Singletary v. Bowen

Decision Date29 August 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-3799,85-3799
Citation798 F.2d 818
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 16,938 Eddie SINGLETARY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. Summary Calendar.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Edward J. Cloos, III, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

Nancy A. Nungesser, Asst. U.S. Atty., New Orleans, La., John M. Gough, Atty., Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before GEE, REAVLEY and HILL, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

Eddie Singletary appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Health and Human Services affirming the denial of his application for disability benefits. We reverse.

Facts

Eddie Singletary is twenty-nine years old. He has completed the tenth grade and received his GED. He has also been in and out of several trade schools. For more than ten years, he has led a wandering, nomadic existence, travelling back and forth between Texas, Mississippi and Louisiana and living in hospitals, bus stations, missions, the woods and the homes of relatives. He has been sporadically employed, working for various intervals as a deck-hand, roustabout, rigger, or galley-hand. He has also worked for short periods of time at painting, plumbing, carpentry, air-conditioning, refrigeration, machine shops, loading and unloading trucks, and dishwashing. He has spent considerable amounts of time in various hospitals and mental institutions.

The doctors who have examined Singletary, and there have been many, have differed in their evaluations, diagnosing him at different times as suffering from schizophrenia, various psychoses, delusions, an antisocial personality, an inadequate personality, and a passive-aggressive personality. While they differ in their diagnoses, the doctors concluded that Singletary has serious, long-term mental impairments.

In 1982, Singletary applied for social security benefits, claiming that he was disabled due to his mental condition. His application was denied both initially and on reconsideration. In 1984, a hearing was conducted before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who recommended a finding of no disability. Singletary's request for review was rejected by the Appeals Council, and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The district court, upon recommendation of a magistrate, determined that the Secretary's determination was supported by substantial evidence, and granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.

Discussion

An individual is disabled under the Social Security Act only when he has a physical or mental impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for at least 12 months and which is so severe that the claimant is unable to engage in substantial gainful employment. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(1)(A) (1982); 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1505 (1985). Substantial gainful activity is work that involves significant and productive activities for pay or profit. Id. Sec. 404.1510. To determine whether an impairment is so severe that it prevents a claimant from pursuing any gainful activity, the Secretary is required to engage in a five-step sequential evaluation process. Id. Sec. 404.1520(b)-(f).

First, if the claimant is already employed, disability benefits are denied regardless of the severity of the impairment. Second, if the individual is not working, the Secretary must determine whether the claimed impairment is "severe." See id. Sec. 404.1521. If the impairment is severe, the Secretary must determine whether the impairment is so severe that the claimant is presumed to be unable to pursue any gainful activity. This determination is made by comparing the impairment to a specific Listing of Impairments. See id. Sec. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the claimant's impairment does not fall within the Listing of Impairments, the Secretary must determine whether the individual has a sufficient "residual functional capacity" to perform the kind of work he did in the past. See id. Sec. 404.1545. Fifth, if the individual is unable to do past relevant work, then the Secretary must determine, based on the individual's age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy. See id. Sec. 404.1566.

Determining whether a claimant is disabled because of a mental condition under the above sequential process can be a difficult task. In some cases, the mental impairment may be so severe that the claimant is presumed to be incapable of working. See, e.g., Moore v. Secretary of the United States Dept. of Health and Human Services, 778 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.1985) (finding that the claimant was disabled under the Listing of Impairments). Quite often, however, the claimant is capable of finding a job and working for short periods of time. The nature of the mental impairment is such, however, that the claimant is unable to remain employed for any significant period of time. Such circumstances raise two important questions. First, does the impairment meet the 12 month duration requirement? Second, is the impairment so severe as to prevent the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity? These questions are to a certain extent intertwined, and this has caused some confusion, confusion which was evident in this case.

I. The Durational Requirement

The ALJ concluded that Singletary's mental condition "does not appear to have been severe enough to have prevented substantial gainful employment for more than short periods of time--far less than twelve continuous months." This finding evidences a misunderstanding of the duration requirement. It confuses the duration requirement, which applies only to the impairment, with the severity requirement, which determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from working.

The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(1)(A) (1982). The statute quite clearly requires that it is the impairment only which must last for a continuous period. Normally, of course, when a claimant has an impairment severe enough to prevent him from working, he will be unable to work for as long as the impairment lasts. This is particularly true when the impairment is physical. The statute, however, does not require that a claimant be unable to engage in work during the entire 12 month period. See also 20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.1505(a); 404.1509; 404.1510. The ability of a claimant to engage in work for limited periods of time certainly calls into question the severity of the impairment, but it does not necessarily determine whether the impairment, however severe, has lasted for at least 12 months.

While a claimant need only show that an alleged impairment has lasted or can be expected to last for the 12 month period to meet the duration requirement, a claimant alleging a mental impairment may face a difficulty not presented in cases involving physical impairment. As one court has stated,

While the mere existence of symptom-free periods may negate a finding of disability when a physical impairment is alleged, symptom-free intervals do not necessarily compel such a finding when a mental disorder is the basis of the claim. Unlike a physical impairment, it is extremely difficult to predict the course of mental illness. Symptom-free intervals, though sometimes indicative of a remission in the mental disorder, are generally of uncertain duration and marked by an impending possibility of relapse. Realistically, a person with a mental impairment may be unable to engage in competitive employment, as his ability to work may be sporadically interrupted by unforeseeable mental setbacks.

Lebus v. Harris, 526 F.Supp. 56, 61 (N.D.Cal.1981).

Because of such considerations, the courts which have considered the question have concluded that a claimant whose claim is based on a mental condition does not have to show a 12 month period of impairment unmarred by any symptom-free interval. See, e.g., Miller v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 475, 478 (8th Cir.1984); Dreste v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 224, 226 n. 2 (8th Cir.1984). We agree with the assessment of these courts. A finding that a claimant has a mental impairment which manifests itself from time to time over a long-term period is not inconsistent with the language of the statute, which requires that an impairment last "for a continuous period of 12 months." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(1)(A) (1982); see also 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1509. Of course, as required by the regulations, a claimant must present medical evidence which indicates that his mental condition is a long-term problem and not just a temporary set-back. See 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1508.

In this case, there is no question but that Singletary presented such evidence. With years of visits to hospitals and numerous diagnoses of mental problems, Singletary's impairment unquestionably lasted for more than 12 months. Moreover, the doctors who saw Singletary all determined that his problems involved long-term difficulties. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Singletary met the duration requirement.

II. Substantial Gainful Activity

The ALJ determined that Singletary was suffering from a personality disorder. The ALJ also concluded, however, that Singletary was able to engage in substantial gainful activity because he was capable of performing work, such as dishwashing, which he had done in the past. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ ignored one very important aspect of Singletary's mental condition: the extent to which his condition...

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