Alejandro v. Barnhart

• Decision Date: 11 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.B-03-018.,CIV.A.B-03-018.
• Citation: 291 F.Supp.2d 497
• Parties: Jose G. ALEJANDRO v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

291 F.Supp.2d 497

Jose G. ALEJANDRO v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

No. CIV.A.B-03-018.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Brownsville Division.

September 11, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John R. Heard, Attorney at Law, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff.

Julia Baird Denegre, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

JUDGMENT

HANEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from a denial of Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits and disability insurance.¹ Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Both parties conceded in the May 9, 2003 hearing held telephonically that the case was ripe and the issues in dispute could be resolved by ruling on these motions. For the reason stated below, the Court hereby DENIES the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

A. Background

Plaintiff is a thirty-nine (39) year-old individual whose case is premised upon three main impairment claims: (1) Hepatitis C; (2) an organic brain syndrome that causes seizures; and (3) a personality disorder accompanied by depression. He also claims that he has memory problems and anxiety. The record indicates that he has a ninth (9th) grade education (although the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") stated that the Plaintiff has the equivalency of a high school education) and a long history of alcohol abuse.

In 1999, Plaintiff applied for and was denied Social Security benefits. The following year, this benefit request was reconsidered and denied again. Following this second denial, Plaintiff requested and received an administrative hearing, which was held in April of 2001. In July of 2001, the ALJ ruled against the Plaintiff and the Appeals Council denied further review in May of 2002. Plaintiff then filed this appeal in the Southern District of Texas-Corpus Christi Division. In January of 2003, this matter was transferred to this Court due to the fact that the Plaintiff lives in the Brownsville Division.

B. Standard of Review

The same standard rules governing summary judgments apply to a review of an administrative denial of social security benefits. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir.1993). While standard summary judgment rules control, the judicial role in social security matters, including appellate review, is limited by 42 U.S. § 405(g). Dellolio v. Heckler, 705 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir.1983). This Court may review the ALJ's findings: (1) to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and (2) to determine whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standard. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.1994). It may not weigh the evidence in the record nor retry the issue de novo, nor substitute their judgment for that of the Commissioner — even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Stated differently, conflicts in the evidence are for the ALJ, not this Court, to resolve. Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir.1990) (per curiam).

Having said this, this Court is not a rubber stamp for the Secretary's decision and is not simply reviewing the record to find evidence to support the ALJ's decision. See Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir.1985); Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir.1986). Unlike the area of substantial evidence, the ALJ's legal determinations are not afforded the same deference.

C. The Administrative Decision²

In the instant case, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff is not engaged in any substantial gainful work. Next, the ALJ determined that the medical evidence established the existence of the conditions about which the Plaintiff complained. She found that the Plaintiff indeed suffers from Hepatitis C, a seizure disorder, and an organic personality disorder. The ALJ found that these conditions were severe, but not severe enough to meet one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Since Plaintiff had no relevant work history, the ALJ proceeded to a determination of his residual functional capacity. This term is defined by regulation as what one is able to do despite his limitations and is used to identify that particular type of work that a person can do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. The ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff retained functional capacity and then proceeded to describe various kinds of areas at which the Plaintiff could work. Finally, the ALJ determined that these jobs existed in significant numbers in today's economy. These conclusions lead the ALJ to determine that the Plaintiff is not disabled as that term is defined in the Social Security regulations.

D. The Administrative Evidentiary Record

Given the substantial evidence standard of proof, a court's review of an administrative decision is necessarily fact-intensive. See Randall, 956 F.2d at 107 (noting "the fact intensive nature of our review"). As with the plaintiff in Randall, the instant Plaintiff has a substantial medical history that stretches across a significant expanse of time. Record at 57-480. Accordingly, in order to place the parties' contentions in their proper context, it is first necessary to concisely summarize that history. Randall, 956 F.2d at 107; see also Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir.1988) (per curiam) ("In applying the `substantial evidence' standard; we must carefully scrutinize the record to determine if, in fact, such evidence is present.")

At the administrative hearing, three persons testified: the Plaintiff, his wife, and a vocational expert. Record at 23. All formal medical evidence was documentary in nature (i.e., no medical experts testified at the administrative hearing). Plaintiff has not worked since approximately 1998-99. Id. at 25, 30-32, 46-49. His present claim of disability is premised on the effects of Hepatitis C, an organic personality disorder with depression, and an organic brain syndrome that causes seizures. Id. at 25. At the hearing, Plaintiff and his wife testified regarding the following symptoms and conditions: anxiety, paranoia, lack of concentration, dizziness, lightheadedness, fatigue, forgetfulness, balance problems, backache, inarticulateness, feelings of uselessness, memory problems, and frustration. Id. at 34, 36-45, 49, 51.

In support of his disability claim, Plaintiff principally relies on the assessments of his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Igoa. The ALJ states that Dr. Igoa concluded that the Plaintiff was disabled in April 2000. See id. at 15 (stating ALJ's characterization of Dr. Igoa's medical opinion). However, the ALJ may have misstated the date of Igoa's diagnosis. See id. at 478 (April 6, 2001 letter from Dr. Igoa that characterizes Plaintiff as being "totally and permanently disabled for gainful employment"). The evidentiary basis for Igoa's diagnosis is limited to Igoa's treatment notes for the periods of June through October of 1998 and February of 1999 through April of 2000, a Residual Functional Capacity Assessment completed on July 25, 2000, Igoa's April 6, 2001 letter, and a "Progress Note" of the same date that memorializes an examination. See id. at 208-19, 467-76, 478-79.

The ALJ rejected Igoa's conclusion, however, because the former regarded the latter's opinion as being "outside his expertise" and without support "even by his own examinations." Id. at 15. As a matter of law, Dr. Igoa's blanket statement of disability, id. at 478, is neither dispositive nor entitled to "any special significance." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1)-(3), 416.927(e)(1)-(3). The sole documentary evidence that might be marshaled in support of Igoa's April 6, 2001 statement is the "Progress Note" of the same date, which reads states a diagnostic impression of "Organic Affective Disorder" and "Organic Personality Disorder." Record at 479. It lists his medications as being "Serzone" and "Vistaril," and records that he reported doing "okay" with the assistance of said medication. Id. Igoa stated that Plaintiff was "[p]leasant, appropriate, animated, although with still some symptoms of anxiety and some irritability," and assessed Plaintiff as being "[o]n a good plateau although still not being able to function well." Id. No alteration in his treatment plan was suggested, and nothing in the way of diagnostic or laboratory findings is associated with the "Progress Note."

In his 1998 assessment, Dr. Igoa opined that the Plaintiff had poor or no ability to engage in the vast majority of tasks necessary to undertake unskilled work and had "severe depressive symptoms" and "impulse control problems" due to "brain abscess" and lacked the ability to manage benefits in his own interest. Id. at 467-69. Yet his treatment and evaluative records are at best unsupportive of said conclusion. Indeed, some of Igoa's records are out-right contradictory. For example, on June 16, 1998, Igoa wrote of the Plaintiff:

In his mood, he acknowledge [sic] some feelings of despondency and depression. Denied any suicidal intent. Thought stream was of normal trend and productivity. Thought content showed no evidence of any well systematize delusional belief. Perceptual disturbances were denied. Intellectually [sic] was well oriented in time, place, person, and circumstances. Memory was good for recall of remote and recent events. Insight was good. Judgment was not overtly impaired socially.

Id. at 215. This diagnostic statement is noteworthy, given that Plaintiff premises his disability claim, in part, on paranoia, concentration and memory problems, and an inability to articulate his thoughts aloud. See id. at 33-34, 36, 41, 43-44 (Plaintiff's testimony at the administrative hearing). Moreover, Igoa's records from 2000 report improvement and general well-being regarding Plaintiff's condition. See id. at 471 (assessing Plaintiff as being "stable...