Alford v. Cosmyl, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 4:00-CV-122-2(CDL).,4:00-CV-122-2(CDL).
• Citation: 209 F.Supp.2d 1361
• Parties: Stephanie ALFORD and Pamela Hardge Williams, Plaintiffs, v. COSMYL, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

Page 1361

209 F.Supp.2d 1361

Stephanie ALFORD and Pamela Hardge Williams, Plaintiffs, v. COSMYL, INC., Defendant.

No. 4:00-CV-122-2(CDL).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Columbus Division.

February 20, 2002.

Gwyn Newsom Bunn, Columbus, GA, for plaintiffs.

Forrest Walker Hunter, Emily Sturdivant Sanford, Alston & Bird, Atlanta, GA, Amelia M. Bever, Stephen X. Munger, Atlanta, GA, W. Donald Morgan, Jr., Columbus, GA, Richard D. Tuschman, Neil F. McGuinness, Miami, FL, for defendant.

ORDER

LAND, District Judge.

This case arises from Defendant's termination of Plaintiffs' employment on March 5, 1999. Plaintiffs' Complaint contains six counts. Count I alleges race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Count II alleges race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Count III alleges a violation of the Equal Pay Act. Counts IV, V and VI allege state law claims for negligent retention and supervision of supervisory employees, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to dismiss their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V). Defendant does not object to the dismissal of this claim. Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is granted and that claim is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' remaining claims, contending that no genuine issue of material fact exists to be tried, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs have filed a response to Defendant's motion, and a hearing was held on Defendant's motion on February 5, 2002. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs' Title VII sex discrimination discharge claim and on Plaintiffs' state law claims for negligent retention and supervision. Insofar as Plaintiffs' state law punitive damages claim is based upon Plaintiffs' state law claims, which have now been dismissed, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant on that punitive damages claim also. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied as to Plaintiffs' Title VII race discrimination discharge claim, Plaintiffs' Title VII retaliation claim, Plaintiff's § 1981 race discrimination claim, and Plaintiffs' Equal Pay Act claim.

BACKGROUND

Defendant is a manufacturer of cosmetic beauty products, including gels, lotions, scrubs, and bubble bath. Defendant is owned by the Dalmau family. Jordi Dalmau, a Hispanic male, is president of the company. Defendant has a manufacturing plant in Columbus, Georgia. Its vice president of operations is David Colquhoun, a white male.

Plaintiffs are African-American females who were formerly employed in Defendant's production department. Plaintiff Williams began working for Defendant as a filling line worker in 1995. Plaintiff Alford began working for Defendant in quality control in 1996. Plaintiffs started off making $5.00 per hour. They received periodic raises, and in September 1998, they were earning $8.00 per hour as first shift crew leaders. As crew leaders, they had supervisory roles and assisted production manager Willie Flowers in supervising all production line workers and set-up mechanics. Throughout their employment, neither Plaintiff had received any verbal or written discipline regarding work performance with the exception of one tardiness warning that Williams received in 1996. Plaintiffs routinely received merit pay raises.

In October 1998, production manager Flowers resigned from his employment with Defendant. Instead of replacing Flowers with a production manager, Defendant promoted Plaintiffs to assume Flowers's job duties of supervising first shift production employees. Plaintiffs were given a raise to $9.00 per hour. They received a bonus in December 1998.

Charlie Lopez, a Hispanic male who had been a first shift set-up mechanic, was also given supervisory responsibilities for first shift production employees when Flowers left. A dispute exists as to the nature of Lopez's new responsibilities compared to those of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant's management made it clear to them that they, along with Lopez, were to be jointly responsible for first shift production. According to Plaintiffs' testimony, the job responsibilities of Plaintiffs and Lopez were supposed to be substantially the same.

In December 1998, Plaintiffs discovered that Lopez was earning $13.46 per hour compared to their $9.00 per hour. Defendant contends that Lopez's higher pay was justified because he had technical mechanical skills that Plaintiffs did not possess. Plaintiffs dispute that Lopez's job responsibilities required him to use any skills that were not possessed and used by Plaintiffs in the performance of their jobs. If anything, Plaintiffs contend that Lopez's job was less demanding than theirs.

In January 1999, Plaintiffs complained to Defendant's human resources director about the disparity between their pay and Lopez's pay, claiming that the pay difference was discriminatory on the basis of race and gender. Plaintiffs asked for a raise. Defendant's human resources director responded that Plaintiffs were doing "pretty good for out here" and had "maxed out already" in their pay rate.

Events on Thursday, March 4, 1999

On the afternoon of March 4, 1999, Plaintiffs claim that they complained a second time about race and sex discrimination and unequal pay, this time to their new supervisor, Herberth Posada. Meeting with him at a table in the employees break room, Plaintiffs claim they told Posada that it was not fair for Lopez to be paid more than them. Plaintiffs claim they also asked Posada if they were being paid less because they were black females and Lopez was a Hispanic male and spoke the same language (Spanish) as the owner, Jordi Dalmau, a Hispanic male. They also claim they asked Posada for a pay raise. According to Plaintiffs' testimony, Posada promised to talk to Jordi and Colquhoun about their complaints. Posada admits only that Plaintiffs asked him for a pay raise. Colquhoun walked into the break room during Plaintiffs' conversation with Posada, stopping at their table and asking for change to buy a Coke. Plaintiffs claim that Colquhoun was present to overhear the last part of the conversation where they asked for a pay raise and Posada promised to talk to Jordi and Colquhoun. Colquhoun testified that he did not recall overhearing anything.

According to Plaintiffs, immediately after Posada promised to talk to Colquhoun and Jordi about their complaints, Posada followed Colquhoun out of the break room and into Colquhoun's office. Posada concedes that he may have told Colquhoun about Plaintiffs' pay raise request before they were fired. Defendant admitted to the EEOC that Posada told Colquhoun that Plaintiffs had requested a raise, but denied that Posada told Colquhoun about their discrimination complaint.

Events on Friday, March 5, 1999

Early on the morning of March 5, 1999, Colquhoun decided to fire Plaintiffs. Defendant contends the reason Plaintiffs were fired was because of poor work performance. Colquhoun held Plaintiffs, as production supervisors, responsible for failing to meet production goals between October 1998 and March 1999. Defendant contends Colquhoun was unaware that Plaintiffs had made complaints about discriminatory pay prior to his decision to fire them. Plaintiffs contend that they were not responsible for failing to meet any production goals and that Defendant's reason for firing them is pretextual, the real reason being their complaints about discriminatory pay.

When Plaintiff Alford learned she had been fired late Friday afternoon, she immediately called Posada and asked him why she and Williams had been fired. According to Alford, Posada made no mention of poor work performance and told her, "I don't know, but Dave (Colquhoun) asked me yesterday how I liked working with you guys." Plaintiffs argue that Posada's response shows that he discussed Plaintiffs' situation with Colquhoun prior to Plaintiffs' discharge and after Plaintiffs had complained to Posada about discriminatory pay.

Events on Monday, March 8, 1999

Since Defendant's front office was closed over the weekend, Plaintiffs had to wait until Monday to speak to Colquhoun and Defendant's human resources director about their terminations. Early Monday morning Plaintiffs met with Defendant's human resources director who allegedly told them she did not know why they had been fired. According to Plaintiffs' testimony, the human resources director told them that it was wrong to fire them and that there was nothing in their personnel files. She even offered to provide Plaintiffs with a good job reference.

Plaintiffs then spoke with Colquhoun who told them that they "didn't do what they were supposed to do," which Plaintiffs denied. Colquhoun also told them that "Jordi wanted to downsize." When they asked why Lopez had not been fired since he was also responsible for production, Colquhoun responded "Charlie didn't have anything to do with it. You need to go find a job with better pay and benefits." Plaintiffs contend that Colquhoun's statement about Lopez and "better pay and benefits" shows that Colquhoun was aware of Plaintiffs' complaints of discriminatory pay made to Posada.

Following Plaintiffs' terminations, Defendant assigned their duties to an African American female and a Hispanic female.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). An issue is "material" if it...