Alexander v. City of Duluth
| Decision Date | 20 April 1894 |
| Docket Number | 8487 |
| Citation | 58 N.W. 866,57 Minn. 47 |
| Parties | E. P. Alexander v. City of Duluth |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Submitted on briefs April 16, 1894.
Appeal by plaintiff, E. P. Alexander, from an order of the District Court of St. Louis County, J. D. Ensign, J., made September 11, 1893, sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.
The plaintiff is a resident and taxpayer of the city of Duluth and brings this action in behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, to restrain the defendants, the city, the Common Council, Mayor and Board of Public Works of Duluth from using or allowing to be used any of the funds of the city in the construction of a proposed tunnel from the main shore to Minnesota Point under the ship canal that connects the lake with the bay of Duluth. The complaint states they are about to expend a million dollars in such enterprise claiming to have authority under Laws 1893, ch. 210; that the statute is in conflict with the Constitution, Art. 4, § 33, as amended in 1892, and is void. The defendants demurred to the complaint and the sole question in issue was the constitutionality of that statute. The court held the statute to be valid and sustained the demurrer. Plaintiff appealed.
Order reversed.
Allen & Baldwin, for appellant.
Laws 1893, ch. 210, is in reality a special act. Nichols v Walter, 37 Minn. 264; Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117; State v. Sheriff of Ramsey Co., 48 Minn. 236.
This statute was drawn by men who had these and other cases in mind, with a view of avoiding as far as possible the objections covered by these cases. The objection, however, to special legislation is one of substance and not of form. We may not be able in this case to point out any provision on the face of this act which of itself renders the act invalid but we believe that a consideration of the peculiar provisions of the entire act will show it to be special legislation. It is designed to apply to certain conditions existing in the city of Duluth and is so drawn as not to apply to similar conditions existing or possible elsewhere in the State of Minnesota.
The act is not uniform in its operation throughout the state. In order that it may be carried into effect by the different cities, different methods of carrying on condemnation proceedings, of making assessments and of collecting the same, are employed in the various municipalities. Under the constitutional provision it is unlawful to make laws assessing benefits and damages through the diverse ways of this local legislation. If this part of the act be declared unconstitutional the rest cannot stand.
H. F Greene, for respondents.
If we concede that the law should be uniform in its operation this statute fully complies with the requirement. This clause of the constitution means that the law should, so far as itself is concerned, work uniformly, not that its effect should be uniform, in connection with other laws of a special and local character. Such lack of uniformity will not result from the operation of this law.
The general character of the law is not affected by the circumstances that there may be but a single locality falling within its operation, provided it is so framed as to be applicable to others if such should either presently exist or otherwise arise. The question is not as to the number of cases involved, but as to the rational basis for the classification irrespective of numbers.
The fact that the city may undertake this improvement when it deems the public interests require it so to do, that bonds may be issued without popular consent, and that it may be made without regard to the remonstrances of property owners are clearly matters of policy and have no bearing on the question whether the act is general or special, uniform or local, in its operation.
Mitchell J. Buck, J., absent, sick, took no part.
The only point made on this appeal is that Laws 1893, ch. 210 entitled "An act to authorize the construction of tunnels by cities in certain cases," is invalid. Several objections to the act are alleged; but the only one which we find it necessary to consider is that it is in violation of the constitution, Art. 4, § 33, as amended in 1892, which provides that "the legislature shall pass no local or special law regulating the affairs of * * * any county, city, village," etc.; also, that "the legislature may repeal any existing special or local law, but shall not amend, extend or modify any of the same." We have had occasion so recently, in State ex rel. v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, (58 N.W. 150,) to fully consider this constitutional provision, that no extended discussion of its construction or application is required at this time. We discover nothing in the first section of the act that is obnoxious to the constitutional provision referred to. It authorizes any city which is or shall be so divided by unbridged navigable waters that portions thereof are inaccessible to each other, except by water transportation, if, in the opinion of the city council, the bridging of such water way would be impracticable, and the...
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