Cash v. Barnhart
Decision Date | 07 February 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 02-14177 Non-Argument Calendar.,02-14177 Non-Argument Calendar. |
Citation | 327 F.3d 1252 |
Parties | Linda CASH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Byron A. Lassiter, Lassiter & Associates, P.C., Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Mary Ellen Russell, Baltimore, MD, Roy F. Blondeau, U.S. Atty., Tallahassee, FL, Pamela A. Moine, Asst. U.S. Atty., Pensacola, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.
Before ANDERSON, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.
Linda Cash appeals the district court's order dismissing her petition for a writ of mandamus against the Commissioner of Social Security. Cash requested that the district court order the administrative law judge ("ALJ") to conduct a hearing on her second application for social security benefits, which the ALJ dismissed as barred by res judicata. The ALJ also denied Cash's implied request to reopen her first application for benefits. After review, we affirm.
In 1996, Cash filed an application for disability benefits, alleging her disability began on June 1, 1988. This application was denied initially and on reconsideration. It is undisputed that Cash had a right to a hearing before an ALJ on her first application, if she timely requested one. The problem for Cash is that she did not request a hearing before an ALJ or appeal the determination of her first application in any way.
In 1999, Cash filed a second application for disability benefits, again alleging her disability began on June 1, 1988. The agency staff at the regional level denied Cash's second application.1 Cash requested reconsideration, and that request also was denied in an agency letter stating, 2
Cash then requested a hearing before an ALJ as to her second application. The ALJ conducted a hearing on whether Cash's claim should be reopened but not an evidentiary hearing on the merits of her claim. The ALJ dismissed Cash's hearing request on the basis of res judicata because he found that Cash's "current request for hearing involves the rights of the same claimant on the same facts and on the same issues which were decided in the final and binding determination ... made on the [first] application." Throughout this case in the district court and on appeal, there has been no dispute over the ALJ's finding that Cash's second application involved the same facts and issues as her first application.
Apparently in light of Cash's res judicata problem, the ALJ also construed Cash's request for a hearing on her second application as an implied request to reopen her first application for benefits. The ALJ then found that there was no good cause to reopen Cash's first application, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-404.989, because (1) no new and material evidence had been submitted with Cash's second application and (2) the denial of Cash's first application was not based on a clerical error or an error on the face of the evidence. The Appeals Council denied review.
Cash then filed this petition for writ of mandamus, which sought an order requiring the ALJ to hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits of her second application. The Commissioner moved to dismiss Cash's "complaint," arguing that there had been no "final decision" by the Commissioner and thus the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1361. A magistrate judge recommended that Cash's "action" be dismissed. Over Cash's objections, the district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed Cash's "action" for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 405(g). Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court discussed mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.3
In the district court and on appeal, the parties focus on 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) as the basis for jurisdiction. Thus, we first discuss 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and then mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.4
The district court's jurisdiction is limited by the Social Security Act, and judicial review exists only over the "final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2002).5 The Social Security Administration's regulations provide that the Commissioner may dismiss a hearing request and decline to issue a "final decision" if the doctrine of res judicata applies in the Commissioner has made a previous decision about the claimant's rights on the same facts and the same issues, and this previous determination has become final. 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1).6 Cash does not dispute that the two applications involve essentially the same onset date and same facts and issues. Instead, Cash primarily contends that, in considering her hearing request on her second application, the ALJ was estopped from applying res judicata because her first application had been de facto reopened.
As a general matter, district courts do not have jurisdiction over the Commissioner's refusal to reopen a claim, since such a refusal is not a "final decision" within the meaning of § 405(g). Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-09, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Instead, a decision refusing to reopen an earlier application ordinarily is considered an interim decision not reviewable under § 405(g). See, e.g., Loudermilk v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir.2002); Sherrod v. Chater, 74 F.3d 243, 245 (11th Cir.1996).7
Nonetheless, we have recognized an exception to this rule. Subject matter jurisdiction exists in those cases where a final decision on a prior "social security claim is in fact reopened and reconsidered on the merits to any extent on the administrative level." Sherrod, 74 F.3d at 245. Although the ALJ denied her implicit request to reopen, Cash argues that a de facto reopening of her first claim occurred. Thus, our task is to determine whether there was a de facto reopening of Cash's first application resulting in a new final decision to support jurisdiction under § 405(g).
In this case, it is undisputed that the ALJ did not consider the merits of Cash's second application. Instead, the ALJ did two things. The ALJ looked at Cash's second application and her prior claim only to the extent required to determine if they involved the same claims, facts and issues. After doing so, the ALJ concluded Cash's second application was barred by res judicata. Secondly, the ALJ construed the second application as a motion to reopen the final decision on her first application and expressly denied the motion to reopen. The Appeals Council then denied review.
In prior decisions, this Court has held that no reopening of a prior application occurs and no jurisdiction exists under § 405(g) to support judicial review of the ALJ's and the Appeal Council's decisions in these circumstances. See, e.g., Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) ( ); Cherry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir.1985) ( ).
In contrast, when our precedent has concluded that a reopening occurred, the case involved an actual reopening of a prior claim by either the ALJ or the Appeals Council. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir.1996) ( ); Macon v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.1991) ( ).
We recognize that Cash argues that, prior to the ALJ's action in this case, the letters from the regional level of the Social Security Administration indicated that the agency staff had examined and denied her second application on the merits initially and then on reconsideration. Thus, Cash contends there was a de facto reopening of her first application by the agency staff. Our prior above decisions did not detail exactly what had happened at the staff level before the ALJ determined that res judicata barred a claimant's second application. However, we conclude that those decisions are sufficiently similar to control this case. In addition, the district court has jurisdiction to review only the Commissioner's final decision, and thus we must look to what the ALJ and the Appeals Council did to determine if a reopening occurred and not to the initial interim decisions at the lower agency levels. Further, the ALJ's res judicata analysis and review did not constitute a de facto reopening of Cash's first application. More importantly in this case, the ALJ also construed Cash's second application as a motion to reopen her first claim and expressly denied Cash's motion. Given the particular facts in this case, we conclude there was no actual or de facto reopening of the final...
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Case Index
...ESTOPPEL § 506.1. Res Judicata Albright v. Comm’r of SSA , 174 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1999), 4th-99 Cash v. Barnhart , 327 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. Feb. 7, 2003), 11th-03 Hillier v. Social Security Administration , 486 F.3d 359 (8th Cir. May 15, 2007), 8th-07 Lewis v. Apfel , 236 F.3d 503 ......
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Table of cases
...1995 WL 311738, at *6 (D. Kan. May 11, 1995), § 1107.14 Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. Oct. 4, 2007), 8th-07 Cash v. Barnhart , 327 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. Feb, 7, 2003), 11th-03 Casiano v. Apfel, 39 F. Supp.2d 326, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) , aff’d, Casiano v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 1322 (Table) ......
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Case index
...ESTOPPEL § 506.1 Res Judicata Albright v. Comm’r of SSA , 174 F.3d 473 (4 th Cir. Apr. 22, 1999), 4 th -99 Cash v. Barnhart , 327 F.3d 1252 (11 th Cir. Feb. 7, 2003), 11 th -03 Hillier v. Social Security Administration , 486 F.3d 359 (8 th Cir. May 15, 2007), 8 th -07 Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.......
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Table of Cases
...1995 WL 311738, at *6 (D. Kan. May 11, 1995), § 1107.14 Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. Oct. 4, 2007), 8th-07 Cash v. Barnhart , 327 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. Feb, 7, 2003), 11th-03 Casiano v. Apfel, 39 F. Supp.2d 326, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) , aff’d, Casiano v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 1322 (Table) ......