Alexander v. Handley
Decision Date | 03 December 1938 |
Docket Number | No. 12483.,12483. |
Citation | 123 S.W.2d 379 |
Parties | ALEXANDER et al. v. HANDLEY. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Towne Young, Judge.
Action by W. B. Handley against Mrs. Blanche M. Alexander and another on a compromise agreement. From a judgment for plaintiff, notwithstanding a verdict in favor of the defendants, the defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
J. Hardy Neel and Ervin Neel, both of Dallas, for appellants.
John Davis and Bailey & Shaeffer, all of Dallas, for appellee.
W. B. Handley (appellee), an attorney, sued Mrs. Blanche M. Alexander and son, Winfield Morten (appellants), on a compromise agreement. The controversy arose substantially as follows: on the death of E. W. Morten, in 1929 (father and grandfather, respectively, of appellants), leaving a will which being objectionable to appellants, appellee was employed to contest same, and thereafter, for several years (until August 1933), represented appellants in matters pertaining to the Morten Estate. In August, 1933, appellee was discharged by appellants (the reason not appearing) and in lieu J. Hardy Neel, Esq., their present counsel, was employed.
There arose a disagreement between appellants and appellee as to the amount of his compensation for services rendered; appellee claiming a larger amount than appellants were willing to concede, and a larger amount than the sum subsequently agreed upon. This dispute continued until July 26, 1935, on which date the written agreement sued upon was executed. Prior to its execution, L. O. Handley (brother of appellee), who was connected with the real estate department of the Morten Investment Company and a business associate of Winfield Morten, as intermediary, interceded to bring about an agreement between appellants and appellee and, it seems, succeeded. So, on July 26, 1935, Winfield Morten and his attorney, Mr. Neel, went to the office of appellee for the purpose of reducing to writing the agreement, and after some discussion, appellee, in the presence and hearing of the other parties, dictated the agreement to a stenographer; the first draft, proving unsatisfactory for some reason, was discarded and the instrument finally executed was then dictated, and after being written was approved by Mr. Morten and his attorney, Mr. Neel, and was executed by the parties, after a few words were deleted from the second paragraph, which we do not deem of sufficient significance to merit further mention.
The instrument executed by the parties is in form, words and figures as follows:
Neither the November 1st nor the November 15th installment being paid, appellee made repeated demands upon Winfield Morten for payment, which were not complied with, for the reason, as stated by Morten, they didn't have the ready money and that appellee would have to wait awhile longer. This status continued until two or three days before the institution of the suit, which was on January 27, 1936.
The nature of the defense urged by appellants is revealed by the following excerpts from their briefs; they say, . At another place, they say: . Again they say that, "The purpose of the letter and the construction and interpretation that the parties placed on the provisions thereof at the time was that the defendants would have the opportunity, if they so elected, to pay the Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars in compromise and settlement of the claim, and secondly, that (if) this was not done, that the proposal was ended and that the plaintiff would sue on a quantum meruit basis and the defendants waived their right to plead the statute of limitation"; and, in their conclusion, they say: "We submit, therefore, that the contract, when properly construed, gives the appellants the right to either pay the money or waive their right to plead the statute of limitation * * *." At the conclusion of the evidence, the case was submitted to a jury on only...
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