JEFFERSON CTY. COM'N v. ECO PRESERV. SERV., LLC
Decision Date | 18 August 2000 |
Citation | 788 So.2d 121 |
Parties | JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION v. ECO PRESERVATION SERVICES, L.L.C., and Knobloch, Inc. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Edwin A. Strickland, county atty.; and Charles S. Wagner, asst. county atty., Birmingham, for appellant.
Albert L. Jordan and Michael L. Jackson of Wallace, Jordan, Ratliff & Brandt, L.L.C., Birmingham; and Billy R. Weathington, Jr., of Weathington & Associates, Leeds, for appellees.
Stephen D. Christie of Porterfield, Harper & Mills, P.A., Birmingham, for amicus curiae Petro Stopping Centers, L.P., in support of the appellees.
James W. Webb, Kendrick E. Webb, and Bart Harmon of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for amicus curiae Association of County Comm'ns of Alabama, in support of application for rehearing.
The primary issue presented in this case is whether the Jefferson County Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying ECO Preservation Services, L.L.C. ("ECO"), and Knobloch, Inc., a crossing permit for construction of a sewer line under a public roadway. The trial court determined that the Commission did act arbitrarily and capriciously and entered a partial summary judgment for ECO and Knobloch. Based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court properly entered the summary judgment. We affirm.
ECO is an Alabama company that is arranging to place an underground sewer line on a Jefferson County road right-of-way for the purpose of collecting sewage originating in Jefferson County and transporting it to a sewage-treatment plant in Tuscaloosa County, for discharge in Bibb County into a tributary of the Cahaba River. Knobloch holds a National Pollution Discharge and Elimination System ("NPDES") permit issued by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM"). Apparently, Knobloch has granted to ECO the long-term right, under the ADEM permit, to discharge treated waste.
In August 1997, ECO submitted a request to the Jefferson County Roads and Transportation Department for a road-crossing permit to cross a public right-of-way in western Jefferson County in order to install an underground sewer pipeline. The county engineer, Jerry Drake, denied the request; ECO appealed the denial to the Commission, which also denied the request.
In denying the request, the Commission stated:
After the Commission denied its request, ECO sued the Commission and its agents. Later, Knobloch was allowed to intervene as a coplaintiff. ECO and Knobloch stated the following items in their demand for judgment:
On November 29, 1999, the trial court entered a partial summary judgment for ECO and Knobloch. The summary-judgment order stated, in pertinent part:
The Commission moved to vacate the partial summary judgment, on December 7, 1999. The trial court denied this motion on December 17, 1999, and stated, in pertinent part:
Also in its December 17 order, the court made that order and its November 29, 1999, order final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. On January 19, 2000, the Commission filed its notice of appeal.
The first issue is whether the Commission's appeal is timely. ECO and Knobloch argue that the appeal, which was filed 33 days after the December 17, 1999, final order was entered, was untimely, under Rule 4, Ala.R.App.P., because the order granted injunctive relief. They cite Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 346 So.2d 940 (Ala.1977), for the proposition that even if an injunction order has been made final by a Rule 54(b) certification, it is still subject to a 14-day appeal period. We cannot accept this argument.
In Robinson, this Court addressed the issue whether an appeal could be taken from an order granting a permanent injunction in a case in which some issues were still pending. 346 So.2d at 941. That issue involved this provision of Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P.:
"[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."
(Emphasis added.) The appeal in Robinson was taken without a certification under Rule 54(b), because the order was appealable under Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala.R.App.P.; that rule allows 14 days for an appeal from an interlocutory order granting injunctive relief. The situation in Robinson is not the situation presented by this case.
It is clear that the trial court's November 1999 order, which granted ECO and Knobloch's motions for partial summary judgment, granted injunctive relief.1 However, the 14-day limit prescribed by Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala.R.App.P., applies only to interlocutory orders granting an injunction —orders that are not otherwise appealable. We conclude that the trial court's December 1999 order was not an "interlocutory order" as that phrase is used in Rule 4. While it is true that after the court entered its December 1999 order there were apparently other claims pending in the trial court, the order was not "interlocutory," because the trial court made the order final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. If an injunction order has been made final by a Rule 54(b) certification, as has happened in this case, then the 14-day provision of Rule 4(a)(1)(A) does not apply, because the injunction order is not an "interlocutory order" and is appealable without regard to the provisions of Rule 4(a)(1)(A). We conclude that the 42-day limit, rather than the 14-day limit, applies and that the Commission's appeal is timely.
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