Aldridge v. Parr, 52441

• Decision Date: 01 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 52441,52441
• Citation: 396 So.2d 1027
• Parties: Diane Snyder Parr ALDRIDGE v. Robert Max PARR.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1027

396 So.2d 1027

Diane Snyder Parr ALDRIDGE v. Robert Max PARR.

No. 52441.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 1, 1981.

R. M. Sullivan, Petal, for appellant.

Robert T. Jackson, Jackson & Hammond, Hattiesburg, for appellee.

Before SMITH, LEE and BOWLING, JJ.

BOWLING, Justice, for the Court:

Appellant/cross appellee Diane Snyder Parr Aldridge and appellee/cross appellant Robert Max Parr, were married in November 1960. The parties were divorced by the Chancery Court of Forrest County, Mississippi, on March 28, 1972. At that time, Parr was a student at the University of Southern Mississippi, working toward his Ph. D. degree in psychology. Without the benefit of legal advice, Parr agreed with his wife that the divorce decree would provide for him to pay child support in a sum equal to one-half of his gross monthly income thereafter. The couple had three children: a son age 10 and two daughters ages 7 and 2.

From the date of the divorce decree until July 1973, while finishing his education, Parr made $500 monthly and paid one-half of this amount each month to his ex-wife as child support. Thereafter he secured his present job teaching at a college in Memphis, Tennessee, and increased the monthly child support payments to $396. Both parties remarried with the former Mrs. Parr moving to North Carolina with her new husband and three children.

In May 1977 Parr increased the monthly child support payments to $450 and according to him, requested of his ex-wife whether or not this was sufficient, stating that it was one-half of his net income.

In September 1978 the son joined the military service and became independent. Parr then started placing $150 each month in a savings account for his son and forwarded $300 per month to his former wife toward the support of the two daughters.

On April 13, 1979, Diane Snyder Parr Aldridge filed a petition requesting that her former husband be cited for contempt for failure to pay one-half of his gross pay to her as child support. Parr filed his answer stating that he had performed his support duties in a reasonable manner and alleging in his cross petition that the original decree of March 1972 agreed to by him without the advice of counsel was unreasonable and should not be enforced.

The trial of the contempt petition and the cross petition was had before the chancellor on January 15, 1980. It was stipulated that subsequent to the March 1972 decree, the ex-husband and father, Parr, had paid to his former wife toward child support the sum of $36,622. Mathematically, this averages approximately $375 per month during the entire time, including finishing school, internship, etc. At the time of the hearing, Parr's gross income from teaching and outside work amounted to approximately $27,900 annually. A computation, made as to what his gross income had been since March 1972, revealed that had he paid one-half of this gross each month, he would still be almost $40,000 in arrears.

Parr undisputedly testified that he remained on a good relationship with his children and that he still was on a good relationship at the time of the January 1980 citation hearing. He testified that he had spent around $2,000 for expenses in having his children visit him.

When the son joined the military service he gave the son the used car that the father was driving. He further testified undisputedly that he had told all three of his children that he would see that they got a college education in Memphis, provided, their living quarters would be at his home for the purpose of economizing on expenses. He further testified that since he had been regularly employed, he had carried a policy of medical and hospital insurance which covered all of his children.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court, in its opinion, reviewed the history as briefly set out above, and found that the former provision regarding child support in the original divorce decree was "unreasonable and unrealistic." He found as a fact that the father had substantially paid that which was reasonably possible for him to pay. He concluded this issue by finding that Parr was not guilty of deliberate and contumacious contempt; that the literal requirements of the decree resulted in the nonpayment over the years of a total of $39,937, but that the father should not have the burden of a money judgment in that amount, plus interest. The decree provided that any arrearage owed by the father could not be executed upon nor could he be forced to pay the arrearage except at a minimum rate of $100 per month. The chancellor held that the father should pay to the mother thereafter the sum of $350 per month toward the support of the two daughters, who remained with the mother and the $100 per month toward a payment of the one-half of the gross income as set out in the original divorce decree.

The decree also required Parr to pay to his former wife $750 as attorney's fee.

Appellant/cross appellee Mrs. Aldridge perfected this appeal on two issues and assignments of error only, to-wit: The failure of the court to add interest to the figure of $39,937 as heretofore discussed and the failure of the court to give appellant an immediate money decree in a position for execution thereon immediately instead of paying $100 per month to appellant.

Parr has filed his cross appeal contending that the court erred in holding that he owed back child support payments in the amount of $39,937 and requiring him to make monthly payments thereon. He contends that the claim was barred by either the doctrine of laches, the doctrine of estoppel, or that the original decree as to that issue was void.

Both assignments of error in the original appeal are rendered moot by our holding in the cross appeal. We agree with appellee/cross appellant that the March 1972 decree regarding the future payment of one-half of the father's subsequent income was void.

This Court had before it a similar provision in a final chancery court decree in the case of Webb v. Webb, 391 So.2d 981 (Miss.1980). There on a final decree the chancellor merely required one party to pay to the other party a "reasonable amount" toward the support of the minor child of the parties. After the final decree was entered and the court minutes signed at the conclusion of the term, the parties agreed that the payment should be $150 per month, which was made until the party making the payments became unemployed. This Court in holding that the decree was void as to the monthly support payments said:

Regarding the part of the decree giving judgment against appellant in the sum of $1,500 for alleged unpaid monthly support payments to appellee and requiring appellant to pay $150 per month in the future, we reverse those parts of the decree and...