Alexander v. DeKalb County, S94A0032
| Decision Date | 27 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. S94A0032,S94A0032 |
| Citation | 444 S.E.2d 743,264 Ga. 362 |
| Parties | ALEXANDER et al. v. DeKALB COUNTY et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Dick Wilson, Jr., J. Stuart Teague, Jr., Peterson Dillard Young Self & Asselin, Atlanta, for Alexander et al.
Patrick F. Henry, Jr., Kathryn M. Zickert, Huddleston & Medori, Jonathan A. Weintraub, County Atty., Decatur, for DeKalb County et al.
Joan F. Roach, Asst. County Atty., Decatur.
Joyce M. Averils, Asst. County Atty., DeKalb County Law Dept., Decatur.
We granted this application for discretionary appeal to consider the proper remedy for property owners when a zoning board imposes conditions as part of a court-ordered rezoning. 1 We hold that a property owner who is dissatisfied with a court-ordered rezoning may challenge the new zoning classification as unconstitutional or seek to invoke the superior court's civil contempt powers within 30 days of the date of the rezoning decision. We affirm, but remand for the trial court to vacate two illegal conditions.
The owners of 22 acres of property where the Rock Springs Apartments are located petitioned the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners to rezone the property from 18 apartment units per acre to 30 units per acre. 2 The county denied the application. On appeal in 1992, the superior court declared the board's decision unconstitutional and remanded the case for rezoning. The board rezoned the property to RM-HD, which allows up to 30 units per acre, but imposed a condition limiting development to 22 units per acre. 3 The property owners returned to superior court, seeking judicial review of the rezoning action and a finding that the county commissioners were in contempt for attaching conditions to the rezoning. After a hearing, the superior court ruled that the commissioners rezoned the property as ordered and the conditions imposed were reasonable. The property owners filed an application for discretionary appeal which this court granted. 4
1. In Cobb County v. Wilson, 259 Ga. 685, 386 S.E.2d 128 (1989), this court held that a trial court could employ its criminal contempt powers to enforce an order that a county governing body must rezone property. We adopted criminal contempt as a "safer alternative" to "the radical action of declaring property free from zoning restrictions," which unfairly punishes adjoining landowners. Id. at 686, 386 S.E.2d 128. Subsequently, we rejected inverse condemnation as a remedy in a rezoning case and reversed the award of damages to the property owner. Fulton County v. Wallace, 260 Ga. 358, 361, 393 S.E.2d 241 (1990). In that case, we found that the Wilson decision contained "the available remedies for the zoning board's failure to properly analyze and rezone property in accordance with the trial court's order to constitutionally rezone property." Id.
Just as the remedy of declaring property free of all zoning restrictions is too drastic in most zoning cases, we find the remedy of holding county commissioners in criminal contempt is also too harsh in many cases. It is unfair to county commissioners who in good faith seek to comply with court orders that are often open to more than one interpretation; it is unfair to property owners who must meet the stringent standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the commissioners willfully disobeyed the court order, see In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 670, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985); and it hurts the public's interest by lessening the possibility of compromise. We overrule Wallace to the extent that it limits the available remedies in a zoning case to criminal contempt or exemption from all zoning laws. Although courts may invoke their criminal contempt powers to punish commissioners for defying a rezoning order, criminal contempt should be limited to the rare case, such as Wilson, where the zoning board fails to act in response to the court order.
As part of our continuing "search for safer alternatives," we hold that the contempt remedy in zoning cases to encourage compliance with a previous court order is civil in nature. The difference between criminal and civil contempt depends on the purpose for which the power is exercised. Ensley v. Ensley, 239 Ga. 860, 861, 238 S.E.2d 920 (1977). "The distinction between the two is that criminal contempt imposes unconditional punishment for prior acts of contumacy, whereas civil contempt imposes conditional punishment as a means of coercing future compliance with a prior court order." Carey Canada, Inc. v. Hinely, 257 Ga. 150, 151, 356 S.E.2d 202, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898, 108 S.Ct. 233, 98 L.Ed.2d 192 (1987). Thus, when a zoning board responds to a court order by timely rezoning property, but the property owner contends the action violates the court's order, the property owner may seek civil contempt as a remedy to gain compliance.
2. Property owners are not limited to bringing a contempt action when the zoning board rezones property in response to a court order finding the existing zoning unconstitutional. Instead, the dissatisfied property owner may challenge the constitutionality of the new zoning classification in superior court. 5 The challenge must be filed within 30 days of the zoning board's decision in the trial court which ordered the rezoning. See Village Centers, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 248 Ga. 177, 180, 281 S.E.2d 522 (1981) (); City of Atlanta v. McLennan, 237 Ga. 25, 28, 226 S.E.2d 732 (1976) (). The action may be filed along with the contempt motion, as was done in this case.
3. In considering the trial court's findings of fact, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Dougherty County v. Webb, 256 Ga. 474, 477 n. 3, 350 S.E.2d 457 (1986). The DeKalb County commissioners on remand from superior court received a planner's report recommending a maximum density of 22 units per acre and evidence of the adverse effect on the community if the property were developed at 30 units per acre. The commission then rezoned the Rock Springs property to a more intensive use but imposed conditions that limited development to 22 units per acre. The property owners filed a motion in superior court within 30 days of the county's decision. The motion sought a ruling that the new zoning classification did not comply with the 1992 order or the commissioners were in contempt. At the hearing, the property owners requested that the court return the case to the commissioners for further action before considering contempt as an option. Denying the property owners' request, the trial court found that the commissioners were not in criminal contempt and acted reasonably in imposing the twelve conditions. The decision in effect determined that the new zoning classification with conditions was constitutional.
Our review of the record shows the trial court was correct in determining that the county commissioners complied with its 1992 order to rezone the property to a constitutional classification. We disagree, however, that the county may adopt conditions that prevent property owners from seeking, and the board from granting, parking and administrative variances. Any condition prohibiting a variance is invalid because it attempts to limit the authority of future legislative bodies to regulate the property. See 3 E. Ziegler, Rathkopf's Law of Zoning and Planning, § 29A.02(6)(b) (4th ed. 1990). We remand to enable the trial court to vacate the two conditions banning variances. It is not necessary for the trial court to reconsider the motion for contempt since there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of no contempt, even under the civil contempt standard.
Judgment affirmed and case remanded with direction.
All the Justices concur, except CARLEY, J., who dissents.
BENHAM, P.J., not participating.
I agree with the holdings in Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion, wherein the remedies available to a property owner in a rezoning case are discussed generally. In Division 3, however, the majority turns to the specifics of the instant case and ultimately holds that the superior court's order must be affirmed and remanded only for the limited purpose of "enabl[ing] [that] court to vacate the two conditions banning variances." While I agree that, as a matter of law, those two conditions must be vacated, I cannot agree to an affirmance and remand for that sole limited purpose. In my opinion, the case should be reversed in its entirety and remanded to the superior court for the additional purpose of determining whether the other ten conditions should also be vacated. Accordingly, I must dissent to the majority's affirmance and limited remand of the instant case.
Cross v. Hall County, 238 Ga. 709, 713(2), 235 S.E.2d 379 (1977). In determining that the specified conditions, which are not applicable to other land which is also zoned RM-HD, were nevertheless "valid and reasonable" conditions applicable to appellants' property, the superior court found as follows:
[A]t the rezoning hearing, the Druid Hills Civic Association requested that these conditions be adopted out of concern that [appellants'] development of [their property] would negatively impact on the surrounding neighborhood. [Appellees] expressed the same concern and adopted the twelve conditions to ameliorate the possible negative impact. For these reasons, ... the conditions imposed on the rezoning of [appellants'] property are valid and reasonable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In my opinion, a superior court's determination of the validity and reasonableness of the various conditions imposed upon rezoned...
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