Aldridge v. Dean
| Decision Date | 12 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. T-74-1300 to T-74-1308. |
| Citation | 395 F. Supp. 1161 |
| Parties | Andre ALDRIDGE, a minor by Ruth Kent, his mother and next friend v. James DEAN, Superintendent, Maryland Training School for Boys. Donald BRADY v. STATE OF MARYLAND. William L. CAMPBELL, a minor by William Campbell, his father and next friend v. James DEAN, Superintendent, Maryland Training School for Boys. Michael A. EPPS v. STATE OF MARYLAND. Joseph FENWICK, a minor by William Beckett, his stepfather and next friend v. Edward J. LANG, Regional Director, Region 8, Department of Juvenile Services for Baltimore City. James Oliver LOVE, a minor by Joyce Love, his mother and next friend v. STATE OF MARYLAND. George McLEAN, a minor by Minnie Johnson, his mother and next friend v. James DEAN, Superintendent, Maryland Training School for Boys. Quinton R. STEWART, a minor by Haynie Stewart, his father and next friend v. James DEAN, Superintendent, Maryland Training School for Boys. Phillip WITHERSPOON, a minor by Elsie Witherspoon, his mother and next friend v. Leonard GMEINER, Superintendent, Montrose School. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Peter S. Smith and Michael S. Elder, Baltimore, Md., and Forrest Foss and Janet Webb, practicing under Rule 18, Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland, and appearing with permission of this Court, for petitioners.
Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. of Md., and James G. Klair and Bernard A. Raum, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, Md., for respondents.
M. King Hill, Jr., Baltimore, Md., and John M. McCabe, Chicago, Ill., for National Conference of Uniform State Laws, amicus curiae.
Adrienne E. Volenik, St. Louis, Mo., for National Juvenile Law Center, amicus curiae.
This opinion deals with nine habeas corpus cases which have been heard together by this court. In each case the petitioner contends that he has been subjected to double jeopardy in the juvenile proceedings in the Division for Juvenile Causes of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (hereinafter the Juvenile Division), that his constitutional rights have been violated thereby, and that he is entitled to be released from the custody (in five cases confinement,1 in one case probation,2 and in three cases potential confinement3) to which he has been subjected.
The procedural steps followed by the Juvenile Division are prescribed or authorized by the applicable Maryland statutes4 or Maryland Rules of Procedure5 or both, which permit an "adjudicatory hearing" to be held by a master assigned to the Juvenile Division, who hears evidence presented by an Assistant State's Attorney and announces his "finding" that the charge has been sustained or not sustained, i. e., that the child is or is not delinquent. See Rule 908, set out in Finding 4, below. If the master finds that the charge has not been sustained and recommends that the judge sign an order dismissing the case, Rule 908 e 3 provides that the State's Attorney may file, within five days, written exceptions to the master's finding and request a hearing before the judge assigned to the Juvenile Division, and if such exceptions are filed, the judge shall hear the entire matter de novo.6 Plaintiffs contend that such a de novo hearing before the judge constitutes double jeopardy.
Finding 1. In each of the nine cases the office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City filed a printed form of petition, which had been filled out to allege that the "named child under the age of eighteen years is Delinquent" for the reason that on or about a certain date and hour the juvenile, in some cases alone and in some cases with others, unlawfully did (a) rob a named person with a deadly weapon, or (b) rob a named person, or (c) assault with intent to murder a named person, or (d) break into a specified house at night with intent to take and carry away property of a stated value, or (e) wilfully destroy specified property of a named person.7 The reverse side of the petition contains spaces for entries which constitute, in effect, the docket entries in the case.
Finding 2. A date for arraignment was then set before one of the seven masters assigned to the Juvenile Division. At the arraignment the juvenile was advised of his rights, including the right to counsel. In each of the nine cases a public defender was appointed to represent the juvenile and entered a denial of the charge. In some of the cases, with the approval of the intake officer, the master determined that the juvenile should be detained at the Maryland Training School for Boys pending the adjudicatory hearing, and the juvenile was so detained forthwith; in those cases an order was prepared for the signature of the judge assigned to the Juvenile Division, and was usually signed on the same day or a day or two later.
Finding 3. Shortly thereafter, the deputy clerk of the Circuit Court who is designated as the chief responsible clerk of the Juvenile Division assigned the case to one of the masters to hold the adjudicatory hearing.8
Finding 4. Rule 908 (see n. 5, above), in force at the time of all hearings in all nine cases and still in effect, is headed "Conduct of Hearings — Generally". Sub-part e of that rule, headed "Masters", provides:
Finding 5. At the adjudicatory hearing in each of the nine cases the master received evidence and heard argument. No recording of the testimony by a court reporter or on tape was made.9
Finding 6. At the conclusion of the evidence and argument in each of the nine cases, the master announced his "finding" and his "recommendation" in the presence of the juvenile, his counsel and others.
Finding 7. In eight of the nine cases (all except Stewart), the master's finding was "Charge not sustained". Then or shortly thereafter, in each of the eight cases, a clerk entered on the reverse side of the petition, after the printed word "Finding", the words "Charge not sustained", and after the printed word "Order", the word "Dismissed", both entries being made under the date of the hearing before the master.
Finding 8. (a) In six of the eight cases covered by Finding 7, the prosecutor stated, immediately after the master announced his finding and recommendation, that he would file written exceptions thereto. In those cases no report or form of order for the judge's signature was prepared. In each case the State's attorney promptly filed a printed form excepting to the finding of the master and requesting that the matter be reset for hearing before the judge.
(b) In two of the six cases included in (a) above (Brady and Epps), their counsel filed with the clerk of the Juvenile Division motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. After a hearing in a similar case (Matter of Anderson), at which certain facts were stipulated, Judge Hammerman granted the motions to dismiss and filed a full opinion on August 1, 1973, stating the reasons for his decision. The State appealed. Similar motions were granted in other cases not involved in the present habeas corpus proceedings. The State appealed four decisions, including Brady and Epps, and the four appeals were consolidated. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the lower court and remanded all four cases, with directions that the petitions be heard de novo by the judge. Matter of Anderson, 20 Md. App. 31, 315 A.2d 540 (1974). The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals. Matter of Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 321 A.2d 516 (1974). An appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States by Epps, Brady and Smith was dismissed "for want of substantial federal question". Epps v. Maryland, 419 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 21, 42 L.Ed.2d 35 (1974).10 These rulings and opinions will be discussed below. Brady and Epps are not now in custody, but unless relief is granted by this court, the State intends to proceed with the de novo hearings before the judge.
(c) In three of the six cases included in (a) above (Aldridge, Campbell and Witherspoon), Judge Hammerman held the de novo hearing after the decision of the Court of Appeals in Matter of Anderson, supra. In each case he found the juvenile to be delinquent, and thereafter ordered him to be kept and detained under the care and custody of the Department of Juvenile Services.
(d) In the other case (Love), included in (a), above, the hearing before the judge has been postponed.
(e) In the other two cases covered by Finding 7 (Fenwick and McLean), both of which were heard by a master in the late summer of 1974, after the decision of the Court of Appeals in Matter of Anderson, the master in each case announced his "finding" at the conclusion of the hearing as "Charge not sustained". In each of the two cases the master signed a printed form, entitled "Master's Report", which read:
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Swisher v. Brady
...held that the Rule 908.e provision for a de novo hearing on the State's exceptions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F.Supp. 1161 (Md.1975). In that court's view, a juvenile was placed in jeopardy as soon as the State offered evidence in the hearing before a master.......
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Mark R., In re, 49
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