Aleutian Homes v. Fischer
| Decision Date | 07 October 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 668,668 |
| Parties | ALEUTIAN HOMES and Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board, Appellants, v. Norma H. FISCHER, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
George N. Hayes and James K. Singleton, Delaney, Wiles, Moore & Hayes, Anchorage, for appellants.
Martin A. Farrell, Jr., and Allen L. Jewell, Anchorage, for appellee.
Before NESBETT, C. J., and DIMOND and RABINOWITZ, JJ.
Early in December 1963 appellee Norma H. Fischer was employed by appellant Aleutian Homes as a secretary-bookkeeper. By Christmas of that year the skin on appellee's hands had 'erupted' and become 'itchy and painful.' This condition continually worsened until the 'weeping' of her hands interfered with work to such an extent that during the second week in February 1964 she discontinued her employment. In August of that year appellee filed an application for temporary total disability with the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board.
A hearing was held before the Board in September 1964, and thereafter the Board rendered a decision in which it denied compensation. Appellee then appealed the Board's denial to the superior court which, after hearing the matter on the record, reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case for determination of the amount of compensation to be awarded to appellee and additionally to determine appellee's medical expenses, costs, and attorney's fees. Appellant Aleutian Homes now brings this appeal from the superior court's reversal of the Board's compensation order.
In the court below, appellant moved to dismiss appellee's appeal from the Board's decision on the grounds that appellee had not timely complied with the applicable statutory procedures for obtaining review of a compensation order of the Board. 1 In this appeal appellant reasserts its contention that the superior court was without jurisdiction to entertain appellee's appeal from the Board's decision due to appellee's lack of compliance with the provisions of our compensation act governing review of compensation orders.
Appellant's position is that AS 23.30.125 (a) of our act establishes that a compensation order becomes effective thirty days after it is filed in the office of the Board unless proceedings to suspend it or set it aside are instituted in the superior court in conformity with section 23.30.125(c) of the act. 2 Appellant specifically contends that appellee failed to institute a section 23.30.125(c) injunction proceeding in the superior court within thirty days of the date on which the compensation order in question was filed in the office of the Board. 3
The decision denying appellee's application for compensation was dated November 9, and was filed in the office of the Board on November 23, 1964. The record further establishes that the decision was sent by registered mail to appellee-claimant on December 9, 1964 and was received by her on the tenth or eleventh of December. Claimant, on January 7, 1965, then filed a 'Notice of Appeal' in the superior court. 4 After denying appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal the superior court permitted appellee to file an amended pleading in the nature of an injunction action against appellant and the Board in conformity with the provisions of AS 23.30.125(c).
Under AS 23.30.110(e) of our act, a compensation order, either rejecting a claim or making an award, is required to be filed in the office of the Board and a copy of such order must be sent by registered mail to the last known addresses of both claimant and employer. 5 This provision of our act makes it mandatory upon the Board, once it has filed its compensation order, to promptly mail a copy of its order to claimant, as well as to claimant's employer. 6 The Board has no discretion to delay mailing copies of the order after it has been filed. 7 Here the record shows that the Board initially delayed filing its November 9, 1964, decision for a period of approximately two weeks. Then, after it had filed its decision on November 23, 1964, it again waited an additional two weeks, until December 9, 1964, before sending a registered letter to appellee, which communication was received by her on the tenth or eleventh of December. We consider it significant that the 'copy' of the Board's decision which was sent to appellee on December 9 failed to indicate thereon that the decision had been filed in the office of the Board. 8 Under these circumstances, we hold that the appellee's 'Notice of Appeal' filed in the superior court on January 7, 1965, was timely under AS 23.30.125(a) and (c). 9
Appellant concedes that if claimant had received no notice at all, or received notice after the time for seeking review had run, then claimant would be entitled to relief as a matter of due process. We re in agreement with those authorities which, in construing similar sections of the Long-shoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, have concluded that the thirty-day period within which review proceedings must be instituted begins to run from the day the order is filed in the office of the Board and not from the time a copy of the order is received by the claimant. 10 Further, we are in accord with the decision in Gravel Products Corp. v. McManigal 11 where, in a case arising under the federal compensation act, the court said:
Certainly the plaintiff was an interested party and should have had notice, and, if no such notice was given, the plaintiff should not be denied the opportunity of being heard and having the case disposed of on the merits. If the provisions of the act with regard to notice were not complied with, the restriction imposed by the act, limiting the time within which to seek injunctive relief, cannot be applied, and the court may, under its general equity powers, grant the relief prayed for. Nothing is more firmly established than that a fundamental requisite of the due process guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments is the opportunity to be heard.
In our view the factual situation presented by this record approaches the situation discussed in the Gravel quote. In the case at bar claimant-appellee never received a copy of the compensation order which had been filed in the Board's office because, as was pointed our earlier, the copy which was sent claimant was devoid of any indication that the order had, as yet, been filed in the office of the Board. All that is necessary under AS 23.30.110(e) and 23.30.125(a) to start the thirty-day period running is for the Board to promptly send, after filing, a registered copy of its order (a copy being one that reflects the date on which the original thereof was filed in the office of the Board) to claimant and claimant's employer at their respective last known addresses. Here claimant was never given any notice that the Board's order had been filed. In light of this fact and the circumstances that the copy which appellee received on December 10 or 11 was dated November 9, 1964, and postmarked December 9, 1964, at Juneau, Alaska, we hold that the lower court did not commit reversible error in concluding that appellee had thirty days from receipt of the Board's decision within which to seek review in the superior court. 12
Appellant further argues that review of a compensation order is expressly provided for by the injunction procedures of AS 23.30.125(c) and since appellee's 'Notice of Appeal' 13 did not comply with AS 23.30.125(c), the superior court was without jurisdiction to review the Board's order. The question of whether the procedure established by AS 23.30.125(c) of our compensation act or the appeal procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act 14 govern review of a compensation order has been the subject of controversy in the superior court and has not as yet been resolved by decision of this court. As a general statement of law, we are in agreement with appellant's contention that where the legislature has established a specific procedure for review of administrative decisions, or orders, such procedure is controlling. 15 We, therefore, hold that in all future cases in which a party to a proceeding before the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board seeks review in superior court of a Board order, such review must be initiated by the injunction procedures made obligatory by AS 23.30.125(c). 16
On the record before us we cannot say that the lower court erred in permitting appellee to amend her original 'Notice of Appeal' in order to file an injunction action in conformity with AS 23.30.125(c). We have already alluded to the uncertainty which existed as to whether the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act or our Workmen's Compensation Act were to be followed in taking appeals from Board orders. In addition to this factor, it is of significance that in the past this court has held that the scope of review of appeals from Board orders was to be governed by our Administrative Procedure Act. 17 Here the record shows that appellee's counsel was in doubt as to the proper procedure for perfecting an appeal to the superior court, and that the 'Notice of Appeal' which was filed on behalf of appellee clearly specified the decision of the Board which was questioned. 18 Under these circumstances, we hold that appellee's 'Notice of Appeal' was both timely and sufficient procedurally to commence proceedings to obtain review of the Board's compensation order.
Before leaving this point mention should be made of appellants' reliance upon this court's decision in Alaska Mines & Minerals, Inc. v. Alaska Industrial Bd. 19 That case also concerned an appeal to the superior court from a decision of the Board. Central to our disposition of the case was our construction of the Alaska Business Corporation Act 20 which provided that 'No domestic or foreign corporation may commence or maintain a suit, action or proceeding in a court in the state without alleging and proving that it has paid its annual corporation tax last due * * *.' 21 There...
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