Alexander Orr, Jr., Inc. v. Florida Indus. Com'n

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: BUFORD, Justice.
• Citation: 176 So. 172,129 Fla. 369
• Parties: ALEXANDER ORR, Jr., Inc., et al. v. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Decision Date: 29 September 1937

176 So. 172

129 Fla. 369

ALEXANDER ORR, Jr., Inc., et al.
v.
FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

Florida Supreme Court

September 29, 1937

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mrs. Andrew Jerome Maxwell, a widow, claimant, for compensation for death of her husband, Andrew Jerome Maxwell, opposed by Alexander Orr, Jr., Inc., employer, and the Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, insurance carrier. From a decree affirming an award of the Florida Industrial Commission granting compensation, the employer and insurance carrier appeal.

Affirmed. [129 Fla. 369] Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; H. F. Atkinson, judge.

COUNSEL

McKay, Dixon & DeJarnette, of Miami, for appellants.

Ross Williams, of Miami, for appellees.

OPINION

BUFORD, Justice.

The appeal here is from a decree of the circuit court affirming the award of Florida Industrial Commission in favor of Mrs. Andrew Jerome Maxwell, a widow, as compensation for the death of her husband, Andrew Jerome Maxwell, whom she alleged died as result of sunstroke, and that the same was an accident under the terms of Florida Workmen's Compensation Act, being chapter 17481, Acts of 1935, in that the death of Andrew Jerome Maxwell proximately resulted from an injury arising out [129 Fla. 370] of and in the course of his employment, by and under the direction of Alexander Orr, Jr., Inc., a Florida corporation.

Paragraph 5 of section 2 of that act provides:

'The term 'injury' means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably results from such injury.'

So it is that the question for our determination is whether or not the petition sufficiently alleges, and the testimony establishes, a state of facts which makes the provisions of the act above mentioned applicable and the petitioner, the appellee here, entitled to compensation thereunder.

We have found no better expression of the rule which is applicable in cases such as this than that enunciated by the Supreme Court of Alabama in the case of Gulf States Steel Co. v. Christison, 228 Ala. 622, 154 So. 565, 569, in which that court said: [176 So. 173]

'If the heat exhaustion arose out of the employment, as well as in its course, we think it is clear that any harmful effect upon the physical structure of the body of the employee, which was a proximate result of it, is an accident under our statute. Section 7596, (i) Code; Gulf States Creosoting Co. v. Walker, 224 Ala. 104, 139 So. 261; New River Coal Co. v. Files, 215 Ala. 64, 109 So. 360; 1 Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, p. 281, § 86. In connection with the sort of accident here involved, the principle to which most authorities give assent is that the harmful condition does arise out of the employment, if, in the performance of the duties for which he was engaged, in the manner required or contemplated by the employer, it is necessary for the employee to expose himself to a danger, materially in excess of that to which people commonly in that locality are exposed, when not situated as he [129 Fla. 371] is when thus performing his service, and that such excessive exposure may be found to have been the direct cause of the injury, though...