Alexander v. Vann

• Decision Date: 13 October 1920
• Docket Number: 108.
• Parties: ALEXANDER v. VANN.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

104 S.E. 360

180 N.C. 187

ALEXANDER v. VANN.

No. 108.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 13, 1920

Appeal from Superior Court, Hertford County; Devin, Judge.

Action by J. W. Alexander against J. N. Vann. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The occasion on which the communication was made may rebut the inference of malice, or it may tend to prove malice and that the defendant was actuated by motives of personal spite or ill will independent of the occasion on which the communication was made.

The action was submitted to the jury upon the following issues:

(1) Did the defendant publish of and concerning the plaintiff the letter set out in paragraph 3 of the complaint? Answer: Yes.

(2) Were the matters and things published of and concerning plaintiff in said letter true? Answer: No.

(3) What damage, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover therefor? Answer: $500.00.

From the judgment rendered, the defendant appealed.

D. C Barnes, of Murfreesboro, W. R. Johnson, of Ahoskie, Winston & Matthews, of Windsor, and W. D. Boone, of Winton, for appellant.

Rogers & Williams, of Ahoskie, Stanley Winborne, of Murfreesboro and W. H. S. Burgwyn, of Woodland, for appellee.

BROWN J.

We are of opinion that Judge Devin was correct in holding that the words of the letter are libelous of themselves and actionable because the doctrine of qualified privilege does not apply. The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff was a deputy sheriff of Hertford county under Sheriff Garrett at the time the said libelous letter was written and mailed to the sheriff of Pitt county. On 5th May, 1917, Sheriff Garrett received a telegram from Sheriff McLawhorn of Pitt county requesting him to arrest one Zemas, a Hungarian of desperate character, a fugitive from justice who had murdered his wife for whose capture a reward of $200 had been offered. Eley Reid, a colored man, captured Zemas in the swamps of Chowan river, and single-handed delivered him to the sheriff of Hertford county at Winton. Sheriff Garrett had been requested to have the prisoner well guarded by two men at the expense of Pitt county. He deputized the plaintiff, a regular deputy to take the prisoner to Pitt county, and appointed said Reid, a very powerful man, to act as guard. The plaintiff took the prisoner and placed him with himself and Reid in the smoker of a white coach, and delivered him safely to Sheriff McLawhorn at Greenville, Pitt county, N.C. The plaintiff, with Reid, then returned to Hertford county. The evidence shows that the plaintiff rode in the white coach and Reid was in the colored coach, except for a short distance, when he first got on the train, he was called into the smoker of the white coach by one Mr. Ames, a railroad detective who knew him, and having heard of the capture of Zemas, the Hungarian wife-murderer, asked of Reid the details of the capture. When Reid had related the story to Mr. Ames he returned to the colored coach and remained there until he reached Ahoskie, his destination.

In the fall, just prior to the publication of the letter in question, J. N. Vann, the defendant in this action, was for the third time defeated by A. E. Garrett in the election for sheriff of Hertford county, and at the time of the publication of the said libelous letter J. N. Vann was a private citizen of Hertford county, and was unfriendly toward Sheriff Garrett.

Eley Reid was, at the time the said letter was written, an ex-convict, and he is a negro,

The alleged libel is contained in the following letter received by Sheriff McLawhorn from the defendant:

"Ahoskie, N. C., March 9th, 1917.

Sheriff McLawhorn, Greenville, N. C.

Dear Sir: I read with surprise and disgust to a certain degree that account of the capture of the criminal from your section by Eley Reid of this county.

Judging from the report that Deputy Alexander brought back here you gentlemen evidently did not recognize Reid as being a negro, nor did Alexander have self-respect to inform you of this fact, judging from the entertainment he reports you gentlemen have accorded Reid. A friend of mine says that Alexander actually had Reid in the white coach on the seats with gentlemen on his return trip here.

Reid is a negro, and an ex-convict, and Alexander is a very little better, and I should say, except by birthright, Reid is a superior man.

Regretful to say the high office of sheriff of Hertford county has reached a very undignified state, to which the better element of people here do not approve.

I am not giving you this information in confidence by any means, but I do think it the duty of all respectful whites who are proud of their Caucasian blood from which they sprang to state these facts.

I am yours very truly, J. N. Vann."

As we understand it, a privileged communication is one which, under ordinary circumstances, would be defamatory made to another in pursuance of a duty, political, judicial, social, or personal, so that an action for libel or slander will not lie, though the statement be false, unless actual malice be proved in addition.

The great underlying principle of the doctrine of privileged communications rests in public policy.

Qualified privilege extends to all communications made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has some moral or legal duty to perform.

The occasion on which the communication was made may rebut the inference of malice, or it may tend to prove malice, and that the defendant was actuated by motives of personal spite or ill will independent of the occasion on which the communication was made. Mr. Newell says (section 497) that a communication, to be privileged, must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or proper cause. The learned author further says (section 501) that if the...