Aldridge v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 13 April 2001
• Citation: 809 So.2d 785
• Parties: Debbie ALDRIDGE et al. v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

809 So.2d 785

Debbie ALDRIDGE et al. v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION.

1981622.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 13, 2001.

Dissenting Opinion on Overruling of Application for Rehearing July 13, 2001.

Richard F. Ogle of Schoel, Ogle, Liles & Upshaw, L.L.P., Birmingham; Douglas J. Centeno of Benton & Centeno, L.L.P., Birmingham; and J. Zach Higgs, Jr., Huntsville, for appellants.

Charles A. Powell III, David W. Proctor, and Brian R. Bostick of Johnston, Barton, Proctor & Matthew C. McDonald of Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, Mobile, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This case involves two issues: (1) whether fraudulent-misrepresentation claims regarding a program outlined in a collective-bargaining agreement are preempted from adjudication in a state court and (2) whether an employee can maintain breach-of-contract and promissory-fraud claims when the employment was subject to the employment-at-will doctrine and the employee is claiming lost wages and benefits as damages.

Facts and Procedural History

The 32 appellants (Debbie Aldridge, Nina Allen, Brenda Armstrong-White, Tula Wade Battle, Deborah Billions McKeown, Patsy Boldin, Cynthia Bousson, Betty Brown, Detra Campbell, Betty L. Craft, Sherry Davis, Daniel Dayton, Janice Esslinger, Susan Esslinger, Joyce Fearn, Mary Fitchard, Margaret Gordon, Deborah Grantham, Ina Guger, Brenda Hammonds, Joe Johnson, Olivia Jolly, Kenneth Lovell, Linda Faye Nash, Rebecca A. Bain Nave, Julia M. Patton, Jamie Owens Ponder, Katherine Reed, Doris Segars, Ethel Evelene Shaw Sutton, Susie M. Thompson, and Janice Whitman), who will be collectively referred to hereinafter as "the employees," were employees of Daimler-Chrysler Corporation ("Chrysler") at its Huntsville production facility. Each of the employees worked on the production line and each was classified as a "Tech III." Their seniority ranged from a few years to 17 years.

In the summer of 1990, amid rumors that Chrysler was having financial difficulties and rumors that a large-scale layoff might take place, Chrysler offered eligible employees a "voluntary termination of employment program" ("VTEP"). The VTEP was an agreement negotiated by Chrysler and the United Automobile Workers Union ("UAW"), and it was included in the collective-bargaining agreement ("CBA") to which the employees were subject; it was jointly administered by Chrysler and the UAW. To be eligible to participate in the VTEP, an employee must have had at least one year of seniority and must have been ineligible to retire under the provisions of the Chrysler Pension Plan. If an employee met these criteria and elected to take the benefits of the VTEP, the participating employee could leave his employment and receive a guaranteed payment based upon his seniority. Finally, the VTEP provided that if any employee participating in the VTEP was subsequently reemployed by Chrysler, he would be ineligible to participate in the VTEP again for five years following the reemployment. The VTEP outlined in the CBA contained no reference to an employee's right to be rehired if he chose to take the benefits of the VTEP.

On August 28, 1990, Chrysler held a meeting to discuss the VTEP with eligible employees. At the meeting, Chrysler distributed a document explaining the VTEP.

Some of the employees attended the VTEP meeting, and some did not. The record indicates that the employees' interpretations of the statements made by the Chrysler representatives at this meeting, or at later dates, vary. Sixteen employees alleged that they were promised preferential rehire rights by an unidentified Chrysler representative at a VTEP meeting in August 1990.¹ Ten employees testified that Sarah Howard or another Chrysler human-resources manager promised them preferential rehire rights or promised them that they would be considered for reemployment whenever Chrysler began rehiring.² Three employees testified that coworkers told them of the promise of preferential rehire rights allegedly made at the VTEP meeting in August.³ Employee Cynthia Bousson testified that her union representative told her of the preferential rehire rights. An unidentified company representative was alleged to have promised preferential rehire rights to employee Detra Campbell when she signed her VTEP application in August 1990. Finally, employee Julia M. Patton testified that although no one ever promised her preferential rehire rights or future employment, she had "assumed" that she would be able to come back.

All of the employees in this case participated in the VTEP offered by Chrysler in 1990. The employees contend that they relied on a promise of preferential rehire rights or of consideration for future employment and that in reliance on that promise voluntarily resigned their positions, thereby breaking their seniority with Chrysler. In exchange for their participation, the employees received lump-sum payments that ranged from $12,000 to $65,000.

In 1994, Chrysler began hiring 60 to 65 new employees because of an increase in production. Upon receiving inquiries regarding a rehire of those employees who had participated in the VTEP, Sarah Howard, the employment supervisor in the Human Resources Department of the Huntsville Plant, telephoned Bob Morgan in the Corporate-Union Relations Department to determine whether the VTEP participants could be rehired. Morgan told Howard that a VTEP participant could be rehired only if no other skilled person was found, or if the VTEP participant had enhanced his skills. No employee who had participated in the VTEP in 1990 was considered for the new positions.

Because they had not been considered and/or rehired in 1994, the employees sued Chrysler in the Madison Circuit Court, on March 26, 1996, seeking damages on theories of promissory fraud, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel.⁴ Chrysler timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, on the ground that the employees' state-law claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Specifically, Chrysler alleged that the VTEP was provided for in the CBA; thus, it argued, only a federal court had jurisdiction to decide the issues. In its memorandum and order remanding the case, the federal court stated that the employees were not complaining about the administration of the VTEP; rather, it said, they were claiming they had been induced to accept the VTEP because of a fraudulent misrepresentation that was unrelated to the program itself. Because neither the CBA nor the VTEP documents before the federal court contained any provision squarely addressing the issue of the employees' claimed right of rehire, the federal court determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the case and remanded it to the Madison Circuit Court.

In the state court, after the parties had conducted discovery, Chrysler moved for a summary judgment. In addition to arguing that the employees' state-law claims were preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, §§ 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), and the Employees' Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), Chrysler argued that the employees' breach-of-contract claim was barred by the employment-at-will doctrine. Chrysler further contended that the promissory-estoppel doctrine could not be applied to create a contract for preferential rehire rights or for consideration for future employment. Finally, Chrysler argued that the employees could not establish a cause of action for promissory fraud. On May 10, 1999, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Chrysler on all three of the employees' claims, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and promissory fraud. The employees appeal from that summary judgment.

Analysis

Because this appeal is from a summary judgment, we review the case de novo. EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 775 So.2d 128 (Ala.2000). We review the judgment by the same standard the trial court used in determining whether the evidence presented demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jefferson County Comm'n v. ECO Preservation Servs., L.L.C., 788 So.2d 121 (Ala.2000) (quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988)). Once the movant establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). In reviewing a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertain such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Jefferson County Comm'n v. ECO Preservation Servs., L.L.C., supra, 778 So.2d at 126 (citing Renfro v. Georgia Power Co., 604 So.2d 408 (Ala.1992)).

Chrysler argues that state-court adjudication of the employees' claims is preempted by federal law. In its order remanding the case to the Madison Circuit Court, the federal court concluded that federal law did not preempt state adjudication of the employees' claims. Although Chrysler's preemption argument to the federal court was based only on preemption under § 301 of the LMRA, Chrysler presented three grounds for preemption in its summary-judgment motion filed in the Madison Circuit Court. After reviewing the record and the federal caselaw regarding preemption in all three areas, we conclude that the employees' state-law claims are not preempted by federal statutes.

Chrysler first argues that the employees' claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.⁵ In considering preemption under § 301, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "when `[t]he heart of the...