Alexander v. Shapard

• Decision Date: 01 May 1922
• Citation: 240 S.W. 287,146 Tenn. 90
• Parties: ALEXANDER v. SHAPARD ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

240 S.W. 287

146 Tenn. 90

ALEXANDER v. SHAPARD ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 1, 1922

Certiorari to Court of Civil Appeals.

Bill by John T. Alexander against Charles R. Shapard and others. Decree for complainant reversed, and cause remanded by the Court of Civil Appeals, and complainant brings certiorari. Decree of Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and that of chancellor affirmed.

Thos N. Greer, of Shelbyville, for plaintiff.

B. O Kingree and Chas. S. Ivie, both of Shelbyville, and J. C Higgins, of Nashville, for defendants.

L. D SMITH, Special Justice.

This is a proceeding begun by bill in equity to reform a deed on the ground of mistake.

On November 15, 1917, the deed sought to be reformed by the bill in this case was executed by W. E. Gant, conveying to the complainant, John T. Alexander, and wife, Mildred Shapard Alexander, a tract of land in the Seventh civil district of Bedford county, Tenn. The complainant and his wife were married in July, 1916. The wife died on the 20th of December, 1919. There were no children born of this marriage. The defendants are brothers and sisters of the plaintiff's widow, and her only heirs at law. The allegations of the bill are, in substance: That the complainant and his wife, soon after their marriage, entered into an agreement whereby it was agreed that in the event real estate was purchased by them the title to the same should be taken so the survivor would take the entire estate. This agreement is alleged to have been the result of the fact that complainant had an estate of about $6,000 and was earning about $200 a month, and the wife had inherited an estate from her father of approximately $10,000. That, in accordance with this agreement, in 1917 they purchased a house and lot in the town of Shelbyville, and had the deed made to them jointly, and with the understanding and each believing that in case of the death of the other the survivor would take and become the owner of the house and lot in fee. That thereafter, and on November 15, 1917, the complainant and his wife determined to purchase the farm in question, with the agreement and understanding that the title thereto would be taken to them jointly, and so as that in the case of the death of one the survivor would take the fee. That the purchase of the farm was consummated, the complainant and his wife conveying to W. E. Gant, the owner of the farm, the house and lot in Shelbyville at a valuation of $2,200, paying $2,500 in cash and executing two notes for $2,500 each, due in one and two years respectively, and another note for $2,000 due three years after date. That the complainant and his wife had both been advised by attorneys and by Mr. Gant, who drafted the deed, that a joint conveyance to them would have the effect of vesting in them an estate by the entirety, and one which, in the event of the death of either would vest in the survivor. With this understanding between them the deed was executed and drawn so as to convey the farm to them jointly, the conveying clause thereof being, "I have this day bargained and sold and by these presents transfer and convey unto John T. Alexander and wife Mildred Shapard Alexander all the right, title, claim and interest I have in and to the following described tract or parcel of land," and the habendum, "To have and to hold the same to the said John T. Alexander and wife, Mildred Shapard Alexander, their heirs and assigns forever." That after the execution of this deed both the complainant and his wife understood and acquiesced in the belief that the deed which had been executed conveyed to them an estate in the entirety, and that the complainant had no suspicion that such was not the case until after his wife had died and her brothers and sisters set up claim to an undivided one-half interest, and that then, upon investigation, he ascertained that the Supreme Court of Tennessee had decided that under an act of the Legislature passed in 1913 (Acts 1913, c. 26) commonly known as the "Bejack" law, which emancipated married women, a deed to husband and wife jointly did not convey an estate by the entirety, but constituted the husband and wife tenants in common. Hence the bill sought, upon the averments aforesaid, to have this deed reformed so as to make it conform to the real intentions of the parties at the time, and to have the title to the land vested in the complainant and the claim of the defendants removed as a cloud. The grantor, W. E. Gant, was not made a party defendant, but no exception was taken by the other defendants to this fact, either by demurrer or answer in the chancery court, nor by them on appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals.

The defendants put in issue all the material facts in the bill by answer, and also filed a cross-bill seeking to have the land partitioned, and to have an accounting between them and the complainant and to set up a resulting trust in their favor upon the theory that the land had been paid for with money belonging to the complainant's wife and their sister.

The chancellor was of the opinion that the complainant had made out his case, and that the conveyance of the land to the husband and his wife jointly was a mistake which could be reformed. He therefore pronounced a decree in favor of the complainant, and dismissed the cross-bill of the defendants. The defendants appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which latter court reversed the decree of the chancellor and remanded the case to the chancery court for further proceedings in accordance with the written opinion filed. The complainant has filed a petition for certiorari to have the decree of the Court of Civil Appeals reviewed and reversed by this court.

The view of the Court of Civil Appeals, as expressed in the written opinion, was that, although there was an agreement and understanding between the complainant and his wife that the deed would be executed so as to create an estate by the entirety, the failure to have such an estate expressed in the deed or conveyance to them jointly was but a mere mistake of law, stripped of all other circumstances, and constituted no grounds for the reformation thereof. On this point the opinion of that court reads, in part, as follows:

"It is quite difficult, after examining the large mass of evidence in this record, to come to an entirely satisfactory conclusion as to the fact, just how the wife of complainant wanted the deed to the Gant farm made, whether made to her alone, or to her and her husband jointly. We think we can say, however, that when talking to her family relatives and to her family lawyer she wanted the deed made to her alone. But when her husband talked and argued with her, she expressed a willingness for the deed to be made to them jointly, and the record shows that she said to a number of parties, some of them the friends of her husband, and to others, that she was glad the deed was made to them jointly.

There is evidence in the record tending to show that she agreed for the deed to be thus made--that is, to her husband and her jointly--as it procured or secured peace and harmony between her and her husband.

We think the weight of the proof also shows that her husband, being a man of education and strong will, dominated his wife whenever an occasion arose requiring it.

After a thorough consideration of the evidence, we have arrived at the conclusion, and we so find that the wife of complainant, in order to have peace and harmony between her and her husband, and out of wifely deference to his wishes, agreed for the deed to be made to them jointly.

We think it is certain from the evidence that, after the deed was made as it was, both the complainant and his wife believed it created an estate in them by the entirety, and that the survivor would take the fee in the land.

We may say, in this connection, that the deed as made was believed to create such an estate until the decision of our Supreme Court in the case of Gill v. McKinney et al., 140 Tenn. 549, 562, 205 S.W. 416.

Under said decision the deed as made constituted complainant and his wife tenants in common in the land.

It follows, of course, if that be the legal effect of the deed, allowing it to stand as made, defendants as heirs at law of the wife of complainant became owners of one-half of the land as tenants in common with complainant.

Now, it is quite clear, from the entire evidence in the record, that no fraud or misrepresentation was brought to bear upon complainant or his wife by defendants, or by any one else, to have the deed made as it was made. As before stated, complainant had Judge Gant. the owner of the land, to prepare the deed as it was prepared, and it is obviously true that both complainant and Judge Gant believed the deed created an estate by the entirety in complainant and his wife.

So we have a case where, assuming that the husband and wife both believed the deed as made created an estate by the entirety in them, both made a mistake of law, or, rather, acted upon a mistake of law, as to the legal purport of the deed, and a mistake not superinduced or brought about by fraud or misrepresentation on the part of defendants or any third party. This being so, the main question in the case is: 'Can there be a reformation of it, so as to make it have a different legal import, whereby the complainant, the survivor of his wife, will take the land absolutely?' "

The opinion, after referring to and discussing authorities cited by counsel, concludes the discussion of this particular point as follows:

"We think the doctrine to be extracted from the great weight of authority is that a mere mistake of law, stripped of all other circumstances, constitutes no ground for the reformation of written contracts. Such is the rule announced

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