Alessandra v. Barr
| Decision Date | 18 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-2878-MCR/MJF |
| Parties | SPERANZA ALESSANDRA, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM BARR, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the United States Department of State to grant her Egyptian husband a consular interview so that he may obtain a United States visa to enter the United States. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment (Doc. 14), Defendants responded (Doc. 17), and Plaintiff filed a reply. (Doc. 18). As discussed below, because genuine issues of material fact remain outstanding, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be denied.1
On July 27, 2017, Plaintiff, a United States citizen, married Mr. Ayman Ibrahim Elbadrawy Abdelkader, a national of the Arab Republic of Egypt. To obtaina visa for her husband to enter the United States, on February 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative. "For an individual to procure an immigrant visa as the spouse of a United States citizen, the spouse must first file the Form I-130 to establish his or her relationship with the individual seeking the visa." United States v. Russell, 957 F.3d 1249, 1251 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i)). "Generally, by filing an I-130 petition, 'any citizen of the United States' can request that the Attorney General recognize a foreign national family member, like a spouse or child, as an 'immediate relative.'" Bourdon v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 940 F.3d 537, 539-40 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i)).
After USCIS approves an I-130, the Department of State—through the National Visa Center ("NVC")—processes I-130 petitions. The NVC is responsible for scheduling the beneficiary—here, Plaintiff's husband—to appear for an interview to execute the visa application. Before the NVC schedules a visa interview, however, an applicant must: (1) pay any fees; (2) complete an immigrant visa application; and (3) submit required financial and civil documents.
The required documents and fees are submitted to the NVC online through the Department of State's Consular Electronic Application Center ("CEAC"). (Doc. 14 at 7; Doc. 17-1 ¶ 2, 4). If required documents are missing or there are errors with the submission of these materials, the NVC notifies the applicant to resubmit thedocumentation. (Doc. 14 at 5). Once a case becomes documentarily complete—that is, the fees have been paid and all documents have been properly submitted—the NVC schedules the beneficiary to appear at a U.S. embassy or consulate for an interview and to execute the visa application before a U.S. consular officer. (Doc. 17-1 at ¶ 5). The NVC generally schedules an interview with the consular officer within 30-60 days of the case becoming documentarily completed. (Doc. 14-3 at 2).
On August 1, 2018, the NVC emailed a welcome letter to Plaintiff. (Doc.14 at 10; Doc. 17-1 ¶¶ 2, 6). Plaintiff paid all of the required fees. (Doc. 14 at 7; Doc. 17-1 ¶ 6). On October 11, 2018, Plaintiff began submitting the required documents. (Doc. 14 at 10; Doc. 17-1 ¶ 7). Due to Plaintiff's errors with these submissions, the NVC notified Plaintiff six times between October 17, 2018, and January 7, 2019, that various documents needed to be resubmitted. (Doc. 17-1 ¶ 7).
Plaintiff contends that as of January 7, 2019, the CREAC website indicated that all required documents—including Plaintiff's marriage termination documents—had been received and were deemed "accepted." (Doc. 1-7 at 3).2 Plaintiff asserts that, on January 23, 2019, the NVC sent Plaintiff an update which indicated that the visa application was in final review. This status update, however, was subsequently removed. (Doc. 1-6 at 2; Doc. 14-3 at 2).
Despite this electronic notification and the CREAC website indicating that Plaintiff's documents had been "accepted," the NVC did not schedule a consular interview. In order to facilitate the processing of the petition, Plaintiff's counsel sent several emails to NVC regarding the consular interview. (Doc. 14-8 at 2). On March 21, 2019, the NVC responded that Plaintiff's documents were (Doc. 14-8 at 1).
On April 10, 2019, Plaintiff again inquired about the consular interview. (Doc. 14-8 at 4-5). On April 22, 2019, the NVC responded:
(Doc. 14-8 at 3). Plaintiff's counsel asserts that his staff promptly uploaded the marriage termination documents. (Doc. 14-3 at 2).
In May 2019, Plaintiff's counsel sent two emails requesting a status update regarding the consular interview. (Doc. 14-8 at 8-10). On June 14, 2019, the NVC responded indicating that it had sent a message to Plaintiff which informed her that unidentified documents were missing from her application. The NVC indicated thatPlaintiff was required to upload these missing documents before the NVC could continue processing the visa application. (Doc. 14-8 at 7).
On July 31, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this civil action. (Doc. 1). On December 17, 2019, one day after Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment, the NVC informed Plaintiff that the NVC was "unable to accept these documents as uploaded." (Doc. 18-1 at 2). The NVC advised Plaintiff that these documents needed to be resubmitted. (Doc. 17-1 at 4; Doc. 18 at 2). On December 18, 2019, Plaintiff's counsel resubmitted the marriage termination documents to the NVC. (Doc. 18-1 at 2; Doc. 20 at 2).
On February 20, 2020, the NVC deemed the visa application to be "documentarily qualified." (Doc. 20-1). The NVC indicated that it would schedule the consular interview and inform Plaintiff and her husband of the date of the interview. (Doc. 20-1). Before the consular interview could be scheduled, on March 20, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department of State suspended routine visa services at all U.S. Embassies and Consulates. (Doc. 20-2; Doc. 20-3). As a result, the U.S. Embassy in Egypt has cancelled routine Visa Appointments until approximately September 30, 2020.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to anymaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A "genuine" dispute exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). An issue of fact is "material" if it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995).
When addressing a motion for summary judgment, a court must decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Hickson, 357 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52). At "the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S at 249. In evaluating a summary judgment motion, all "justifiable inferences" must be resolved in the nonmoving party's favor so long as there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006); see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Congress empowered courts to adjudicate mandamus actions in Section 1361 of Title 28, which states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of anyaction in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361; United States v. Davis, 359 F. App'x 128, 129 (11th Cir. 2010); Cash v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003). Mandamus, however, is "'a drastic and extraordinary' remedy 'reserved for really extraordinary causes.'" Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947)); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Serrano v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 655 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011); In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 953 (11th Cir. 2003). "Equitable relief, particularly mandamus, does not necessarily follow a finding of a violation: respect for the autonomy and comparative institutional advantage of the executive branch has traditionally made courts slow to assume command over an agency's choice of priorities." In re Barr Lab'ys, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
To prevail in a mandamus action, a party must show that: (1) it has a clear and indisputable right to relief; (2) there are no adequate alternative means by which it may obtain that relief; and (3) the grant of mandamus is appropriate under the circumstances. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81; Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980); Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976). When a plaintiff fails to demonstrate that it has a clear and indisputable right to relief, a court may "begin and end with the first" of the three mandamusrequirements. In re Trade & Com. Bank, 890 F.3d 301, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
As to the first element, a plaintiff's right to issuance of a writ of mandamus is clear...
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