Alexander v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P.

• Decision Date: 09 January 2023
• Docket Number: 1:19-cv-2375-MLB
• Parties: Derese Alexander, Plaintiff, v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

Derese Alexander, Plaintiff,
v.
Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-2375-MLB

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

January 9, 2023

OPINION & ORDER

MICHAEL L. BROWN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant WalMart Stores East, LP's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 88).

I. Background

Plaintiff visited Walmart to purchase a sleeping bag. The store stacked sleeping bags on a shelf with a metal grid to secure them in place. (Dkt. 88-2 ¶ 6; Dkt. 101-6 ¶ 6.) The grid was supposed to withstand some force so customers could pull sleeping bags out from under it. (Dkt. 105 ¶ 20.) After Plaintiff removed a sleeping bag from the shelf, the metal grid fell on Plaintiff. (Dkt. 101-6 ¶ 4.) When Plaintiff removed the sleeping bag, she did not notice anything strange, different, peculiar, or

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otherwise “not right” with the shelf or bracket. (Dkt. 101-6 ¶ 17.) Plaintiff did not see anything that indicated the grid or shelf was improperly installed or secured. (Dkt. 101-6 ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also did not see any loose bolts or screws on the ground after the incident. (Dkt. 1016 ¶ 29.) The incident was caught on video.^[1] (Dkt. 101-6 ¶ 20.) Plaintiff now sues Defendant for negligence and negligent training. (Dkt. 1.) Defendant moved for summary judgement, but apparently only as to negligence arising from premises liability and any associated punitive damages. (Dkt. 88.)

II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” W. Grp. Nurseries, Inc. v.

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Ergas, 167 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 1361 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials in the record, that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The nonmoving party then has the burden of showing that summary judgment is improper by coming forward with “specific facts” showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Ultimately, there is no “genuine issue for trial” when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson,

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477 U.S. at 247-48. A district court must “resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant[] and draw all justifiable inferences in his or her favor.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).

III. Discussion

“[I]n order to recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier.” Robinson v. Kroger Co., 493 S.E.2d 403, 414 (Ga. 1997). But before reaching this two-prong inquiry, “[t]he plaintiff's first burden in a premises liability case is to show the premises were defective or hazardous.” Carroll v. Georgia Power Co., 240 Ga.App. 442, 443 (1999).

A. Defective or Hazardous Premises

Defendant first moves for summary judgment on the grounds Plaintiff has not proven the shelf or grid was defective or hazardous. (Dkt. 88-1 at 8.) Plaintiff argues “the existence of a hazardous condition is not an independent material element in a premises liability case.”

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(Dkt. 101-1 at 8.) The Court is puzzled by this assertion Georgia law is crystal clear on this matter. Without a hazardous or dangerous condition, there is no premises liability claim. Id; H.J. Wings & Things v. Goodman, 320 Ga.App. 54, 55 (2013) (“When the plaintiff cannot show the existence of a hazardous condition, she cannot prove the cause of her injuries and there can be no recovery because an essential element of negligence cannot be proven.”); Flagstar Enterprises, Inc. v. Burch, 267 Ga.App. 856, 856 (2004) (“The threshold point of inquiry in a slip and fall case is the existence of a hazardous condition on the premises.”) Here, Plaintiff has provided no evidence of a hazardous condition, and it is not clear whether Plaintiff is alleging that the shelf was defectively manufactured, poorly installed, poorly maintained, overstocked, or something else. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a manufacturing defect or overstocking, Plaintiff has provided no evidence of such. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging negligent installation or maintenance, the undisputed evidence suggests the contrary: Plaintiff admits that the shelf appeared sturdy and that she saw no screws or bolts on the ground after the incident. (Dkt. 101-6 ¶¶ 17, 26, 29.) While this evidence does

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not preclude that the shelf was poorly installed or maintained, Plaintiff provides no contrary evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact.

The Georgia Court of Appeal's decision in Warner v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 321 Ga.App. 121 (2013), is instructive on this matter. In Warner, a customer shopping at a Hobby Lobby store removed a whiteboard from a shelf resting inside a set of curved brackets mounted on a peg board. Id. at 121. The shelving unit gave in, causing all of the other boards to fall on the customer. Id. at 122. Upon inspection, an employee found the brackets had been misaligned, specifically an employee had installed one bracket slightly higher than the other bracket. Id. One bracket had also separated and had signs of rust at the joint. Id.

The customer sued, arguing Hobby Lobby had actual knowledge of a hazardous condition because its own employees misaligned the brackets upon installation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, because the customer “failed to show that the misaligned brackets constituted a dangerous condition.” Id. at 124. The Court explained the customer had offered no evidence that the “slight misalignment” of the bracket caused

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the bracket to break or the whiteboards to fall on her. Id. The court further explained

the mere possibility that the misalignment may have caused or contributed to the break is not enough to allow [Plaintiff] to survive summary judgment on her claim. When the question of whether the allegedly dangerous condition caused the plaintiff's injuries remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to grant summary judgment for the defendant.

Id.

At least the customer in Warner alleged a specific defect- misaligned shelves. Id. Here, Plaintiff has not even done that. She has not identified anything that caused the metal grid to fall let alone explained how that “thing” constitutes a defect, which makes summary judgment even more appropriate than in Warner. But in other respects, Warner is on point: Plaintiff has provided no evidence that any alleged defect in the shelf caused her injuries. And “a mere possibility” that a defect of some nature caused Plaintiff's injuries is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Id. On the current evidence, “whether the allegedly dangerous condition caused the plaintiff's injuries remains one of pure speculation or conjecture.” Id. See also Metts v....