Aldridge v. State

• Decision Date: 02 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. A98A2012.,A98A2012.
• Citation: 237 Ga. App. 209,515 S.E.2d 397
• Parties: ALDRIDGE v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

515 S.E.2d 397

237 Ga. App. 209

ALDRIDGE v. The STATE.

No. A98A2012.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

February 2, 1999.

Reconsideration Denied March 24, 1999.

Certiorari Denied July 2, 1999.

Vansant, Corriere & McClure, John M. Vansant, Jr., Albany, Michael W. Strahan, for appellant.

J. Brown Moseley, District Attorney, Victoria Spear-Darrisaw, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. POPE, Presiding Judge.

A jury convicted William Nelson Aldridge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30), possession of less than one ounce of marijuana (OCGA § 16-13-30), driving under the influence of drugs (OCGA § 40-6-391), operating a motor vehicle with an expired license plate (OCGA § 40-2-80), driving without headlights (OCGA 40-8-20), and no proof of insurance (OCGA 40-6-10). Aldridge appeals from the order denying his motion for new trial, raising eight enumerations of error. We affirm.

1. Aldridge contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana. The standard of review for a denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal when the sufficiency of evidence is challenged is whether, under the rule of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant guilty of the offenses charged. Cantrell v. State, 230 Ga. App. 693, 694-695(1), 498 S.E.2d 90 (1998); Cody v. State, 222 Ga.App. 468, 470(1), 474 S.E.2d 669 (1996). In reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict, we may consider all the evidence in the case, and we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Covington v. State, 226 Ga. App. 484(1), 486 S.E.2d 706 (1997). Viewed in this light, the record reveals the following:

On September 23, 1997, at about 1:53 a.m., Mitchell County Sheriff's Deputies Luckey and Hayes observed a car traveling toward them on Highway 300. The car was being operated without headlights. Just as the deputies activated their blue lights and turned the patrol car around to follow, the driver pulled over onto the shoulder of the highway. As the deputies drove up behind the car, they saw the driver reach over the seat as if he were placing something on the floorboard behind the passenger seat.

Although Aldridge was able to produce a valid driver's license, he had no proof of insurance. Aldridge searched through the front of the vehicle, looking for an insurance card while explaining to the deputies that he was driving a car that belonged to a friend, Jody Cox. The deputies had their dispatcher telephone Cox; Cox claimed the car but admitted he had no insurance. While Aldridge was looking through the car trying to find an insurance card, the deputies noticed the car's tag had expired. They also observed signs that Aldridge was intoxicated: his speech was slurred, his eyes were glassy, his gait was unbalanced, and he leaned frequently on the car. The deputies asked Aldridge if he was under the influence of alcohol. Aldridge said "no" and agreed to take an alco-sensor test. The deputies then radioed a senior deputy, Allegoode, who had the alco-sensor device. While awaiting Deputy Allegoode's arrival, the deputies asked Aldridge if he would consent to a search of his car. Aldridge agreed.

While en route, Deputy Allegoode radioed for a wrecker to tow Aldridge's car. When Allegoode arrived, he administered the alco-sensor test, which Aldridge passed with a .00 test result. The deputies did not perform any other field sobriety tests because Aldridge was so unsteady on his feet. Although Aldridge passed the alco-sensor test, the deputies still suspected Aldridge was under the influence of something because he had been driving without headlights and showed signs of intoxication. When asked if he was under the influence of any medication, Aldridge responded "no." When asked if he had any contraband in the car, Aldridge again responded "no" and told the deputies they could search his car. He even agreed to sign a consent to search form. However, the deputies were out of consent forms.

Deputy Luckey searched Aldridge's car. He found a black plastic glasses case on the floorboard behind the passenger's seat. A plastic bag was sticking out from the corner of the case. Inside the bag was less than an ounce of a green leafy material which tested positive for marijuana. The deputies also found in the case a plastic bag containing a large chunk and several individually packaged smaller "rocks" of a white substance which tested positive for methamphetamine. The large chunk and the individually packaged rocks of methamphetamine had a combined weight of 18.8 grams and an estimated street value of $1,800. A drug task force agent testified that the amount of methamphetamine found, its street value, and the way it was packaged evidenced a plan to distribute the drug. The deputies also found a small glass vial and a butane torch in the car. The vial and the torch are often used to smoke methamphetamine. The vial contained methamphetamine residue.

Upon discovering the suspected contraband, deputies Hayes and Luckey placed Aldridge under arrest. Deputy Luckey read Aldridge the implied consent warning and asked him to submit to a urine test. Aldridge refused. When they arrived at the police station, the deputies again read Aldridge his implied consent warnings and asked him to consent to a urine test. Again, Aldridge refused. During the course of the entire incident, Aldridge never offered an explanation for why he was driving without his headlights. The deputies found nothing wrong with the car. Aldridge did tell the officers he was driving to the gas station to get gasoline. However, the station he said he was going to had been closed for several hours.

At trial, Jody Cox testified that the car Aldridge was driving and the glasses case found in it belonged to him. But Cox testified that when Aldridge took the car Cox had no reason to believe there was any contraband in it. The drugs were not his. Further, he had no reason to believe that anyone else who had access to the car would have put drugs in it.

Aldridge argues that mere presence in the vicinity of contraband, without more, does not establish possession and there must be a showing of possession by him other than mere spatial proximity. While we agree with those principles of law, they are inapplicable here. Although Aldridge was driving a borrowed car and the drugs were discovered in a place out of Aldridge's view, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show Aldridge had sole, actual possession of the drugs.

First, when the deputies blue-lighted the car, they saw Aldridge reach over the driver's seat as if he were concealing something behind the passenger's seat where the contraband was in fact found. Second, although others may have had access to the car prior to Aldridge's driving it, Jody Cox testified that he had no knowledge of the drugs being in his car or in his glasses case. Further, Cox had no reason to believe that anyone else who may have had access to the car would have put drugs in it. Third, Aldridge appeared intoxicated. His speech was slurred; his eyes, glassy; his gait, impaired. Fourth, although Aldridge agreed to take an alco-sensor test, and passed it, he declined to take a urine test. The jury was authorized to infer from this that a urine test would reveal the presence of methamphetamine or marijuana in Aldridge's system. See Rayburn v. State, 234 Ga.App. 482, 506 S.E.2d 876 (1998); Brooks v. State, 187 Ga.App. 194, 195(1), 369 S.E.2d 801 (1988). Further, if the jury inferred the presence of drugs in Aldridge's system, they were authorized to infer that he previously possessed the drugs ingested. See Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 626(1), 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990).

This evidence shows a connection between Aldridge and the contraband that goes beyond mere spatial proximity. In fact, the evidence and all the inferences logically drawn from the evidence supports a conclusion that Aldridge had direct, physical control over the drugs because he had been using them and had concealed them when the deputies pulled him over. Consequently, we believe this evidence, though largely circumstantial, was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Aldridge was in sole, actual possession of the methamphetamine and marijuana found in the car. See, e.g., Noble v. State, 225 Ga.App. 470, 471, 484 S.E.2d 78 (1997); Heath v. State, 186 Ga.App. 655, 656-657(1), 368 S.E.2d 346 (1988). Also, the state offered physical evidence and expert opinion testimony from which a jury could infer Aldridge's intent to resell the methamphetamine he possessed, e.g., James v. State, 214 Ga.App. 763, 764(1), 449 S.E.2d 126 (1994). Because the evidence is sufficient to support Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, we find no error.

2. Aldridge argues that his refusal to submit to a urine test should not have been admitted into evidence because his arresting officers failed to read the implied consent warning in strict compliance with OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b). Aldridge raised this as error for the first time in his motion for new trial. Aldridge has not shown, and the transcript before us does not reveal, that Aldridge filed a motion in limine or interposed a timely objection to this evidence on this basis at trial. Consequently, this allegation of error is not preserved for our review. Kollman v. State, 231 Ga.App. 630(1), 498 S.E.2d 745 (1998).

3. Aldridge argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the methamphetamine and marijuana evidence because it was obtained as the result of an illegal, warrantless search of his car. Specifically, Aldridge argues that because he was detained for approximately 45 to...