Aldrich v. State
| Decision Date | 18 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 05-00-00109-CR,s. 05-00-00109-CR |
| Citation | 53 S.W.3d 460 |
| Parties | (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001) DANA MICHELLE ALDRICH, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee - 05-00-00110-CR |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F99-37394-MR, F99-37395-MR
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Before Justices Lagarde, FitzGerald, and Richter
Dana Michelle Aldrich appeals her convictions for impersonating a public servant. Appellant pleaded guilty to the indictments and true to the enhancement allegations without an agreement as to punishment. The trial court accepted her pleas of guilty and true and sentenced her to five years' imprisonment. Appellant brings two issues on appeal asserting: (1) "the court abused its discretion (unknowingly) in not rejecting appellant's plea of guilty" (appellant's parentheses); and (2) she did not receive effective assistance of counsel. We resolve appellant's issues against her and affirm the trial court's judgments.
Appellant was charged in two indictments on separate incidents of impersonating a public servant. In cause number 05-00-00109-CR, the indictment alleged that appellant impersonated a police officer "by demanding Arlene Galvan open the door so that [appellant] could arrest said occupants." In cause number 05-00-00110-CR, the indictment alleged that appellant impersonated a police officer by "demanding Cole Gillean to turn around and be arrested." Each indictment contained a second paragraph alleging a prior conviction for burglary of a habitation.
At a hearing on December 15, 1999, after being admonished by the trial court,1 appellant entered guilty pleas to both indictments and pleas of true to the enhancement allegations. The trial court admitted into evidence without objection documents entitled "Waiver of Jury, Felony Plea of Guilty/Nolo Contendere/Indictment/Information" containing confessions in which appellant stated: "I do further admit and judicially confess that I am the person named in the charging instrument and that I understand the charge contained therein and I am GUILTY of the offense of impersonating an officer exactly as alleged in the charging instrument . . . and I confess that I did unlawfully commit the said offense in Dallas County, Texas on the 30th day of Oct., l999."
The evidence of the underlying facts of the offenses presented at the plea hearing included the confessions incorporating the indictments and the following dialogue between appellant and the trial court:
The Court: What the police and the prosecutor claim happened is that you went over to a motel in Mesquite and claimed to be a police officer so the clerk would let you in to one of the rooms, and that's true; is that correct?
[Appellant]: Yes, sir. I had already been in the room.
The Court: Right. But you wanted to get back in the room and you thought if you claimed to be a police officer they'd let you back in the room without asking a bunch of questions?
[Appellant]: Yes, sir.
The trial court, after being personally assured three times by appellant that no one forced her, threatened her, or promised her anything to get her to plead guilty, accepted appellant's pleas of guilty and true in each case. Following the introduction of the State's evidence, the trial court stated for January 6, 2000.
The punishment hearing took place on January 6, 2000 before a different judge.2 Appellant testified at the hearing she wanted to plead guilty and did not want to contest her guilt before either a jury or a judge. Appellant wanted the trial court to assess punishment. She acknowledged that she could receive up to twenty years' imprisonment, but she requested probation so she could help her ailing grandmother. After appellant testified that she could live up to the terms of probation, her attorney asked her if she had anything else she wanted to say to the trial court. Appellant responded as follows:
[Appellant]: Well, to everything that happened that day that I said I was a peace officer, I am guilty of saying that. I did say that I was a peace officer but I did not have a badge, no gun, no uniform, nor did I tell them at any time to turn around and place their hands behind their back. From reading the indictment, that's what it said. I did not say that.
I went to the manager's office and told her to call the police because they wanted to do something else which I didn't want to do. So when she called the police, I had left from the motel and they arrested me at a different place that I was visiting some friends at.
So when the police officer[s] arrested me, I asked what I was being arrested for, and they said impersonating a peace officer. And I tried to explain to them the day they arrested me that I didn't do it just to be getting anything out of it. I did it to save myself because the guys were trying to rape me.
So, that's about all I have to say. And I guess the manager had misunderstood me because I talk fast when I get scared. I talk fast, anyway. So when I get scared, I even talk faster. So when I was trying to explain it to her, I took her out in the parking lot of the motel and pointed out the room where the guys were standing the day everything happened.
The Court: You've already pled guilty. I can't find you not guilty.
[Appellant]: No, I'm guilty of saying it.
The Court: I'm just trying to decide what I should do to you.
[Appellant]: I'm guilty of saying it.
Appellant testified about her criminal history, which showed she originally received deferred adjudication with five years' probation on the burglary charge. Appellant stated she violated her probation within a year by committing credit card abuse and evading arrest, for which she was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and served eighteen months in the penitentiary.
Appellant also presented the testimony of her employer, Harold Helm, who supervised appellant's training as a boxer in his amateur program. In response to the trial court's questions, Helm testified to what appellant had told him about how the incidents occurred:
[Helm]: - she told me about what she tried to explain to you. I think she had some communication skill problems in communicating. But she told me that some guys were trying to do something she didn't want done.
I asked her, And she explained that to me. And I said, well, it sounded like something she did out of necessity, you know, on the thing.
But she went ahead and pled the way she did so she understands how the laws work and she didn't have a trial, but she did tell me that or related that. And I said, "you shouldn't get yourself in those situations no more." She thought she was doing the right thing at that time.
The Court: Did she tell you why she was at that motel?
[Helm]: They were supposed to have a party there. She was invited to a party. She found out she was the only party. She asked where the other girls were. They weren't there so she just wanted to go. They wouldn't let her go. That's when she said that. Then she went down and asked the manager to call the police and she took her outside and pointed out the room. That's what she explained to me. And I said, "Oh, my gosh almighty, what a mess you got into."
After the parties rested in the punishment phase, the State requested that the trial court sentence appellant to the penitentiary, and appellant requested probation. After considering her criminal history, the trial court stated she would be sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Appellant protested that her family depended on her being able to help them, and she told the court, "I promise to fulfill anything that I need to, but I don't deserve to go back to TDC because I just said those words." The trial court told her, "Well, your credibility is just not very good, you know, when you go around telling people you're a police officer and you are not." Appellant again protested her sentence saying, "Sir, I didn't know what else to say, sir, at the time."
On appeal, appellant asserts that her statements at the punishment hearing and Helm's testimony of her explanation to him raised the defense of necessity. In her two issues, appellant asserts the trial court or her counsel should have acted in response to the raising of this defense.
The indictment alleges appellant demanded "Arlene Galvan open the door so that [appellant] could arrest said occupants." Thus, the indictment alleges appellant sought Galvan's assistance to enter the room. However, appellant's purported "necessity defense" sought to prove she was seeking to escape from people in a room. Thus, appellant's evidence in support of her purported "necessity defense" is not conceivably consistent with or related to the allegations in this indictment and does not make "evident the innocence of the accused or . . . reasonably and fairly raise[] an issue as to such fact." Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). This Court concludes appellant's contention regarding her purported "necessity defense" does not apply in cause number 05-00-00109-CR. We conclude appellant's points of error are inapplicable to her conviction in cause number 05-00-00109-CR and affirm this conviction.
In her first issue, appellant contends: "The court (unknowingly) abused its discretion in not rejecting appellant's plea of guilty" (app...
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