Aldrich v. Press Printing Co.

• Decision Date: 01 January 1863
• Citation: 9 Minn. 123
• Parties: CYRUS ALDRICH vs. THE PRESS PRINTING COMPANY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

9 Minn. 123

CYRUS ALDRICH vs. THE PRESS PRINTING COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from order of the district court, Ramsey County.

Points and authorities for appellant: —

1. The criticisms, comments, or charges, in a public journal upon a public officer or upon the official conduct of one while in office, and who is again a candidate for high official preferment, even where they impute the commission of a public offense, are quasi privileged, and not, as in ordinary cases, presumed to be malicious. Hence, in an action for libel against the publisher of a public journal, founded upon such criticisms, comments, or charges, express malice must not only be averred but proved; and in order to lay a foundation for such proof it must be averred that the offensive publication was made without probable cause. 5 Johns. 526-531; 13 Wend. 473; 23 Wend. 28; 21 Wend. 325; 2 Wheat. Selwyn, 1061-1066; 6 How. Pr. R. 366, § 2; 7 Johns. 193; 19 Barb. 111; 16 N. Y. 369; 3 Denio, 110; 3 How. (U. S.) 290, 291, or 15 Curtis, 449, 450.

2. Proof of express malice being necessary to sustain an action for libel founded upon a quasi privileged publication, it cannot be maintained against a body politic or corporate — it being incapable of express malice. 1 Bouvier Inst. § 193; Angell & Ames on Corp. § 388.

3. Malice being the gist of the action of libel, and the only difference between express and presumed malice being in the manner of proof, and a body corporate being a purely intellectual and ideal existence, and consequently incapable of malice, no action for libel will lie against it. 1 Bouvier Inst. § 193; Angell & Ames on Corp. § 388; 16 N. Y. 369; 4 U. S. Dig. 434, § 282; 15 Conn. 327.

4. The alleged causes of action set up in the complaint are improperly mixed up and commingled — each cause of action must be separately stated.

Points and authorities for respondent: —

1. An action of libel against a corporation can be maintained; the old doctrine, that a corporation aggregate is not capable of malice, is abandoned. The more modern and correct doctrine holds them liable for all torts which work injuries to others, whether direct and intentional or arising from their own negligence. 96 Eng. Com. Law, 115, 121; 22 Conn. 531; 14 Conn. 146; 10 Conn. 384; 35 Penn. 302; 2 Hill, 631; 2 Eng. Law & Eq. 406; 21 How. (U. S.) 202.

2. An averment of express malice or want of probable cause in a complaint for libel is not necessary.

3. The fact of express malice or want of probable cause, when necessary to be established, is a matter not of pleading, but relates to the onus of proof on the trial.

4. That the matter charged is libelous admits of no doubt. If defendants seek to protect themselves by reason of the publication having been made under circumstances giving it a privileged character it rests with them on the trial to prove those circumstances, and if they are matters proper to be pleaded at all they must be set up as a defense in the answer.

5. The second count clearly substantiates charges of express malice. 4 N. Y. 91; 2 Sanders' Plds. & Ev. (5th Am. ed.) part 2, 913, 914.

D. Cooper, for appellant.

F. R. E. & W. B. Cornell and H. R. Bigelow, for respondent.

FLANDRAU, J.

This is an action for a libel brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, a corporation, for the publication of libelous matter in a newspaper published by the defendant. The complaint is demurred to upon the ground that the matter charged as libelous was a privileged or quasi privileged communication, which, to be libelous, must have been published with express malice and without probable cause, and that the defendant is a corporation, and consequently incapable of the commission of an offense depending upon sentiment or passion such as malice.

Theoretically a corporation is perhaps incapable of passion. I say perhaps, because upon an analysis of the construction and practical operation of these bodies the theory becomes invested with considerable doubt. That they should possess this attribute in law, in order to harmonize their obligations and liabilities with those of individuals prosecuting the same enterprises, there is not only no doubt, but an imperative necessity. Corporations have almost entirely supplanted individual action in many branches of industry. If a citizen sets out on a journey he will find himself almost exclusively in the hands of corporations until his return. The stages, rail cars, and steamboats, by which he is transported, the hotels at which he is entertained, the theatre at which he may be amused, and the very newspaper by which he is informed of the events of the day, are generally the property of and controlled by corporations. Manufactures, commerce, mining, lumbering, in fact, almost every department of human industry is largely filled by corporations. It is difficult to see why these bodies should be exempt from liabilities depending upon an evil intent or a bad passion, when an individual committing the same offense would be held liable. These corporations may be composed of one man or several. In everything they do, although expressing themselves through agents and officers, they act with as much deliberation, design, and intelligence, as an individual. Take, for example, the case of a corporation established for the publication of a newspaper. The members of this body become hostile to a citizen and determine to injure him. They assemble in their corporate capacity, and resolve to circulate an infamous libel concerning him. One member pens it, and the rest approve. The ensuing morning it is read by thousands, and a citizen who was the day before above suspicion, stands before the community branded with crime and infamy. The position, that this corporation, being a purely intellectual and ideal existence, is incapable of malice, because malice is an emotion of the heart — a passion — is too refined a fiction for tolerance in the practical affairs of life at the present day. The old doctrine that corporations aggregate could not commit torts, was always considered...