Alexander's Admr. v. Kentucky Bankers Ass'n.
| Decision Date | 03 February 1931 |
| Citation | 237 Ky. 232 |
| Parties | Alexander's Administrator v. Kentucky Bankers Association. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
2. Criminal Law. — County court has no jurisdiction to determine guilt of one accused of robbery or attempt at robbery (Constitution, secs. 7, 12).
3. Rewards. — Courts favor liberal construction of words of offer to pay reward and enforce it in favor of person's substantially meeting conditions of contract.
4. Rewards. — Person induced to take action because of reward offered resulting in arrest and leading to conviction is entitled to reward.
5. Rewards. — Action of county court in committing juveniles to school of reform held not "conviction," within offer of reward for conviction of persons robbing or attempting to rob bank. (Ky. Stats., secs. 331e-1 to 331e-23.
County court, by virtue of Ky. Stats., secs 331e-1 to 331e-23, having primary jurisdiction of juvenile offenders, with no power in circuit court over persons coming within purview of those sections, unless county court transfers case in mitting juveniles to school of reform was not an establish-mitting juveniles to school of reform was not an establishment of the fact of guilty by court having jurisdiction to punish offense of robbery or attempt at robbery, and did not carry the consequences of such a conviction.
Appeal from Perry Circuit Court.
W.A. STANFILL and J.W. CRAFT for appellant.
F.J. EVERSOLE, JESSE MORGAN, TRABUE, DOOLAN and HELM & HELM for appellee.
Affirming.
The Kentucky Bankers Association posted at the Perry Bank & Trust Company in Hazard this offer to pay a reward:
William Alexander instituted an action against the Kentucky Bankers Association to recover $4,000, alleging that he had caused the arrest of four persons whom he caught attempting to rob the Perry Bank & Trust Company. He further alleged that the four persons were infants under the age of 15 years and, by reason of their immature age, exclusive jurisdiction of their persons was committed to the Perry county court. and that they had been convicted and committed to the House of Reform at Greendale.
The defendant denied the allegations of the petition. At the conclusion of the evidence offered by the plaintiff, the court directed a verdict for the defendant. The appeal is prosecuted by the personal representative of Alexander, who had died pending the action.
It appears that the four boys were incorrigible and had committed numerous offenses. They were seen by Alexander in an attempt to rob the bank, and he caused them to be arrested. In committing them to the School of Reform, the county judge held that they were subject to discipline and guilty of several offenses "including breaking into the Perry Bank & Trust Company and attempting to steal therefrom."
The oldest boy was 15 years of age, one was 11, and each of the others was but 10 years of age.
By virtue of Kentucky Statutes, sections 331e-1 to 331e-23, both inclusive, the county court has primary jurisdiction of juvenile offenders, and the circuit court has no power over persons coming within the purview of those sections, unless the county court transfers the case to that court, section 331e-5. Newsome v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 710, 13 S.W. (2d) 1046; L. & N.R.R. Co. v. Offutt, 204 Ky. 51, 263 S.W. 665; Waters v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 457, 188 S.W. 490; Talbott v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 659, 179 S.W. 621; Commonwealth v. Franks, 164 Ky. 239, 175 S.W. 349.
We may assume, without deciding, that the plaintiff proved his case sufficiently to go to the jury, if the action of the county court respecting these four incorrigible boys constituted a conviction within the contemplation of the terms of the contract upon which the action is based.
The question is, then, whether such a commitment is a conviction within the intent and meaning of the offer to pay a reward. It will be observed that the offer was to pay the reward for the "arrest and and conviction of each person robbing, or attempting to rob the bank." It is presumed that the parties employed the word "conviction" according to its legal import and effect. 34 Cyc. 1741; 13 C.J. p. 705. The term was defined by this court in the case of Dial v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 32, 133 S.W. 976, where it was said that the word was one of dual meaning. Its significance, first, relates to the determination of the fact of guilt, as by the verdict of a jury, or by confession in open court; and, in the other sense, concerns the state of infamy resulting from the final judgment of condemnation for crime. Undoubtedly the offer of a reward contemplated the judicial ascertainment of the guilt of the accused of the offense of robbery, or attempt at robbery of the bank. It plainly had no reference to the commitment of...
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