Alexander v. State

• Decision Date: 09 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. S09A0294.,S09A0294.
• Citation: 675 S.E.2d 23,285 Ga. 166
• Parties: ALEXANDER v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

285 Ga. 166

675 S.E.2d 23

ALEXANDER v. The STATE.

No. S09A0294.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 9, 2009.

Ann Marie Fitz, Atlanta, for appellant.

W. Kendall Wynne, Jr., Dist. Atty., Layla H. Zon, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty., Gen., Sara K. Sahni, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

CARLEY, Justice.

A jury found Mazzetti Alexander guilty of malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on the malice murder count and one of the firearm counts and sentenced Alexander to life imprisonment for the murder and five years in confinement for the firearm offense. The felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of law. Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 434 S.E.2d 479 (1993). The remaining offenses were merged into the malice murder. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial, and Alexander appeals.^*

1. Construed most strongly to support the verdicts, the evidence shows that Alexander and Tiffany Davis had a verbal confrontation, during which Alexander shot and killed Ms. Davis with a handgun. Alexander threw down the gun and fled from the scene. Witnesses called the police and identified Alexander as the shooter. A short time later, the gun was recovered from the scene and Alexander was apprehended. He told a Georgia Bureau of Investigation special agent that he carried the gun for protection and he admitted that he had killed the victim. Alexander stated that when the victim arrived at the scene she had her hands in her back pockets and began walking toward him, that she did not threaten or push him, but gestured at him with one hand and asked if they had a problem, that he responded to her, and that he then got scared and shot her. The evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Alexander guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

We note that Alexander also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the guilty verdicts as to the other charged offenses. However, the trial court did not enter judgment of conviction or sentence Alexander for any of those offenses. Therefore, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to those offenses. Carter v. State, 269 Ga. 420, 422(2), 499 S.E.2d 63 (1998).

2. Alexander claims that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's general reputation for violence and for carrying a gun, which he claims he learned of from his girlfriend. The general rule is that a victim's character and reputation for violence are irrelevant and inadmissible in a murder trial. Traylor v. State, 280 Ga. 400, 401(2), 627 S.E.2d 594 (2006); Woods v. State, 269 Ga. 60, 63(5), 495 S.E.2d 282 (1998). However, there is an exception and such evidence is admissible when the defendant makes a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant was honestly trying to defend himself. Traylor v. State, supra at 401-402(2), 627 S.E.2d 594; Woods v. State, supra.

In this case, Alexander arguably made a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor based on evidence that she walked up to him and yelled at him about whether they had a problem. However, Alexander failed to make the requisite showings that the victim assaulted him or that he was honestly trying to defend himself when he shot the unarmed victim. "Since Appellant failed to make the prima facie showing of self-defense, the trial court correctly [excluded the evidence]. [Cit.]" Arthur v. State, 275 Ga. 790, 792(3), 573 S.E.2d 44 (2002).

3. Alexander contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State had the burden of disproving his affirmative defense of justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, where, as here, there is no request for a charge on the State's burden to disprove the defense and "the trial court charged `the jury on the elements of the defense of [justification], the presumption of...