Alcorn v. Chicago & A. R. Co.
Decision Date | 11 May 1891 |
Citation | 16 S.W. 229 |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Parties | ALCORN v. CHICAGO & A. R. Co. |
On rehearing.
This cause has been reargued. It is an action for damages laid at the sum of $15,000. The main ground upon which the plaintiff relied for recovery was the insufficient blocking of the tracks of the defendant, which was claimed to be the proximate cause of the injury, and that the accident in question occurred while a train of defendant's cars was in motion, and while defendant was in the act of uncoupling one of the cars of such train, his foot being caught between the rails on the track by reason of an insufficient block between the rails, and in consequence being knocked down by that train. The answer was a general denial, as well as a plea of contributory negligence, alleging that plaintiff was familiar with the locality in question, knew the condition of the tracks, being employed in the yards for several months prior to the accident, and failed to complain; and the answer further set forth that the plaintiff got in between the cars while in motion, in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant company in that behalf made and provided, etc. The rule to which reference was made in the answer is the following:
SHERWOOD, J., (after stating the facts as above.)
1. The first point for discussion is whether the testimony of Lamoreaux was admissible, as to having seen the next day a new block between the rails at the point of the accident, which block so filled the space between the rails as to render another like accident impossible. That testimony of subsequently occurring events, like the substitution of a new for the old block, is inadmissible for the purpose of originating an inference or implied admission of negligence because of failure to make the substitution at an earlier period, is supported by abundant authority, as shown by the briefs of defendant's counsel; and this court has announced the same doctrine. Hipsley v. Railroad Co., 88 Mo. 348; Brennan v. City of St. Louis, 92 Mo. 482, 2 S. W. Rep. 481. A different view from the one here asserted obtains in some jurisdictions, but obviously such a theory of the law places a virtual interdict upon a corporation or individual promptly making needful improvements or repairs when an accident occurs, for fear that such repairs or improvements will be construed into a tacit admission of prior negligence in failing to make them before, and thus to have prevented the litigated injury.
2. But it is objected that in any event the testimony in question was admissible for another purpose, to-wit, to establish the protective character of proper blocking, and therefore that a general objection to such testimony of its being "incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial" was insufficient; that the objection should have been special. There are several answers to this contention. In the first place, there was no such issue raised by the pleadings; in the second place, not a particle of testimony was offered to show who substituted the new for the old block, — the necessity for which preliminary testimony is virtually recognized in Brennan v. City of St. Louis, supra; third, other testimony could readily have been introduced to show the necessity for a proper block, and the evident and only object of the controverted testimony was to convict the defendant company of a confession of negligence because of making repairs; and, fourth, the testimony for these reasons being wholly inadmissible as well as misleading, a general objection was sufficient. State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. loc. cit. 120, 12 S. W. Rep. 516. As is aptly said in Nalley v. Carpet Co., 51 Conn. loc. cit. 532: "If the subsequent act is made to reflect back upon the prior one, although it is done upon the theory that it is a mere admission, yet it virtually introduces into the transaction a new element and test of negligence which has no business there, not being in existence at the time." Touching similar evidence, it was said in a recent case in this court: "This evidence was not admissible to show negligence on the part of the city, for that must be made out by proof of the condition of the street and knowledge thereof by the city at the time the injury occurred." Brennan v. City of St. Louis, supra.
3. It is contended that the trial court properly refused to admit in evidence rule 55 of the defendant company, because the same had not been pleaded. This contention is grounded in error. That portion of the answer in reference to the rule is as follows: "Defendant for further answer says that plaintiff received the injury complained of in his petition in consequence of getting between the cars while in motion for the purpose of uncoupling them, in violation of his duty and of the rules and regulations of the defendant in that behalf made and provided."...
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