mortgage on the property in excess of the monthly obligation. Because the parties' settlement agreement forecloses any community lien on the marital residence, we need not reach either of Wife's arguments regarding the premarital agreement.

¶13 General principles of contract law govern determinations concerning the validity, interpretation, and scope of settlement agreements. Emmons v. Sup.Ct., 192 Ariz. 509, 512, ¶ 14 (App. 1998). "The purpose of contract interpretation is to determine the parties' intent and enforce that intent." Roe v. Austin, 246 Ariz. 21, 26, ¶ 17 (App. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). "In determining the parties' intent, courts must decide what evidence is admissible in the interpretation process, bearing in mind that the parol evidence rule allows extrinsic evidence to interpret, but not to vary or contradict the terms of the contract." Id. "Whether contract language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation so that extrinsic evidence is admissible is a question of law for the court." Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 148, 158-59 (1993). We review de novo a superior court's interpretation of a settlement agreement as well as its conclusion that the agreement is enforceable. Burke v. Ariz. State Retirement Sys., 206 Ariz. 269, 272, ¶ 6 (App. 2003); Schuck & Sons Const. v. Indus. Comm'n, 192 Ariz. 231, 233, ¶ 6 (App. 1998).

¶14 By its express terms, and without qualification, the settlement...