Aldrich v. Duggan
| Decision Date | 04 November 1927 |
| Citation | 107 Conn. 17,139 A. 270 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | ALDRICH v. DUGGAN ET AL. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Newell Jennings, Judge.
Action by Robert Aldrich against Mary E. Duggan and others for damages alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant Ellen Connor, as agent of the defendant Duggan, in operating an automobile owned by the latter. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Error, and new trial ordered.
See also, 139 A. 272, 274.
Samuel Campner and Daniel Pouzzner, both of New Haven, for appellants.
David A. Cronin, of Bridgeport, for appellee.
Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.
The defendants, after verdict, filed three separate motions: One in arrest of judgment on the grounds that the judgment was contrary to law and that the court erred in charging the jury in two respects alleged; a motion to set aside the verdict alleging that it was against the evidence and the law and was excessive, that the jury was prejudiced by a statement in argument of counsel, and the same claimed errors in the charge as alleged in the motion in arrest; and a motion for a new trial, identical in allegations with the motion to set aside the verdict. The denial of these three motions is made the subject of the first four reasons of appeal. The motion to set aside the verdict would have been sufficient for all the purposes sought under any of the motions. Swift's Digest, side page 774 et seq.; Hamilton v. Pease, 38 Conn. 115, 120. The defendants, in brief and argument, properly confine their attention to the denial of this motion, specially relying upon their claim that it was against the evidence.
As to this, the principal contention is that the physical facts, especially the condition of the defendant's automobile after the collision with the plaintiff's car, were such as to preclude a finding that the collision happened in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, operating an Essex car, was traveling southerly on Orange street, in New Haven; the car owned by the defendant Duggan was a Hudson coach and was traveling westerly on Trumbull street. The cars collided in the intersection of the two streets and the plaintiff's car turned over on its right side, damaging it considerably, and injuring the plaintiff and two passengers in his car. The evidence indicated that the only damage to the defendant Duggan's car was that the front bumper was broken off and the right front fender and front end of the right side of the frame were bent slightly to the left. The defendants argue that this relatively slight damage is so palpably inconsistent with the plaintiff's evidence that the front of defendant's car struck his automobile on the left side with such force as to overturn it, as to discredit that claim, and to conclusively indicate that the overturn was due to a sharp turn at excessive speed on the part of plaintiff's car, or some other cause than the force of collision with the defendant's automobile. However, we are unable to hold upon all the evidence bearing upon the circumstances of the collision, including the greater weight of the defendant's car, that we have here " the rare case where the physical facts resolve the apparent conflict in evidence by showing that the testimony which created it is * * * untrue because in conflict with the undisputable physical facts," and we consider that the jury's conclusion on this point, as imported by the verdict, could reasonably have been reached. Richard v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 104 Conn. 229, 232, 132 A. 451; Gianotta v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 98 Conn. 743, 120 A. 560. Therefore the denial of the motion to set aside the verdict may not be disturbed by us.
In the course of the charge the court referred to arguments as having been made on both sides attacking the reasonableness of testimony as to the conduct of some person with relation to the accident, to the effect that it was improbable or impossible that any one would act in that way, and said:
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State v. Gullette
...been sufficient to raise the question which is presented to us on the ruling on the defendant's motion for a mistrial. Aldrich v. Duggan, 107 Conn. 17, 18, 139 A. 270. The parties, however, during trial and on appeal, have pursued this method of presenting for review the interlocutory rulin......
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Heslin v. Malone
... ... be found only where that discretion has been abused ... Crotty v. Danbury, supra; Smith v ... Hausdorf, 92 Conn. 579, 581, 103 A. 939; Aldrich v ... Duggan, 107 Conn. 17, 20, 139 A. 270. The nature and ... extent of such comment must largely depend upon the facts ... involved in the ... ...
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Giddings v. Honan
... ... discretion as to the extent to which the facts shall be ... commented upon in the charge. Aldrich v. Duggan, 107 ... Conn. 17, 21, 139 A. 270 ... We find ... no harmful error in the charge; none of the requested ... corrections of ... ...
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Bundy v. Capitol Nat. Bank & Trust Co.
... ... of this statement. Our rule that the court may and often ... should express its opinion on the facts is well settled and ... salutary. Aldrich v. Duggan, 107 Conn. 17, 21, 139 ... A. 270; Schiesel v. S. B. Poli Realty Co., 108 Conn ... 115, 124, 142 A. 812; Heslin v. Malone, 116 Conn ... ...