Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Com'n of Minneapolis and Saint Paul, C7-89-1206

• Decision Date: 11 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. C7-89-1206,C7-89-1206
• Citation: 452 N.W.2d 492
• Parties: James H. ALEVIZOS, et al., Petitioners Below, Frank L. Ario, et al., Petitioners and Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. The METROPOLITAN AIRPORTS COMMISSION OF MINNEAPOLIS AND SAINT PAUL, Respondent. . Review Denied
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 492

452 N.W.2d 492

James H. ALEVIZOS, et al., Petitioners Below, Frank L. Ario, et al., Petitioners and Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. The METROPOLITAN AIRPORTS COMMISSION OF MINNEAPOLIS AND SAINT PAUL, Respondent.

No. C7-89-1206.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Review Denied May 11, 1990.

March 13, 1990.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In an action in mandamus for inverse condemnation, a trial court may properly submit disputed issues to a jury prior to the trial court's determination of the legal issues establishing the taking of an avigational easement, where such issues constitute mixed questions of law and fact.

2. A petition in mandamus will properly be denied in an action for inverse condemnation of an avigational easement, where evidence at trial does not establish a direct and substantial invasion of landowners' property rights which deprives the landowners of the practical enjoyment of their property; is not of an occasional nature but rather is repeated and aggravated; has a reasonable probability of continuing into the future; and results in a measurable diminuation of the market value of the landowners' property.

3. In an action to establish the unconstitutional taking of an avigational easement, a trial court may properly exclude evidence of state pollution control agency noise standards which are preempted by federal law and unenforceable, absent an independent offer of proof manifesting relevance and non-preemption.

4. A trial court may properly refuse to give a party's requested jury instruction where such instruction was given in substance, where the instruction, if given as requested, would have additionally required a balancing statement and where the trial court's instruction, as given, fairly and correctly stated applicable law.

5. A trial court may properly direct a verdict as to an issue where evidence so overwhelmingly predominates that the trial court would be compelled to set aside a jury's contrary determination as being manifestly against the evidence.

Eric J. Magnuson, Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, Richard J. Gunn, Bradley J. Gunn, Olson, Gunn and Seran, Ltd., Minneapolis, for appellants.

Michael Berens, Kelly & Berens, P.A., Lucinda E. Jesson, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered and decided by NORTON, P.J., PARKER and HUSPENI, JJ.

OPINION

NORTON, Judge.

This action in mandamus for inverse condemnation was initially brought in Hennepin County District Court on July 17, 1970 as a class action against respondent Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) by appellants and others owning property near the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP). The landowners alleged that the noise created by the movement of aircraft to and from MSP was an unreasonable invasion of their property rights which constituted an unconstitutional taking of an avigational easement. The landowners, however, were denied class certification by the district court and appealed. On March 15, 1974, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of class certification in Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 298 Minn. 471, 216 N.W.2d 651 (1974) (Alevizos I ). The court remanded the case for further proceedings, setting forth the elements necessary to establish MAC's liability under a theory of inverse condemnation.

The remanded action was subsequently tried as a test case concerning a single parcel of land owned by appellants Frank and Georgette Ario. Following a trial on the merits to the district court without a jury in early 1979, the landowners were denied a writ of mandamus. Subsequently, the case was once again appealed. In Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 317 N.W.2d 352 (Minn.1982) (Alevizos II ), the supreme court determined that the landowners were entitled to a jury trial and reversed and remanded the action for trial on all issues.

In June of 1983 the landowners again sought class certification, but as to a smaller class of properties. The trial court ordered the class certified over the objections of MAC, but certified its order as important and doubtful for review. On May 17, 1985 in Ario v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 367 N.W.2d 509 (Minn.1985), the supreme court reversed the trial court, holding that the proposed class still failed to meet the conditions established in Alevizos I for maintenance of a class action.

Once again, the case was assigned for trial. To facilitate settlements, the trial court ordered that the matter be tried initially only as to a group of three parcels, to be followed by trials concerning parcels in groups of five. On January 11, 1989 this action came on for trial as to the three parcels of land owned by appellants Frank and Georgette Ario, Carl and Gloria Frost and Helen Wade.

In order to assure the orderly presentation of testimony and that appellants' parcels would be valued as of the same date, the parties agreed in pretrial proceedings that June 1, 1986 would be the valuation date of the property.

Following a trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding no direct and substantial invasion of appellants' property rights by MAC. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the jury's verdict. Appellants subsequently moved the trial court for an order granting alternatively: judgment notwithstanding the verdict; judgment notwithstanding the verdict (or amended findings of fact and conclusions of law) and a new trial on the issue of diminution and market value; and/or a new trial on all issues. The trial court denied appellants' motion for post-trial relief and entered judgment in favor of MAC.

We affirm.

FACTS

The appellants in this matter have resided in south Minneapolis near MSP for many years. Mrs. Wade built her home in 1938, the Arios purchased their home in 1962, and the Frosts moved into their home in 1967.

Appellants' neighborhood is near many schools, churches and shopping centers and has good public transportation and convenient access to freeways. The neighborhood has many mature trees and is made up of attractive, well-kept homes.

Appellants' homes are within a three block radius and each is located within two or three blocks of the northwest corner of MSP. MSP's two parallel runways, 11L-29R and 11R-29L, which run in a northwest to southeast direction in order to take advantage of predominant northwesterly winds, handle the majority of the take-offs and landings at the airport. Appellants' parcels are in such a position that many take-offs and landings at MSP require aircraft to be directed over their homes.

Prior to the late 1960s, aircraft noise affecting appellants' neighborhood wasn't a problem. After 1968 or 1969, however, the aircraft noise became more serious. During the 1970s and 1980s many factors affected the aircraft noise impacting appellants' neighborhood. The number of aircraft operations (defined as a take-off or a landing) steadily increased from 236,108 in 1972 to over 400,000 in 1986. As peak traffic hours grew, more and more operations were forced to use MSP's parallel runways and to fly over appellants' neighborhood.

The amount of noise generated by individual planes was reduced somewhat as technology improved and the commercial fleet was upgraded with modern aircraft. MAC also implemented policies designed to minimize the noise problem, such as, a "preferential runway system" to divert aircraft traffic away from South Minneapolis when traffic and weather conditions permitted. As the number of operations at MSP grew, however, the average number of hours the preferential runway system could be used daily fell from 21 in 1979 to 11 in 1986.

Because the property owners in the area perceived the aircraft noise as a serious problem, they brought this action, initially as a class action composed of approximately 27,565 businesses and residential property owners, alleging their property had been unconstitutionally taken due to the aircraft noise.

Evidence was presented at trial as to the nature of appellants' neighborhood and its amenities; the noise level in the area produced by aircraft taking off and landing at MSP; the detriment suffered by appellants due to such noise; and the compatibility of the neighborhood as a residential area given the noise produced by the aircraft. Additionally, extensive evidence was introduced as to the effect of the aircraft noise on the value of properties in the real estate market encompassing appellants' homes.

Following final argument, the trial court instructed the jury as to the elements of the law constituting a taking under a theory of inverse condemnation. The jury subsequently returned a special verdict form consisting of three questions to be answered with regard to each of the appellants:

1. Was there a direct and substantial invasion of the property rights?

2. Did such invasion result in a definite and measurable diminution in market value of the petitioners' property, which the property owning public in general did not suffer?

3. State in money the diminution in market value of the petitioners' property as a direct result of the invasion of property rights and increase, if any, in noise level that occurred since they purchased the property, or since July 17, 1964, whichever was later, until June 1, 1986.

The latter two questions were to be answered only in the event the preceding question was answered in the affirmative. The jury answered the first question "no" with regard to each of the appellants. Subsequently, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law indicating that no substantial invasion of appellants' property rights occurred and entered judgment in favor of MAC.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court properly determine the issue of "substantial invasion" of appellants' property rights by submitting the question to the jury?

2. Was the trial court's judgment in favor of MAC finding no substantial invasion supported by the...